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Initial public offerings (IPOs), executive compensation, and employment agreements have 
drawn attention in business, academia as well as financial press. Yet, despite that the literature have 
focused on large established firms, the role of top managers remuneration packages and their 
contractual agreements on IPOs is scarce, providing thus considerable scope for further research. 
With these in mind, this thesis explores the effect on internal and external tournament incentives on 
short- and long-term IPO performance. In addition, it examines the impact of managerial time 
horizon on CEO outcomes and IPO performance.  
Firstly, I find that, while both compensation and internal pay gap exhibit lower IPO first-day 
returns, underpricing is on average higher when there are high levels of industry and local pay gap. 
The negative effect of total CEO remuneration on the value of underpricing is concentrated among 
firms with high managerial discretion, while that of internal pay gap is reinforced among 
institutions with high agency conflicts. Additionally, my findings suggest that a positive association 
between industry tournament incentives and IPO first-day returns is stronger in less competitive 
industries as well as among firms with specialist and overconfident CEOs. In contrast, the positive 
impact of tournament incentives on underpricing is less pronounced in competitive Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSA) and in firms with new CEOs.  
Second, I document that IPO firms with generously compensated CEOs and large pay 
disparities in the boardroom have lower failure rates and longer survival time in the periods 
following the offering. The relationship between CEO pay and IPO survival is strengthened among 
firms with lower agency conflicts, while the link between pay gap and IPO survival is pronounced 
when CEO succession planning is more important. Both measures of managerial pay are associated 
with lower information asymmetry, better valuation, and superior operating performance in the 
post-IPO market. The results are robust to alternative interpretations and additional tests. 
Finally, I find that fixed-term contracts have higher probability of turnover, while at-will 
agreements are less sensitive to CEO turnover. Firms with no employment agreements are 
positively associated with underpricing. I also document that firms run by fixed-term CEOs exhibit 
lower R&D and firm performance. On the other hand, firms led by CEOs with at-will agreements 
tend to increase investment through R&D and capital expenditures, and are associated with lower 
volatility. My results indicate that fixed-term contracts have lower survival rates, while at-will 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) are private firms that are going public and affected by 
uncertainty shocks, since they do not have established track records. However, IPO market is vital 
for the development of individual firms because their success largely determines the amount of cash 
raised, and consequently the ability of a firm with limited resources to propel its growth and 
solidify its competitive advantage. Furthermore, IPOs are crucial for the aggregate economy 
because a vibrant market for Initial Public Offerings is an important asset for the economy given its 
role in facilitating entrepreneurship, job creation, and economic growth. Finally, it is noticeable that 
IPO firms essentially undergo a transitional phase in their life cycle, as they do not only experience 
a dramatic visibility shock, but they are also required for the first time to publicly disclose sensitive 
information, such as the level and structure of the board compensation as well as information on top 
executives employment agreements.  
The role of top executive compensation and employment agreements are very controversial 
subjects. They have attracted the attention of the media, practitioners and academia. In response to 
the public outcry for the unjustified levels of executive compensation, academic research has 
extensively examined the sources and implication of excess pay in terms of both levels and 
disparities (e.g., Core and Guay, 2002; Aggarwal and Samwick, 2006; Coles et al., 2006; Ozkan, 
2011; Jenter and Kanaan, 2015; Burns et al., 2017). While the bulk of the studies have focused on 
large established firms, the role of compensation on young firms such as those conducting initial 
public offerings (IPOs) is not well understood. Motivated by the limited knowledge on the subject, I 
endeavor to inform the debate about the role of executive compensation and tournament incentives 
around IPOs. Towards this end, I initially study the implications of internal and external tournament 
incentives on the roadshow. 
However, another important phenomenon witnessed in the IPO market that has not been 
widely examined in the IPO literature is the long-term IPO survivability. The IPO includes 
substantial organisational changes that may influence the company (Jain and Kini, 2008). 
Furthemore, newly-listed firms are exposed to more strict controls from government, investors, 
regulators and capital market participants. Prior studies indicate that newly-public firms show 
substantial underpricing which is followed by low levels of long-run performance. In particular, 
around one third of the firms either failing or being acquired witing fiver years after their IPO 
(Ritter and Welch, 2002; Gounopoulos and Pham, 2018). Being inspired by the impact of CEOs’ 
14 
 
and the pay gap between the CEO and the other senior members, I examined whether the 
implications of internal tournament incentives contribute to the firm survival. 
With respect to the top executives’ employment agreements, there are mainly two types of 
contractual agreements between managers and IPO firms. Managers who may not want to make 
risky investments, and managers who may prefer to be risk-seeking. Prior literature provides 
evidence that employment agreements can protect managers from a dismissal, help to mitigate 
managerial risk aversion, and motivate them to make risky value-enhancing investments with the 
ultimate goal of increasing the firm value (Almazan and Suarez, 2003; Gillan et al., 2009; Song and 
Wan, 2017). Another strand of literature suggests that employment agreements reflect CEO power 
and weak governance which may lead to agency problems (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Kuhnen 
and Zwiebel, 2009). Being intrigued by the impact of CEOs’ employment agreement on firms’ 
outcomes, I question whether the CEOs contractual agreements are related to their outcomes as well 
as to the firms’ financing and investing decisions and operating performance.  
The next three sections of this chapter provide a brief summary of motivations, findings, and 
contributions of the three previously discussed topics of this thesis. 
 
1.2 Executive Compensation, Tournament Incentives, and IPO Underpricing 
Besides the insufficient association between remuneration and value creation, there is a 
widely held perception that CEO pay is excessive, in the sense that it is either much higher than that 
required to retain talent and motivate individual top managers or an outcome of large pay disparities 
between the CEO and other senior executives. In response to the public outcry for the unjustified 
levels of executive compensation, prior literature has extensively examined the sources and 
implication of CEO pay and CEO pay gap. However, none of these studies have examined tthe 
implications of executive compensation and particularly how the market perceives the role of 
compensation in IPO setting.  
 In order to investigate the impact of executive compensation and tournament incentives 
around IPOs, I aim to address the following two research questions: (1) Should the level of CEO 
compensation be viewed as an indicator of human capital or the result of inefficient contracts? (2) 
Should the differential pay between the CEO and other executives be regarded as a reflection of 
incremental abilities and effort or as the outcome of managerial power? To answer these questions, 
I examine the influence of compensation on initial return to investors using four alternative pay 
measures, namely, the CEO compensation, the firm or internal pay gap, the industry pay gap and 
the local pay gap.  
15 
 
Using a large sample of US IPO firms from 2000 to 2016, I initially find that the total CEO 
pay and firm pay gap are significantly and negatively related to underpricing. As for the external 
tournament incentives, I document that industry and local pay gap contribute to higher IPO first-day 
returns. I address any sample selection and endogeneity concerns by performing the Two Stage 
Least Squares Method (TSLS) using various variables as instruments. To further address the 
endogeneity issue, I also apply a Heckman (1979) two-step model as well as a matched sample 
analysis and find that my results are not driven by omitted variables related to nonlinear forms of 
our control variables.  
Finally, I document that the compensation effect is stronger when the firm is in high 
industry concentration and has high performance as well as when the CEO is founder or graduated 
from an Ivy League institution. My findings also suggest that the negative relation between firm 
pay gap and underpricing is more pronounced in firms with more severe agency problems of free 
cash flow. In addition, my analysis indicates that the association between industry, local incentives 
and initial aftermarket returns is conditional on several factors, such as the optimism of the CEO 
and her general abilities as well as the competition level in the industry and metropolitan statistical 
area.  
This chapter contributes to the existing literature on executive compensation on various 
ways. First, this research adds to the broad literature on the effect of CEO incentives and 
contributes specifically to the literature that examines the effect of CEO incentives on IPO first-day 
returns. To my knowledge, it is the first study that establishes a link between total compensation, 
internal-external pay gap and their effect on IPO first-day returns. In addition, this chapter advances 
research on compensation, tournament incentives and underpricing by identifying conditions under 
which the relation between remuneration, tournament incentives and IPO performance weakens or 
strengthens. Furthermore, my study brings a new dimension to the emerging literature on 
geography and initial returns to investors. Overall, my results have important implications on 
corporate decision-making by providing evidence of the impact of executive teams’ incentives for 
prospective issuers as well as equity compensation for individual executives.  
 
1.3 Managerial Incentives and Firm Survival 
Executive compensation is a subject that elicits strong emotions among shareholders, 
practitioners, and the public. Ideally, compensation packages should be designed to attract, retain, 
and motivate executives to perform in accordance with the objectives of the shareholders. This idea 
is consistent with the optimal contractive view of pay that high remuneration reflects compensation 
of effort, risk, or returns to ability (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004). However, critics of executive 
16 
 
compensation often claim that corporate pay packages have grown increasingly complex over time 
and are not sufficiently tied to long-term performance. According to this view, the level and 
complexity in the structure of CEO pay is primarily explained by the greater rent extraction of 
powerful CEOs (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Despite the vast empirical evidence on this subject, 
whether high pay packages are deserved remains a controversial subject.   
In this chapter, I attempt to enrich this debate by studying the implications of top managers’ 
compensation on firm longevity. Accordingly, I use a large sample of US IPOs by constructing a 
unique hand-collected data-set that includes the compensation distribution of the top management 
team prior to the offering. This allows me, to investigate not only the CEO pay implications, but 
also to examine the criticism about the increasing pay disparity between the CEO and the other 
senior members. I initially explore how my managerial pay measures affect the probability of 
delisting over time. My findings suggest that, newly-listed firms with either highly compensated 
CEOs or large pay gaps have a lower probability of failure. Subsequent tests in a multivariate 
setting corroborate this finding, as they indicate that firms with CEO pay in the 75
th
 percentile have 
a failure risk that is, on average, 11.56% lower than the failure risk of firms with CEO pay in the 
25
th
 percentile.  
In an attempt to deal with time-invariant omitted firm and CEO characteristics, I include a 
plethora of additional variables that can be viewed as reasonably stable around the IPO process. To 
address the any spurious correlation between managerial pay and other unobservable factors that 
affect the nature of the pay-setting process, I perform an instrumental variable (IV) approach that 
exploits the fact that firms set compensation policies based on practices of industry peer groups. 
Lastly, I attempt to deal with endogenous firm-CEO matching due to observable characteristic by 
using a matching estimation analysis that minimizes the distributional CEO and firm differences 
between firms with high versus low managerial incentives.  
I also find that the effectiveness of CEO remuneration packages is pronounced in samples of 
firms with low agency conflicts (i.e., with founder, specialists or relatively young CEOs, and strong 
governance mechanisms), whereas the influence of CEO pay gap is strengthened among firms with 
higher likelihood of promotion (i.e., when the CEO is an outsider, generalist, and close to 
retirement). My results also show that, while firms helmed by managers experience lower volatility 
in the IPO aftermarket, they manage to exhibit higher risk-adjusted stock returns and better 
operating performance. I also provide some evidence that these firms devote more resources to 
investment activities compared to the pre-IPO year. Overall, this suggests that, in my sample, high-
powered incentives enable IPO issuers to obtain funds from the capital markets for longer periods 
without compromising their value generating capacity. 
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My research makes contributions to both the literature and current policy debate on the 
efficacy of executive pay schemes. First, my findings speak to the debate over the effectiveness of 
internal incentive structures. Second, to the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to establish 
a link between executive pay incentives (i.e., CEO compensation and CEO pay gap) and the long-
term prospects of newly-public firms. In this regard, it adds a new dimension to the nascent 
literature concerned with the influence of governance factors on the decisions of IPO issuers to 
delist. Third, I provide a more complete picture of how the internal incentive structures of young 
ventures and entrepreneurial firms can serve as an effective governance tool. 
 
1.4 CEO Employment Agreements 
Top executives’ employment agreements have attracted the attention of the media and 
academia (e.g., Gillan et al., 2009; Zhao, 2013; Cadman and Sunder, 2014; Gillan and Nguyen, 
2016; Gonzalez-Uribe and Groen-Xu, 2017; Cziraki and Groen-Xu, 2019). Previous research shows 
that CEOs with short-term contracts are more risk averse, while those with long-term contracts are 
more risk-lovers. The research on CEO employment agreements has primarily focused on large, 
established firms (Gillan and Nguyen, 2016; Gonzalez-Uribe and Groen-Xu, 2017), giving far less 
attention to small, young, fast growing firms such as those conducting an Initial Public Offering 
(IPO). In this chapter, I endeavor to contribute to this literature by exploring the effect of EAs not 
only on firms’ financing and investing decisions but also on CEOs’ outcomes. 
To do so, I use a unique hand collected dataset of US IPO firms from 2000 to 2014 and find 
that CEOs with fixed-term contracts have lower retention rates, while CEOs with at-will contracts 
have lower probability of turnover. Furthermore, my findings show that both types of contracts are 
negatively associated with underpricing but not significantly. My results suggest also that firms 
without employment agreements are associated with higher IPO underpricing. Further, I find a 
strong and positive association between fixed-term CEOs and returns volatility, which is line with 
the idea that newly listed firms prefer to hire CEOs only to complete their issue. Moreover, I 
document a negative association between fixed-term contracts and risky investments. 
In my last set of exploratory tests, I examine the impact that employment agreements might 
play in the aftermarket. Consistent with the notion that at-will CEOs adopt risky investments, I also 
find that this type of agreements is positively related to post-IPO operating performance. I also 
uncover a number of interesting cross-sectional variations in the effects of contractual agreements 
on future firm performance. My findings suggest that, the positive at-will EAs- firm performance 
link is more pronounced in firms with high governance quality and of those with overconfident 
CEOs and more career concerns.  
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 My research contributes to the literature in several ways. This is the first study to examine 
the impact of employment agreements on IPOs firm investment decisions as well as on short- and 
long-term performance. Second, my work adds to the literature on CEO turnover by introducing a 
measure of CEO change that improves the precision of turnover models. I also contribute to the 
broad literature on the effect of CEO incentives, which, so far, has primarily focused on 
compensation incentives, pay disparity, and delta and vega. 
I further contribute to the IPO literature by demonstrating how employment agreements can 
provide incentives to the top managers and by indicating the long-run effects of each contract. 
Finally, my study enriches the empirical literature on CEO employment agreements by showing 
that CEO career concerns and corporate governance quality can strengthen the impact of at-will 
agreements on firm performance. My results are relevant to founders’ and top executives, because it 
indicates that, the effectiveness of employment contracts do not only affect firms’ risk policies but 
should also affect its future performance and longevity. 
The rest of my thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2, 3, and 4 present my studies on the 
previously discussed research topics in the format of three studies. Specifically, Chapter 2 examines 
the impact of executive compensation and tournament incentives on IPO underpricing. Chapter 3 
investigates the effect of managerial incentives on firm survival. Chapter 4 examines the role and 
type of CEO employment agreements on firm and CEO outcomes. Finally, Chapter 5 provides 
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Chapter 2: Executive Compensation, Tournament 
Incentives, and IPO Underpricing 
1. Introduction 
The role of executive compensation is a very controversial subject. It has attracted the 
attention of legislators, the media, practitioners and academia (e.g., Murphy, 1999; Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2003; Focke et al., 2017). More often than not, many observers contend that top-level 
executive compensation is not sufficiently linked to long-term performance. Besides the insufficient 
link between compensation and value creation, there is a widely held perception that Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) compensation is excessive, in the sense that it is either much higher than 
that required to retain talent and motivate individual top managers or an outcome of large pay gaps 
between the CEO and other senior executives. 
In response to the public outcry for the unjustified levels of executive compensation, 
academic research has extensively studied the sources and implication of excess compensation in 
(e.g., Core and Guay, 2002; Aggarwal and Samwick, 2006; Coles et al., 2006; Ozkan, 2011; Jenter 
and Kanaan, 2015; Burns et al., 2017). While the bulk of the studies have focused on large 
established firms, the role of compensation on young firms such as those conducting initial public 
offerings (IPOs) is not well understood. IPO firms essentially undergo a transitional phase in their 
life cycle, as they do not only experience a dramatic visibility shock, but they are also required for 
the first time to publicly disclose sensitive information, such as the level and structure of the top 
executives compensation (Larcker and Tayan, 2018). Top executives in IPO firms typically hold 
large ownership compared to executives in publicly traded companies and this makes the traditional 
incentive instrument less relevant (Certo et al., 2003). In addition, IPOs are young firms with 
limited resources, unsophisticated and underdeveloped governance structures compared to mature 
firms, and as a result, they are less capable to hire and retain talented managers, (Filatotchev and 
Allcock, 2013; Chahine and Goergen, 2014; Larcker and Tayan, 2018).  
This elevates the importance of compensation contracts in IPOs. Besides, these 
compensation contracts in IPOs may play an especially important symbolic role as it may affect the 
investor perceptions about firm quality. Research dating back to Leland and Pyle (1977) predicts 
that CEO compensation conveys a positive signal of potential investors. This is evident by 
anecdotal evidence suggesting that IPO firms may use the compensation not only to reduce the 
usual agency conflicts but also to communicate with interested parties outside the firm about the 
quality of the firm’s human capital. For example, the CEO of Facebook (in 2012) and Snap (in 
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2017) were among the highest paid in the high-tech industry.
1
 On the other hand, other question 
about the signalling role of the compensation in the IPO context given that, for instance Mark 
Zukerberg reduces his cash compensation to $1 after the IPO. Furthermore, the symbolic and 
particularly the valuation role of compensation in IPOs have long been acknowledged in the 
academic literature.  
Considering the above, it becomes apparent that several questions remain unanswered. For 
example, should the level of CEO compensation be viewed as an indicator of human capital or the 
result of inefficient contracts? Should the differential pay between the CEO and other executives be 
regarded as a reflection of incremental abilities and effort or as the outcome of managerial power? 
Moreover, should the pay gap between the incumbent CEO and CEOs of other comparable firms be 
viewed as motivation factor or as failure to follow more successful firms?  
To answer these questions, I organize my discussion building on the dominant theories of 
executive compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Bebchuk and Fried, 2006; Frydman and Saks, 
2010). There are two models of executive pay. One argues that CEO pay is set by efficient contracts 
that are driven by economic or market-based mechanisms, such as the market for corporate talent or 
promotional incentives (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). I name this the efficient contracting perspective. 
An alternative perspective, which I name the managerial power perspective, views CEO pay as a 
reflection of rent-seeking behavior resulting from the relative higher bargaining power of the CEO 
over weak boards (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Thus, the efficient contracting perspective 
hypothesizes that CEOs with high levels of executive pay and pay disparity experience lower levels 
of underpricing. On the contrary, managerial power theory predicts that firms with high 
remunerated CEOs and large pay gaps experience higher underpricing. 
While these perspectives provide competing hypotheses for both total remuneration and 
tournament-based incentives, a common feature is that they are primarily concerned with the forces 
determined by the labor market within the firm. However, the literature from labor economics 
suggests a broader view, and specifically, the consideration of a functional labor market for 
executives that is external to the firm (Coles at al., 2017). Based on these facts, as in the firm 
tournaments, external tournament incentives can also motivate CEOs to exert greater effort in order 
to increase their chances of winning the industry or the local tournament. Therefore, external 
tournament incentives relate positively with underpricing. 
To investigate these hypotheses, I examine the influence of compensation on initial return to 
investors using four alternative pay measures, namely, the CEO compensation, the firm or internal 





pay gap, the industry pay gap and the local pay gap. To measure internal pay gap, I follow Kale et 
al. (2009) using the natural logarithm of the difference between the total CEO compensation and the 
median total compensation of other senior executives. To measure industry pay gap, I follow Coles 
et al. (2017) and consider the horizontal differences in CEO pay, that is, the natural logarithm of the 
difference between the total compensation paid to a CEO and the total compensation paid to the 
second-highest paid CEO in the same industry-size peer group. Lastly, to compute local pay gap, I 
follow the same process as in the industry gap but in this case I use Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(MSA) instead of industries. 
Using a large sample of US IPO firms from 2000 to 2016, I initially document that the total 
compensation and firm pay gap are significantly and negatively related to initial aftermarket 
returns, suggesting that higher total CEO compensation and large firm pay gaps result in lower 
underpricing. My results also suggest an economically meaningful effect of total CEO 
compensation on underpricing, as a one-standard deviation increase in the total compensation is 
associated with a 2.99% lower IPO first-day returns. Interestingly, this negative relation is driven 
by the short-term component of total compensation rather than the long-term element of pay. As for 
the pay disparity measures, I document that industry and local pay gap contribute to higher IPO 
first-day returns and are meaningful in terms of statistical and economic significance. In particular, 
a one-standard deviation increase in the industry pay gap is associated with a 3.89% higher 
underpricing. 
These results are robust once I use different matching methods, including industry and year 
fixed effects (Eriksson et al., 2006; Liu and Ritter, 2011). I also document the robustness of my 
findings with the use of alternative key measures of compensation and tournament measures. Apart 
from the use of alternative model specifications, I attempt to alleviate any concerns of simultaneity 
and omitted variables, by performing the Two Stage Least Squares Method (TSLS) using various 
variables as instruments. To further address the endogeneity problem, I also apply a Heckman 
(1979) two-step model as well as a matched sample analysis and find that my results are not driven 
by omitted variables related to nonlinear forms of mt control variables. Taken together, my 
estimation results from TSLS, Heckman and propensity score matching (PSM) continue to hold and 
suggest a positive (negative) and significant effect of external (internal) tournament incentives on 
underpricing.  
I also uncover a number of interesting cross-sectional variations in the effects of 
compensation and tournament incentives on initial aftermarket returns. I investigate whether the 
effect of compensation incentives should vary with the managerial discretion. Using various proxies 
for the managerial discretion, I document that the incentive effect is indeed stronger when the firm 
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is in high industry concentration and has high performance as well as when the CEO is founder or 
graduated from an Ivy League institution. I next examine to what extent the negative association 
between internal tournament incentives and IPO first-day returns is due to an agency problem (i.e., 
the monitoring hypothesis) or whether should vary with the probability of winning. Firstly, I find 
supportive evidence for the monitoring hypothesis. Particularly, I suggest that the negative relation 
between firm pay gap and underpricing is more pronounced in firms with more severe agency 
problems of free cash flow. 
I also find that this negative association is weaker when the CEO is old and founder as for 
both cases there are numerous reasons that the promotion incentives are less for the other members 
of the top management team. Lastly, my analysis indicates that the association between industry, 
local incentives and initial aftermarket returns is conditional on several factors, such as the 
optimism of the CEO and her general abilities as well as the competition level in the industry and 
metropolitan statistical area. Specifically, industry tournament incentives are strongly and positively 
associated with IPO first-day returns in firms with overconfident, old and specialist CEOs. I further 
suggest that the positive relationship between local pay gap and initial returns to investors is weaker 
for firms with new CEOs and firms which operate in high competitive environments. 
This study contributes to the existing literature on executive compensation on various ways. 
First, this paper adds to the broad literature on the effect of CEO incentives and contributes 
specifically to the literature that examines the effect of CEO incentives on IPO first-day returns. To 
my knowledge it is the first study that establishes a link between total compensation, internal-
external pay gap and their effect on IPO first-day returns. Prior literature has mostly focused on the 
role of compensation-related incentives (Certo et al., 2003; Lowry and Murphy, 2007; Chahine and 
Goergen, 2011), corporate governance (John et al., 2008), internal tournament incentives (Kale et 
al., 2009; Kini and Williams, 2012), external industry and local tournament incentives (Kubick and 
Lockhart, 2016; Coles et al., 2017; Yin, 2017). However, these studies have focused only on large, 
established firms, leaving thus the area of IPOs unexplored.  
A notable exception is the work of Lowry and Murphy (2007). These authors hypothesize 
but fail to support with empirical evidence that IPO options relate significantly with underpricing. 
However, Chahine and Goergen (2011) demonstrate that this relation may hold under the presence 
of venture capitalists (VCs), whereas Certo et al. (2003) show that IPO options increase IPO 
valuation. In contrast to prior research, I consider all components of compensation, and importantly, 
the pay distribution among top executives in the same firm, CEOs in the same industry or CEOs in 
the same metropolitan. By doing so, I provide a broader view of the influence of compensation on 
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IPOs that captures also the impact of non-equity compensation incentives and allows me to 
incorporate the effect of the labor market that is external to the firm.  
In addition to the primary contribution, my study advances research on compensation, 
tournament incentives and underpricing by identifying conditions under which the relation between 
remuneration, tournament incentives and IPO performance weakens or strengthens. Furthermore, 
my paper brings a new dimension to the emerging literature on geography and initial returns to 
investors. Bouwman (2013) finds that CEO pay is strongly correlated with that of geographically 
close CEOs. Yin (2017) documents that local incentives are positively associated with firm risk. 
This study adds to this literature by documenting that tournament competition among local CEOs 
shape the trend of underpricing. Overall, my findings have important implications on corporate 
decision-making by providing evidence of the impact of executive teams’ incentives for prospective 
issuers as well as equity compensation for individual executives.  
My study is most closely related to the work of Lowry and Murphy (2007), Kale et al., 
(2009), Chahine and Goergen (2011), Kini and Williams, (2012), Chen et al., (2013), Kubick and 
Lockhart, (2016), Coles et al. (2017) and Yin (2017). Lowry and Murphy (2007) and Chahine and 
Goergen (2011) examine the relation between compensation and initial returns using IPO option 
grants of all executives as compensation incentive measure. I update their work by using a 
comprehensive sample of IPO companies, as well as by considering all the components of the CEO 
remuneration, and show that the associated relationships are driven mainly from the cash 
compensation. Kale et al., (2009) and Coles et al., (2017) examine the associations between firm 
pay gap, industry pay gap and firm performance. I complement and extend their work by 
conducting various tests using these variables in IPO firms. I also examine and offer new evidence 
on the determinants of tournament incentives. Finally, my study expands and complements the 
work of Yin (2017) and Bouwman (2013) by examining the local tournament incentives on newly 
listed firms. 
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and discusses 
the hypothesis development. Section 3 gives an overview of the sample selection procedure and the 
methodology. Section 4 reports the descriptive statistics as well as the empirical findings of the 
impact of compensation and tournament incentives on underpricing. Section 5 and 6 provide details 
on the battery of the tests conducted to check the robustness of the results. Finally, section 7 






2. Background and Hypothesis Development 
A considerable amount of research has been devoted in explaining the design of executive 
compensation contracts (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Bebchuk and Fried, 2006; Frydman and Saks, 
2010; Murphy, 2012). There are two dominant models of executive pay. One asserts that CEO pay 
is set by efficient contracts that are driven by economic or market-based mechanisms, such as the 
market for corporate talent or promotional incentives (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). I label this the 
efficient contracting perspective. An alternative perspective, which I call the managerial power 
perspective, views CEO pay as a reflection of rent-seeking behavior resulting from the relative 
higher bargaining power of the CEO over weak boards (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2006).  
While these perspectives provide competing hypotheses for both total pay and tournament 
incentives (pay disparity), a common feature is that they are primarily concerned with the forces 
determined by the labor market within the firm. However, the literature from labor economics 
suggests a broader view, and specifically, the consideration of a functional labor market for 
executives that is external to the firm (Coles at al., 2017). Based on these facts, I organize my 
discussion about the implication of CEO compensation on IPO underpricing based on the 
distinction of internal and external labor markets. 
 
2.1 Internal Labor Market Hypotheses 
The efficient contracting hypothesis suggests that CEO compensation is awarded through an 
efficient process, driven by competitive market forces. In this setting, the observed level and 
composition of compensation reflects a competitive equilibrium in the market for managerial talent, 
and incentive structures that motivate managers to optimize firm value (Chen et al., 2013). To better 
understand the implications of this theory, consider first, the absolute form of CEO compensation, 
that is, the total compensation without reference to the other executives. If boards set compensation 
through an arms-length negotiation in the best interest of shareholders, a natural conclusion that 
follows is that the level of compensation reflects the accumulated experience, the quality of human 
capital, as well as the total effort of the executive.  
Consistent with this view, Gabaix and Landier (2008) use an equilibrium model and show 
that changes in absolute CEO pay are almost entirely explained by changes in company size. They 
interpret this evidence as a reflection of an ability matching-mechanism which directs the best 
CEOs to the largest organization, as this maximizes their impact and economic efficiency. In a 
similar spirit, Kaplan and Rauh (2009) examine compensation trends among CEO executives and 
other highly paid individuals such as athletes, celebrities, lawyers and professionals from the 
financial industry. They find that growth in CEO is consistent with growth in those pay groups. As 
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a consequence, they argue that CEO pay is driven by market forces, as it accords with theories of 
skill-biased technological change, superstar, greater scale, and their interaction.  
Nonetheless, an effective compensation design process should also consider the relative 
CEO compensation, that is, the pay differential between the CEO and other members of the top 
management team. As Baker et al., (1988) point out, since the CEO is at the top of the corporate 
hierarchy, her incentives are mainly based on firm output or performance, such as stock options and 
bonus plans (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Guay, 1999; Murphy, 1999). A senior executive, on the other 
hand, faces another type of incentive, commonly referred to as promotion based incentives (Kale et 
al., 2009; Kini and Williams, 2012). In a typical rank-order tournament, the best relative performer 
is likely to be promoted to the next level of the corporate ladder, which carries with it higher pay, 
perks and prestige (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Kale et al., 2009). In this case, the size of the pay 
disparity between the CEO and other top board members is of crucial importance, as it reflects the 
prize of winning the tournament for the CEO position.  
Lazear and Rosen (1981) illustrate that a large pay gap between the CEO and senior 
executives represents a huge extra reward for those competing for the CEO position. Therefore, 
firms can encourage senior executives to stay in the firm and exert greater effort from their senior 
executives by increasing the size of the tournament prize. Greater effort increases their chances of 
promotion (winning the tournament) as well as the firm’s output. In line with this proposition, Kale 
et al., (2009) provide evidence suggesting that tournament incentives, as measured by the pay 
differential between the CEO and senior executives, contribute to higher firm performance.  
As opposed to the efficient contracting hypothesis, the managerial power hypothesis 
predicts that CEO compensation and pay disparity are contributing factors to agency problems 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Under this view, an excessive absolute or relative CEO compensation is 
a product from the entrenchment of the incumbent CEO and a weak board. As Core et al. (1999) 
argue, powerful CEOs can exert greater influence vis-à-vis their board, and extract greater rents, 
thereby creating a large gap between their pay and that of other board members. Accordingly, large 
pay inequalities promote greater risk-taking by senior executives in order to increase the likelihood 
of being promoted (Kini and Williams, 2012; Haß et al., 2015). 
 
2.1.1 IPO Underpricing and Compensation 
Notwithstanding the debate on the sources and implications of (excess) CEO pay is still 
ongoing and intense; the evidence on the relation between the compensation outcomes and IPOs is 
scant. A notable exception is the study of Lowry and Murphy (2007). These authors build on 
agency theory arguments and hypothesize that IPO stock options provide compensation incentives 
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to CEOs, which in turn increases IPO underpricing. However, they fail to provide supporting 
evidence. More recently, Chahine and Goergen (2011) re-examine the role of IPO stock options on 
underpricing and reveal a position association; yet, this relationship is significant only under the 
influence of power CEO and the presence of VCs. As a consequence, existing evidence on the 
impact of CEO compensation on IPO underpricing is not only limited but also inconclusive. 
Surprisingly, the above studies consider only the impact of stock options on underpricing, 
neglecting thus, the role of other compensation elements, the overall compensation, and 
importantly, the pay differential between the CEO and other senior executives. 
IPOs are an interesting framework for investigating the role of CEO pay, since before the 
listing the issuing firm is generally little known among investors. On the contrary, in the process of 
going public those firms experience a dramatic visibility shock, and the degree to which this occurs 
is greatly determined by the underlying characteristics of the IPO firm. As Certo (2003) notes, IPO 
firms suffer from the so-called “liability of market newness”, as information asymmetries emerge 
between insiders such as managers and outsiders. To mitigate this uncertainty, IPO firms have 
strong incentives to use signals in order reduce the opportunity cost of equity and thereby mitigate 
underpricing (Spence, 1973; Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Rock, 1986).  
In this context, the role of CEO pay is elevated as it may be as an important signal to 
investors about the IPO firm’s potential value.
2 Therefore, to the extent that CEO pay – either 
absolute or relative – is a reflection of optimal contracts, I anticipate that higher CEO pay or pay 
disparity to be negatively associated with underpricing. On the other hand, if the size of CEO 
compensation and pay disparity is insufficiently linked to performance due to the exercise of the 
bargaining strength of the CEOs over their boards, I expect that CEO pay results in higher 
underpricing. The previous discussions lead to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Under the efficient contracting hypothesis (managerial power hypothesis), the level 
of executive pay and pay disparity is negatively (positively) associated with the IPO underpricing. 
 
2.2 External Labor Markets 
The discussion thus far, implicitly assumes that tournament incentives appear only inside to 
the firm. However, another strand of the literature contends that tournament incentives for CEOs 
                                                          
2
 E.g., underwriter quality (Beatty and Ritter, 1986); auditors (Beatty, 1989); venture capitalists (Megginson and Weiss, 
1991);  investment bankers (Carter et al., 1998); founder influence (Nelson, 2003); information asymmetry (Cohen and 
Dean, 2005); top management prestige (Lester et al., 2006). 
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may also arise external to the firm.
3
 Building on Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Coles et al. (2017), I 
argue that there is a functioning external labor market for executives. This can be seen in formal 
mechanisms, such as the formation of peer groups based for benchmarking executive pay, that 
provide pay information for other executives in the same industry (e.g., Bizjak et al. 2011). It can be 
also argued, though, that external to the firm tournament incentives affect the compensation design 
process, as the incumbent CEOs can benefit even without leaving their current position, because 
their firms may counter an actual or anticipated external offer.  
Based on the above arguments, Coles et al. (2017) focus on the product capital markets and 
argue that industry tournament incentives reflect the potential for raising further up in the industry 
hierarchy, i.e., a CEO position in a firm larger in size and with more prestige. Hence, like in the 
firm tournaments, industry or local tournament incentives motivate CEOs to exert greater effort in 
order to increase their chances of winning the industry and/or local tournament.  Existing empirical 
evidence support the notion of an active labor market. For instance, Graham et al. (2005) examine 
401 CEOs and find that labor market incentives are more important than compensation incentives in 
influencing CEO decisions. 
Coles et al., (2017) show that industry tournament incentives, as measured by the pay gap 
between the incumbent CEO in the firm and the second highest paid CEO in the industry, are 
positively related to both firm performance and risk. Kubick and Lockhart (2016), demonstrate that 
industry tournament incentives encourage a more aggressive behavior by showing a positive 
relation between industry tournament incentives and tax aggressiveness. In a similar vein, Kubick et 
al. (2018) find that industry tournament incentives decrease credit ratings and increase loan spreads. 
Huang et al. (2019) suggest that industry incentives contribute to a lower financial reporting quality, 
while Huang et al. (2019) document that industry tournament incentives increase cash holdings and 
motivate CEOs to use them strategically to capture their product-market benefits. Lonate et al. 
(2019) develop a text-based measure for product innovation and find that is positively related to 
industry pay disparities. 
Lastly, Yin (2017) finds that local tournament incentives, as measured by the pay gap 
between the CEO in the firm and the second highest paid CEO in the same MSA, are positively 
related to stock return volatility and idiosyncratic volatility. The above evidence suggests that both 
industry and local tournament incentives can change lower paid CEOs’ preference. Since, existing 
                                                          
3
 The existence of an external labor market for managerial incentives is particularly important for two reasons. First, 
because it is less likely to be affected by individual firms or managers; it is less affected by managerial power, 
providing thus, a cleaner experiment for testing the influence of tournament incentives on the firm. Secondly, it is 
related to the public controversy over CEO pay, as it serves as an explanation for the upward pressure on CEO pay 
(Jensen et al., 2004; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). 
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evidence suggests a positive relationship between industry tournament incentives, performance and 
risk, the net effect is not clear. Thus, I formulate my last hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2. Under the external tournament hypothesis, the external pay gap is positively 
associated with the IPO underpricing. 
 
3. Sample Selection and Methodology 
My sample selection starts with retrieving all the IPOs between 2000 and 2016 from the 
Thomson ONE Banker database. Following prior literature, I eliminate financial institutions, 
American Depository Receipts (ADRs), closed-end funds, unit offers, and any other non-common 
stock type of shares. In addition, I eliminate any IPOs with offer price below $5.00. Finally, an IPO 
with no CEO or co-CEOs is also eliminated from the sample.  
I obtain IPO background and issuance information from the Thomson One Banker, 
including the issue data, offer price, total proceeds raised, whether the firm is backed by venture 
capital and the prestige of underwriters. For underwriter prestige ranking, the study employs 
Loughran and Ritter’s (2004) updated measures of Carter and Manaster’s (1990) underwriter 
quality (ranking). Accounting data are retrieved from the Compustat database, and public trading 
prices are from the Center for Research and Security Prices (CRSP). 
Data regarding the executive compensation (e.g. salary, bonus, restricted stock, options, 
non-equity incentive plans, and total compensation) of the named executive officers (NEOs) of 
IPOs are carefully hand collected from firm prospectuses (S-1) on the EDGAR database of the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Also, I use the IPO prospectuses to construct the 
biographical profiles of CEOs (e.g., CEO duality, CEO tenure) and for information about their work 
experience I use the BoardEx database. In addition, I utilize the Execucomp database to retrieve 
data on executive compensation from the S&P 1500 universe in order to calculate the industry-
based tournament measures. Finally, I match each headquarter ZIP code to a Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA) using the crosswalk provided by the United States Department of Labor. 
After merging the data from the above databases and eliminating observation with missing values, 
my final sample consists of 1,658 IPO firms.  
 
3.1 Measurement of Compensation, Firm, Industry and Local Incentives 
In order to capture the incentive effects of compensation of the CEO I use total 
compensation. An executive’s total compensation is the sum of short-term and long-term 
compensation. The former is defined as the sum of salary and bonus, whereas the latter is expressed 
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in the form of stock and option awards, non-equity incentives and other long-term incentive 
payouts. To correct for skewness effects, I measure both the short- and long-term elements of 
compensation and the total compensation using natural logarithmic transformations.  
To capture vertical differences in compensation, I follow prior research and compute the 
firm pay gap between the CEO and other named executives (e.g., Kale et al., 2009; Kini and 
Williams, 2012; Haß et al., 2015; Park, 2017). Firm pay gap is calculated as the natural logarithm of 
the difference between the total compensation of the CEO and the median total compensation of top 
three non-CEO named executives. This difference reflects the “size of the prize” if the CEO wins 
the firm tournament and can be further distinguished in short-term firm pay gap, which is based on 
short-term compensation, and long-term firm pay gap, which is based on long-term compensation.
4
 
In addition, I follow Coles et al., (2017) and calculate horizontal differences in CEO 
compensation as the natural logarithm of the difference between the total compensation paid to the 
second-highest paid CEO and the total compensation paid to a CEO of that particular industry-size 
peer group (using Execucomp data item TDC1).
5
 I label this difference as the industry pay gap 
because it reflects the “size of the prize” if the CEO wins the industry tournament. In the same 
spirit, I calculate local gap as the natural logarithm of the second highest paid CEO in the same 
MSA and the total compensation paid to a CEO of that particular MSA-size peer group. Higher 





3.2 Research Design 
The major focus of this paper is to estimate the relation between compensation based 
incentives and IPO underpricing. In accordance with my developed hypotheses, I test this 
relationship using the following multivariate model: 
 
                                                                           (1) 
 
                                                          
4
 I use the top three members of the management team including the CEO rather than the top four members that is 
common in the literature because the average number per year of non-CEO executives in my sample period is close to 
three. However, my findings are robust if I use the top four members of the management team for the median 
estimation whenever possible. 
5 The reason that I use the total compensation of the second highest paid CEO is to mitigate the potential impact of 
outliers. For example, there may be extreme compensation within an industry in a particular year may due to an 
unusual, transitory event (e.g., large stock grant), in which case maximal industry CEO compensation is not likely to 
approximate what the executive would receive if they “won” the tournament. 
6
 When either internal or external gap is negative, I monotonically transform all observations by adding a constant equal 
to the absolute value of the minimum gap. 
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My dependent variable, underpricing, is estimated as the percentage difference between the 
offer price and the closing price of the first trading day. In model 1, the main variable of interest is 
total CEO compensation. As mentioned before, the level of remuneration represents how the CEO 
is compensated for his effort, experience and talent. Therefore, investigating how it is associated 
with underpricing permits me to understand the way that the market perceives total compensation in 
the valuation of an IPO. However, in order to gain further insights regarding the underlying drivers 
of this relationship, I also consider the structure of CEO compensation by decomposing it into its 
short-term and long-term components. 
In the next models, I examine the impact of tournament incentives in order to assess how the 
market regards the influence CEO remuneration relative to other senior executives within the firm, 
other CEO within the same industry or other CEO within the same metropolitan. Thus, I replace the 
CEO total pay with the firm pay gap, industry pay gap, and local pay gap, respectively. As in the 
case of total compensation, firm pay gap is disaggregated into its corresponding short-term and 
long-term parts. According to the market-based (optimal contracting) view, the size of internal 
tournament prize reflects the motives of senior executive to expend a greater effort in the benefit of 
the firm. Therefore, it serves as a credible signal of interest alignment and reduces the uncertainty 
surrounding the IPO firm, thereby affecting negatively the immediate aftermarket returns. 
In addition, I control for offering and firm characteristics that are identified by prior 
literature as potential determinants of underpricing. I use total proceeds at the time of listing as a 
proxy of firm size. Conyon (2006) finds that firms with higher ΙPO proceeds exhibit less 
underpricing, consistent with the idea that large firms suffer less from information uncertainty 
problems than small firms. However, Leone et al. (2007) show that firms with higher IPO proceeds 
may be more underpriced. 
Lowry and Murphy (2007) suggest that the proportion of shares held by managers 
(overhang) as well as the market returns, influence IPO first-day returns via the investor demand 
channel. Specifically, the authors argue that overhang can be thought a scarcity measure, because 
the fewer shares offered to the public, the stronger should be investor demand for the asset. On the 
other hand, market returns reflect investor sentiment, which in turn shapes accordingly the trading 
behavior. Hence, I expect both of these variables to have a positive impact on initial returns to 
investors. 
Moreover, Chahine and Goergen (2011) argue that while financial intermediaries, such as 
underwriters and VCs play a certification role in the IPO process, they also have strong incentives 
to improve the initial aftermarket returns. To consider the role of these intermediaries, I control for 
the reputation of the underwriter and the presence of venture capitalists. In addition, Chahine and 
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Goergen (2011) suggest that financial leverage may play an important role, as it tends to limit 
opportunistic managerial action due to the imposed debt covenants. Consequently, I expect leverage 
to be negatively related to underpricing.  
Gounopoulos et al. (2017) find a positive association between IPO first-day returns and firm 
performance. I control for the influence of firm performance on underpricing by including earnings 
per share (loss). Also, prior studies show that IPO returns depend on the level and nature of 
riskiness of the firm’s operations (e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 2004). To this end, I include R&D 
intensity and consider which firms are in the Internet and Technology sector and whether they are 
incorporated in Nasdaq. 
Besides typical company characteristics, I also control for internal and external monitoring 
mechanisms that may affect the information asymmetry and hence underpricing. The board 
governance variable captures the overall internal board governance quality and strength, whereas 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) reflects the intensity of product competition within 
industries. I expect both indicators to be negatively associated with IPO first-day returns (Jain and 
Kini, 1999).  
Cao and Shi (2006) show that IPO underpricing is clustering in particular industries and that 
underpricing may be short-lived and sensitive to fluctuation to general economic activity. Thus, to 
control for these effects and also to mitigate for potential omitted variable problems, I include both 
time-fixed effect and industry-fixed effect dummy variables in all regressions. All inferences are 
based on ordinary least squares (OLS) models and standard errors clustered at the year and 
industry-level. 
 
4.  Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Table 1 presents the distributional statistics for the number of IPOs, the average level of 
underpricing, as well as the average value of the absolute and relative CEO compensation measures. 
Panel A of Table 1 focuses on the time-series dimension, while Panel B reports the cross-industry 
variability of these measures. All variables are defined in Appendix A. An inspection at Panel A 
illustrates that the number of IPOs and the level of underpricing tends to decline after stock market 
or economic crises, as indicated by the tot-com bubble and the credit crunch in 2000 and 2007, 
respectively. An explanation of this behavior lies in the sensitivity of the investor sentiment to 
economic shocks (Loughran and Ritter, 2004) and the so called “strategic waiting” (Colak and 
Gunay, 2011), both of which affect the timing of IPOs. By contrast, despite the substantial yearly 
fluctuations, total compensation and the pay disparity measures display an increasing trend, which 
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is in line with the well-documented phenomenon of “Lake Wobegon Effect” (Hayes and Schaefer, 
2009).  
Panel B of Table 1 classifies IPO firms in sectors and reveals a relatively high concentration 
of IPOs in the chemical products and the computer equipment and services sectors. The food 
products and entertainment services sectors have the lowest representation of IPO firms. Consistent 
with the IPO literature (e.g., Ritter and Welch, 2002), technology firms, such as those operating in 
the computer sector, are more risky, and as such, they experience more underpricing than firms 
operating in less opaque environments, such as utility firms. Regarding the compensation, it is 
interesting to mention that, the CEOs with the largest compensation, both in absolute and relative 
terms, can be found in transportation and public utility or wholesale and retail firms, whereas CEOs 
in the scientific instrument sector are less generously compensated. Thus, a natural conclusion is 
that industry forces and time influence both IPO first-day returns and compensation. As a 
consequence, it is essential to control for unobservable industry and time effects in my regressions. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the subsamples of low and high absolute and 
relative CEO compensation. Panel A of Table 2 reveals that, on average, the differences of all 
compensation components across the low and high groups are statistically significant. However, it 
is interesting to note that the firm pay gap produces larger economic differences across all 
compensation elements than the industry and local pay gap. Panel B of Table 2 describes the 
average CEO profile across all the low and high compensation sub-samples. In accordance with the 
compensation literature, CEOs in the high sub-samples tend to have more accumulated experience 
or knowledge than CEOs in the low regimes, as evidenced by their higher age. In addition, it seems 
that firms that are willing to provide generous compensation packages, prefer to hire generalists, as 
these CEOs may contribute to the firm not only by bringing a fresh view to the firm but also via 
their diversified portfolio of corporate experience. As being relatively new to the firm, better 
compensated CEOs are less likely to hold also a chair position (CEO duality) or to be the founder 
and to capture the board using their voting power (equity ownership). Collectively, Panel B 
suggests that CEOs in IPO firms are more likely to be compensated for experience, talent or effort 
rather than due to their managerial power (entrenchment).
7
  
Panel C of Table 2 demonstrates clearly that firms with better compensated CEOs tend to 
experience lower levels of underpricing, providing thus, preliminary support to the hypothesis that 
compensation may serve as a signal of credibility and desirable managerial attributes, rather than as 
a reflection of managerial power and agency conflicts. Additionally, my results suggest that firms 
                                                          
7
 The correlation between industry and local pay gap is 0.1323. 
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with an above-median industry and local gap have higher immediate aftermarket returns. Consistent 
with prior findings (e.g., Conyon, 2006; Gabaix et al. 2008), CEOs with more attractive 
remuneration packages are typically found in larger, older and more profitable firms.  
It is also worth mentioning, that these firms are able to attract more reputable top-tier 
investment banks (underwriters), but have less backing by venture capitalists, perhaps because they 
are in less need to do so. Furthermore, firms with high level of industry and local pay disparity are 
associated with riskier firms and have lower earnings. Finally, firms with external (HHI) 
monitoring mechanisms tend to provide larger compensation packages CEOs than firms with the 
opposite characteristics.  
 
4.2 Multivariate Regressions 
4.2.1 Determinants of Executive Compensation and Tournament Incentives 
In Table 3 I present the results of my analysis of the determinants of executive 
compensation and tournament Incentives. The dependent variables in these regressions are the total 
CEO compensation, firm pay gap, industry and local pay gap. CEOs with general managerial skills 
tend to earn more than those with special skills, while those who are founders have lower 
remuneration packages. In economic terms, founder-CEOs earn, on average, -16.47% lower (or 
$25,489) than non-founder CEOs. In addition CEO remuneration increases in firm size as well as 
with the presence of a top-tier underwriter. The quality of the compensation committee seems to 
play an important role on the pay distribution into the boardroom as it decreases the firm pay gap. 
Industry gap increases when the CEO is also the founder, but tend to decrease for large firms. 
Finally, local pay gap increases for venture-backed firms and for corporations which belong to the 
technology sector. 
 
4.2.2 OLS Regressions about Total Compensation and Pay Structure 
Table 4 presents the results of my OLS regression tests on the association between absolute 
CEO compensation and IPO underpricing. Column (1) displays the results for the total 
compensation, while Columns (2) and (3) consider the impact of the pay structure by examining the 
role short-term and long-term compensation. In Column (4) I include both short-term and long-term 
compensation as additional controls. To account for potential heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation within industries over time, t-statistics are calculated based on robust standard errors 




Column (1) documents a strong and significant negative relation between total 
compensation and underpricing. Also, the economic magnitude of this effect may be significant, a 
one standard deviation increase in total CEO compensation is associated with a 2.99% lower 
underpricing which is equivalent to a $3.3 million decrease in the money left on the table for the 
average firm in my sample. This result supports the “efficient contracting hypothesis” that the 
quality of the human is inherent in the size of CEO payment, which in turn is translated in lower 
initial returns. For instance, the total CEO remuneration of Ventrus Biosciences before going public 
was around 3 million and its IPO priced with initial returns of 1.61%. 
However, as mentioned before, there is no presumption that the components of CEO 
compensation should affect in the same way the investors’ perceptions about the underlying 
uncertainty of the IPO firm.  Consequently, I cannot rule out the possibility that the total 
compensation masks information embedded in the individual compensation components. To 
examine this possibility, I follow prior studies (e.g., Kale et al., 2009; Park, 2017; Yin, 2017) and 
investigate whether and to what extent the total compensation effect can be attributed to the short-
term or the long-term component. 
Columns (2) and (3) show that both components of total compensation are negatively 
related with underpricing. However, only the role of the short-term component appears to be more 
influential. Specifically, the economic and statistical significance of the short-term compensation 
exceeds that of the total compensation, while the coefficient of the long-term component does not 
vary significantly from zero. This result provides some ground for the conjecture that short-term 
compensation, that is, cash compensation, is more secure award and can be received in the 
immediate future, regardless of the company’s future performance. The results in Column (4) 
indicate that short-term compensation continues to load negative and significant at 1% level, 
suggesting that short-term remuneration (salary and bonus) has a negative effect on immediate 
aftermarket returns. 
As for the results for the remaining control variables, in all specifications their sign and 
significance is generally consistent with the existing literature. For instance, the positive coefficient 
estimates for overhang and market return are consistent with Lowry and Murphy (2007) and 
Chahine and Goergen (2011). In the same line with Gounopoulos et al. (2017) and Lowry and 
Murphy (2007), I find that Technology and Nasdaq firms tend to have higher initial returns. 
However, in contrast to the results of Carter and Manaster (1990), but similar to the findings of 
Chahine and Goergen (2011), Lowry and Murphy (2007), and Loughran and Ritter (2004) I find 
that the prestige of underwriter reputation and the backing of VCs contribute are positively related 
to underpricing.  
36 
 
Also, I report a positive coefficient for the size of proceeds, which is inconsistent with the 
idea that larger firms have lower information uncertainty, but in line with the prediction that larger 
firms attract higher investor demand (Leone et al., 2007). Finally, the coefficients for leverage, 
board governance and HHI are negative, supporting the view that the existence of mechanisms that 
impose management discipline reduce the need for underpricing. 
 
4.2.3 OLS Regressions about Firm, Industry and Local Pay Disparity 
Next, I continue my analysis by replacing the absolute CEO compensation with the relative 
CEO compensation measures, that is, the firm pay gap, industry and local pay gap. Column (1) of 
Table 5 demonstrates that, the coefficient for total firm pay gap is negative and significant at the 5% 
level. Economically, a one-standard deviation increase in the internal pay gap is associated with a 
4.54% lower underpricing. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 provide further insights by examining 
the impact of short- and long-term firm pay disparities on IPO first-day returns. The estimated 
coefficients for short and long-term pay gap are negative and significant only for the first case. 
Therefore, I conclude that, the directional relationship of firm pay gap with IPO first-day returns is 
consistent with that of the total compensation and the tournament hypothesis. 
In addition, Column (1) of Table 6 displays the results using the industry pay gap as the 
main explanatory variable of interest. Findings suggest that industry pay disparity contributes to 
higher IPO initial returns, as the estimated coefficient of industry pay gap is positive and significant 
at the 1% level. This estimate appears to be economically significant. For example, a one-standard 
deviation increase in the industry gap is associated with a 3.89% higher underpricing. This result 
confirms the “external tournament hypothesis” that firms led by CEOs who face greater industry 
tournament incentives exhibit higher immediate aftermarket returns.  
Moreover, the estimation results from Column (2) of Table 6 suggest a positive and 
significant relation between local gap and initial aftermarket returns. In terms of economic 
significance, the estimated coefficients on local gap imply that a one standard deviation increase in 
local gap leads to a 3.09% increase in initial returns to investors. Finally, to ensure that the effect of 
local incentives on underpricing is not driven by industry level incentives, Column (3) include both 
industry and local gap. A statistically insignificant coefficient on industry pay disparity rules out the 
possibility that the industry gap impacts the positive association between local pay disparity and 
IPO initial returns. The coefficient estimates of the remaining control variables across all 
specification of Table 4 and 6 are generally consistent with the prior literature (Lowry and Murphy, 
2007; Chahine and Goergen, 2011).  
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Therefore, in contrast to the firm pay gap, industry and local pay gap appear to be positively 
associated with the price behavior on the first day of trading. These findings seem to propound the 
idea that investors are highly attentive to pay disparity signals. Overall, the evidence in this section 
suggests that the associations between compensation, internal pay gap and underpricing are 
negative and these relationships are more pronounced in short-term compensation than in long-
term. Further, the associations between external pay gaps and IPO returns are strongly positive.  
 
5. Endogeneity Tests 
5.1 Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) and Heckman Two-Step Model 
So far I have shown that firms with highly compensated managers and large pay gaps are 
strongly associated with underpricing. Although the inclusion of industry and year fixed effects 
absorb omitted industry-varying and time-varying heterogeneity across industries and years, my 
results are still prone to endogeneity bias. Therefore, to address the concern that my OLS estimates 
may be biased by unobserved personal and firm characteristics inherent to the individual correlated 
both with CEO and firm decisions, I use the Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) approach (Kale et al., 
2014). My instruments should be highly correlated with the endogenous regressors (compensation, 
internal and external pay gaps), even after controlling for the exogenous regressors.  
The instruments should also affect IPO first-day returns only through their effect on 
managerial incentives, which excludes any direct impact of the instruments on the dependent 
variable, any effects running through omitted variables, and any reverse impact of the outcome 
variable on the instruments. Specifically, I include as instruments for the endogenous variables in 
my analysis the Median (Industry) Total Compensation, Median (Industry) Firm Gap, and Industry 
CEO Compensation (Ind CEO Comp) which is the natural logarithm of the sum of the total 
compensation of all other CEOs in each industry except the second-highest. These instrumental 
variables are defined as the natural logarithms of the median values of the incentive measures for 
firms in the same industry and in the same size quartile as the firm (e.g., Kini and Williams, 2012).  
The underlying economic rationale for these instruments stems from Murphy (1999), who 
suggests that the level and structure of compensation varies by industry and firm size. Since 
tournament and compensation incentives are based on managerial compensation, median values for 
firms that are in the same industry of similar size, it is unlikely that they can have a direct 
systematic effect on an individual firm’s initial aftermarket returns. Thus, these instruments provide 
good exogenous variation, making them ideal candidates as instruments for my main hypotheses. In 
addition, to selecting my instruments based on economic arguments, I conduct numerous statistical 
tests to determine their relevance and validity.  
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Table 7 reports the results from TSLS estimation. In each column, I report results from the 
second stage of the TSLS specification for each of the three endogenous variables and present all 
the test statistics related to endogeneity and instrumental variable selection in the bottom of the 
table. Firstly, first-stage partial F-statistics provide additional significant support for the relevance 
of all my instruments in the first-stage. These findings indicate that my instruments are individually 
relevant. In addition, the test statistics for the Hausman exogeneity tests are highly statistically 
insignificant suggesting that my variables of interest, Total Compensation, Firm Gap and Industry 
Pay Gap, are indeed exogenous. The findings are consistent with my baseline specifications 
estimated without endogeneity adjustments and reported in Tables 3 and 4.
8
  
Finally, I utilize the two-stage Heckman model to correct for selection bias. First, Ie save the 
residuals from the logistic regression in Table 8 to construct the Inverse of Mills ratio for 
compensation and tournament incentives. The coefficients of the Inverse of Mills ratio are negative 
(apart from the third model) and not significant, which underscores that there is no problem of 
selection bias. Overall, the results from the models account for sample selection bias using 
Heckman’s procedure are still supportive of the efficient contracting as well as the external 
hypothesis. 
 
5.2 Propensity Score Matching 
To gain more insight into the issue of endogeneity, I employ the propensity score matching 
procedure in order to compare the effect of firms with highly compensated CEOs (high internal and 
external tournament incentives) on initial returns. Initially, I measure the propensity score, which is 
the conditional probability of receiving treatment (having a highly compensated CEO/internal 
gap/external gap) given a firm’s pre-treatment characteristics, for all the IPOs by estimating a probit 
regression for the probability of firms having a highly compensated CEO. 
Moreover, I account for various firm and industry characteristics in the probit regression 
including R&D, leverage, proceeds, EPS, VC, technology, internet, underwriter, Nasdaq, overhang, 
HHI, market return, year and industry dummies. Also, I apply the same method for the firm pay 
gap, industry pay gap, and local pay gap. Table 9 presents the results for the average treatment 
effect (ATET) for those IPO firms with a highly compensated CEO versus those with a poorly 
compensated CEO (firm pay gap, industry pay gap, and local gap, respectively). The results support 
the efficient contracting hypothesis as well as the external tournament hypothesis and suggest that 
                                                          
8
 In this section, I do not use local variables as instruments because they are likely to directly affect underpricing. 
Therefore, I do not use TSLS estimations. Instead, I investigate the method of propensity score matching in the next 
sub-section and provide cross-sectional evidence showing that the effect of local incentives varies systematically with 
the probability of winning. 
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IPO firms with high compensated CEOs and firm gaps experience lower underpricing, while those 
with high industry and local pay gap experience higher IPO first-day returns. These findings are 
similar with the results presented in my baseline regressions and consistent with my primary 
hypotheses. 
 
6. Additional Analysis 
The results thus far show that remuneration and internal (external) tournament incentives are 
negatively (positively) associated with initial aftermarket returns. This section presents various 
robustness checks to add confidence in my findings. I first address the concern that my results may 
be specific to the choice of compensation measures and industry definitions. Finally, I discuss the 
effects of various industry shocks in my findings and conduct various additional robustness tests.  
 
6.1 Alternative Ways to Measure Incentives 
To be consistent with Lowry and Murphy (2007) and Chahine and Goergen (2011), I ignore 
total compensation and instead assume that the incentive measure of compensation are stock 
awards.
9
 I then investigate the relevant tests reported in Table 10 and report the effect of stock 
awards (incentives) on underpricing in Column (1) of Table 10.  To measure internal pay gap, I 
follow Kale et al., (2009) and use the natural logarithm of the difference between the total 
compensation of the CEO and that of the median VP in the firm as my measure for firm tournament 
incentives. Further, to make my results comparable with Bebchuk et al. (2011), I use the CEO Pay 
Slice.
10
 To make the scale comparable across my dataset, I replicate all my tests using the 
percentage of the total compensation to the top three executives that goes to the CEO. Finally, I 
measure industry gap as the natural logarithm of the difference of CEO’s total compensation to the 
second-highest CEO’s total compensation of that size-adjusted industry using my IPO sample.  
These three robustness specifications are summarized in rows 2-4 of Table 10. In general, 
these results are consistent with the results reported earlier in the study. In particular, the statistical 
significance is stronger in all cases in comparison with the previous results, but their economic 
significance is lower with the only exception of CEO Slice. For example the coefficient for stock 
awards is -0.01 and is statistically significant at the 1% level which is in contrast to the finding of 
Lowry and Murphy (2007), but similar to the result of Chahine and Goergen (2011). This 
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 In results not reported in the paper for brevity, I also estimate the regressions using the pre- and post-IPO stock 
awards. I find that firms with higher compensation incentives (stock awards) tend to have lower underpricing.  
10
 Furthermore, I repeat the analysis using the natural logarithm of the difference between the total compensation of the 
CEO and that of the mean VPs in the firm (as well as Gini Coefficient) as my measure of firm tournament incentive and 




coefficient implies that a one standard deviation increase in stock awards results in 2.76% decrease 
in underpricing. Further, the coefficient estimate for CEO Slice is -8.39 and is not statistically 
significant. In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in CEO Slice will 
decrease underpricing by 3.91%. Lastly, the coefficient estimate for Industry Gap ratio is 
statistically significant at the 1% level but it is not economically meaningful. 
 
6.2 Alternative Key Measures and Industry Definitions 
In my analysis so far, I used underpricing as the dependent variable. In this section, I test the 
robustness of my results by replacing underpricing with offer price revision. I define revision as the 
percentage change from the midpoint of the initial price range to the offer price. I also repeat the 
analysis of Table 3, 4 and 5 with alternative measures of firm performance, industry concentration, 
and corporate governance measure and present abbreviated findings in Table 10. In detail, I replace 
EPS with Tobin’s Q, HHI with the HHI Segment and board governance with takeover index.
11
 To 
save space, I suppress the coefficients of all the control variables. Overall, inferences using OLS are 
similar using these alternative measures.
12
  
Furthermore, I use the Fama-French 17 industry classification scheme estimating my 
baseline models, using industry fixed effects into OLS and to measure industry tournament 
incentives. In this sub-section, I examine the robustness of my main results using alternative 
industry definitions. In Panel C of Table 10, I re-estimate my main equations using OLS and I 
continue to observe negative (positive) and significant coefficient loadings on compensation and 
firm pay gap (industry pay gap), regardless if I use the narrower Fama-French 30 industry 




Moreover, Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Lowry and Murphy (2007) show that many 
factors influenced underpricing differently during the tot-com period (and the financial crisis 
period), which brings us a second thought that my findings in Table 3 and 4 might not be stable 
throughout my sample period. To address these concerns, in untabulated results I re-estimate the 
regressions of the Tables 4, 5 and 6 with adding dummy variables for the bubble period and the 
credit crunch, respectively. The coefficients for my main variables of interest – the measures of 
total compensation, firm pay gap and industry pay gap-still provide support for my main 
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 I thank Hoberg and Phillips as well as Stephen McKeon for making TNIC HHI and Takeover Index data available. 
12
 In addition, my findings remain the same when I use market-adjusted initial returns instead of underpricing and the 
natural logarithm of underpricing. 
13
 In untabulated analyses, I use the Fama-French 12 definitions and I find that my conclusions continue to hold even 
after using another industry classification instead of Fama-French 17. 
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hypotheses. Finally, I report that earlier results also hold if I exclude utility firms from the sample, 




6.3 Cross Sectional Variation  
In the previous section, I documented strong evidence in favor of my hypotheses. My results 
have been robust to several empirical specifications such as industry and year fixed effects, 
propensity score matching and instrumental variables estimation. In this section, I further assess the 
robustness of my finding by examining whether my observed relationships vary in ways predicted 
by theory. The purpose of the following tests will be twofold: first, if I can provide evidence 
consistent with prior results, the concern of missing correlated variables is further reduced; also, 
cross-sectional variations can help me understand the particular mechanism through which 
compensation and tournament incentives are associated with underpricing. 
 
6.3.1 Impact of Managerial Discretion on the Association between Total CEO Compensation and 
Underpricing 
In previous sections, I discussed explanations regarding the sources of the negative impact 
of compensation on IPO first-day returns. In this subsection, I try to shed additional light on the 
plausibility of these explanations by analyzing several implications that arise in this case. Thus, I 
examine the cross-sectional differences between firms in which the CEO has discretionary power 
and firms in which she does not have and I expect to find a stronger effect among the first ones. To 
investigate the impact of managerial discretion on my findings, I have to define the case in which I 
expect the CEO to have the ability to influence the performance of the firm. To proxy for these 
cases, I first use firms’ performance. High firm performance creates the conditions that a CEO 
needs to implement some business plans and eventually have discretion. Moreover, high level of 
performance is a sign for the successfulness of the manager which should also proxy for her power 
within the company.  
I furthermore note the lack of restrictions faced by the CEO due to external monitoring by 
market competition, and therefore, I support the opinion that high industry concentration means 
lower market competition, and hence, possibly more discretionary power of the CEO. I thus use 
industry concentration as a one more measure for the discretionary power of the CEO. I also control 
for the CEO’s founder status, because the founder of a company is more likely to be powerful 
within the company. Finally, I define the case in which the CEO has a degree from an Ivy League 
                                                          
14




institution, as this can be a sign for her education quality and can be also translated into more 
discretionary power within the firm.  I define firms with high managerial discretion as those firms 
with an above-median value of return on assets (ROA), that belong to the top tercile of the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), in which the CEO is a founder and finally firms in which the 
CEO is an Ivy League alumni.  
Panel A of Table 11 reports the results on the impact of managerial discretion. My findings 
suggest that the negative impact of total compensation on underpricing is magnified for the high 
discretion sub-sample (i.e., high firm performance, high industry concentration, founder status of 
the CEO, and holder of a degree from a reputable university). These results can be the combination 
of managerial discretion and ability that give rise to lower money on the table. Interestingly, some 
of the proxies for managerial discretion that I use, like the high industry concentration, are often 
interpreted as indication of weak governance that might affect adversely the firm. Thus, my 
evidence shows that giving a manager a freedom of movement can incur negative consequences. 
However, giving a manager high-powered incentive is unlikely to increase firm performance if the 
manager has no discretion to really influence firm policies and performance. Overall, the fact the 
discretion has a large impact on my finding, suggests that the incentives and activities of highly 
paid managers matter.  
 
6.3.2 Effects of Internal Incentives Conditional on the Monitoring Hypothesis and the 
Probability of Winning 
The results in the previous sections establish a negative relation between firm pay gap and 
underpricing. In order to gain a clearer understanding of these results, I formally test the efficient 
contracting hypothesis when monitoring is more important and with several scenarios that affect the 
probability of promotion. To proxy for the examination of monitoring, I utilize two variables. 
Initially, I use operating cash flows to measure the agency problem of free cash flow. Firms with 
high cash flow are likely to have the most serious agency problem associated with free cash flow. 
On the other hand, firms with low cash flow are likely to have the least severe agency problems. I 
next observe that the CEO with less myopia leads to lower information risk and agency costs.  
I therefore use the decision horizon (DH) constructed by Antia et al. (2010) to capture the 
degree to which a CEO is exposed to agency problems. Further, I analyze several cases which affect 
the probability of promotion. First, when the firm has a new CEO, the probability of winning the 
tournament for some of the other members of the top management team is lower. Thus, I expect 
that the internal tournament effects should be weaker when the firm has just had a change in the 
position of the CEO. Additionally, implying that founder is less likely to abandon the firm they 
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started, I expect that the probability of promotion should be lower when the firm led by CEO-
founder.  
Taken together, I hypothesize that the effect of firm pay gap on underpricing will be less 
pronounced when the CEO is new and founder and more pronounced for the high cash flows and 
decision horizon sub-sample. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 11. My findings indicate 
highly significant and negative association between internal pay gap and initial returns to investors 
when the agency problem of free cash flow is most severe and monitoring is most important. Lastly, 
as expected, I find support for the hypothesis that tournament incentives are weaker when the firm 
has a new CEO or a CEO-founder. 
 
6.3.3 Effects of Industry and Local Incentives Conditional on the Probability of Winning 
So far, my findings indicate a significantly positive relation between external tournament 
incentives and underpricing. This subsection aims to examine whether the strength of these positive 
relations vary across firms with regard to CEO’s probability of winning. The first proxy for the 
probability of winning is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO is overconfident. 
Chowdhury et al. (2017) argue that overconfident managers have a higher probability of 
participating in the industry and local tournament than other CEOs, as overconfident managers 
possibly overestimate the chances from external opportunities. I follow Boulton and Campbell 




The second proxy for the probability of winning is if the CEO has general abilities. A strand 
of literature (e.g., Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004; Bertrand, 2009; Coles et al., 2017) highlights the 
trend over the last decades of the need for CEOs with general abilities. Thus, I expect that the effect 
of industry incentives to be more pronounced among firms with specialist CEOs because their skills 
are more firm or industry specific. Regarding the effect of local incentives, my expectations are that 
the effect should be probably stronger among generalist CEOs as the specialists have less diverse 
background and experiences.  
Then, I examine the effect of industry and local gap on IPO first-day returns among new 
CEOs and I predict that the effect of external tournament incentives on underpricing to be weaker 
when the firm has just a CEO turnover. Lastly, I investigate the impact of external tournament 
incentives on immediate aftermarket returns in high and low competition. Prior literature (Deng and 
                                                          
15
 I have also measured overconfidence using three IPO variables (firm age, overhang and market return) and find 
similar results. Because CEO overconfidence is an industry-based measure, I use it only to examine the association 
between industry pay gap and underpricing. 
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Gao, 2013; Kubick and Lockhart, 2016; Coles et al., 2017) documents that industry tournament 
incentives are stronger in more competitive industries. Also, the competition depends on the 
number of competitors, and as a result, can increase or decrease the outside employment options for 
employees. To measure competition, I follow the method of Kubick and Lockhart (2016), that is, I 
use the number of CEOs operating in each industry-size group.
16
 
Panel C and D of Table 11 present the results. My findings suggest that the industry gap 
positively affects underpricing among overconfident CEOs, which support the hypothesis that the 
effect of industry incentives on initial returns is stronger when the CEO is overconfident. Moreover, 
I find that industry and local pay gap significantly and positively relate to underpricing among firms 
with specialist and old CEOs. Finally, the results from Panel C and D generally support the notion 
that industry and local tournament incentives-initial returns relations are weaker in more 
competitive industries. Overall, the evidence in this section, suggests that the magnitude of the 
industry and local incentives varies with the probability of winning: both effects are stronger among 
specialist CEOs and the effects are weaker among new CEOs.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Most of the existing literature has focused on the impact of compensation on firm 
performance, risk taking, and more recently on tax aggressiveness and earnings management. I 
conceptually and empirically extend the literature of executive compensation around IPOs to 
include all the components of the compensation as well as the internal and external pay disparity. 
Specifically, I investigate whether compensation and tournament incentives impact 
underpricing.  Building upon signaling and tournament theory and recent empirical evidence that 
CEOs respond to the incentives of internal and external labor market, I predict and find strong 
evidence that CEOs who lead firms with greater compensation favor less initial aftermarket returns 
while those firms with high industry and local gap favor higher underpricing. My results are robust 
to estimating my regressions using OLS, industry and year fixed effects, changes specifications, 
TSLS estimation, Heckman two-stage model and propensity score matching. In subsequent tests, I 
document that the association between total CEO remuneration and underpricing is stronger among 
firms with high performance and CEOs who are also founder as well as graduate from an Ivy 
League institution, while those of internal tournament incentives and IPO first-day returns are 
stronger among firms with severe agency problems with non-founder and old CEOs. Also, I find 
evidence that the positive effect of industry pay gap is more pronounced in low competitive 
                                                          
12
 Following the same process, I create a similar metropolitan-adjusted measure for competition.  
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industries among overconfident CEOs with special skills. Finally, I show that the positive impact of 
local incentives on IPO first-day returns is stronger among less competitive industries with old 
CEOs.  
Overall, this study makes the following contributions. First, I establish a link between total 
compensation, internal pay gap, external pay gap and underpricing and, in doing so, I provide a 
channel by which CEOs may be motivated to reduce immediate aftermarket returns. Second, it 
expands the literature of executive compensation around IPOs, by including both short-term and 
long-term compensation into the key compensation components that impact the underpricing. In 
addition, I extend the literature on initial public offerings by examining the role of the geography on 
executive compensation. The results of this study should be of interest to corporate boards, 
prospective issuers as well as equity compensation for individual executives seeking a more 
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Appendix A: Definitions of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: IPO Pricing 
Underpricing 
The difference between the first secondary market closing price available in CRSP and IPO offer price, 
divided by IPO offer price. 
Revision The difference between the offer price and the mid-point of the price range over the latter. 
Panel B: Compensation Variables 
CEO Salary 
The natural logarithm of cash awarded to the CEO as cash compensation in the fiscal year prior to the 
IPO. 
CEO Bonus The natural logarithm of cash awarded to the CEO as bonus in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
CEO Stock 
Awards 




The natural logarithm of options granted to the CEO as option awards under the year (prior to the IPO) 




The natural logarithm of the actual amount earned under short-term, performance-based cash incentive 
plan for fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
CEO All Other 
Compensation 
The natural logarithm of all other compensation awarded to the CEO in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
CEO Total 
Compensation 
The natural logarithm of the sum of all the above compensations awarded to the CEO in the fiscal year 
prior to the IPO. 
Firm Gap 
The natural logarithm of the difference between CEO’s total compensation and the total compensation of 
the median VP following Kale et al. (2009). 
Industry Gap 
The natural logarithm of the difference between the CEO’s total compensation and the second highest 
CEO’s total compensation of that size-adjusted industry following Coles et al. (2017). 
CEO Slice 





The median value of the total CEO compensation by industry and year. 
Median (Industry) 
Firm Gap 
The median value of the firm gap by industry and year. 
Ind CEO Comp 
The natural logarithm of the sum of the total compensation of all other CEOs in each industry except the 
second-highest (by industry). 
Panel C: CEO Characteristics 
CEO Duality Dummy variable set to 1 if the CEO is both chairman/chairwoman and CEO, and 0 otherwise. 
CEO Tenure Number of years working as CEO in the firm until the IPO. 
CEO Age Age of CEO (in years). 
CEO Power 
CEO Power Factor score from Principle Component Analysis (PCA) using CEO tenure, CEO 
ownership, CEO Duality and CEO Triality (CEO, Chairman and President).  
CEO Turnover Dummy variable set to 1 if there is change in the position of CEO prior to IPO, and 0 otherwise. 
Decision Horizon 
(DH) 
                                               , where           is the number of years 
the CEO has held that position prior to IPO,        is the age of the CEO who works for firm I in year t, 
            (          is the industry median of TENURE (AGE) (following Antia et al., (2010)). 
General Ability 
Index 
First factor of applying principal components analysis to five proxies of general managerial ability: 
Number of roles, Number of firms, Number of industries, CEO experience dummy, Conglomerate 
experience dummy. 
Generalist 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO is a generalist, and 0 otherwise. CEO is classified as a generalist if 
CEO’s general ability index is equal to or above the sample median (following Custodio et al., 2013). 
Founder Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is both founder and CEO, and 0 otherwise. 
New CEO Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO tenure is smaller than 2 years, and 0 otherwise. 
Overconfident 
CEO 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO is overconfident and 0 otherwise (using the investment-based 
measure as well as three IPO characteristics following Boulton and Campbell (2016). 
Ivy League 
alumnus 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO is an alumnus of an Ivy League institution, and 0 otherwise. 
Panel D: Firm Fundamentals 
Firm age 
The number of years elapsed since firm’s foundation to IPO date, using foundation dates from Thomson 
Financial database as well as from the Field-Ritter dataset. The variable is transformed into the 
regressions by adding 1 and taking the natural logarithm. 
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VC  Dummy variable equal to 1 for venture capital-backed firms, and 0 otherwise. 
Proceeds 
The natural logarithm of gross proceeds raised by the IPO estimated as shared offered times the offer 
price. 
Overhang The ratio of shares retained by the pre-IPO shareholders over shares issued in the offering. 
Underwriter  
Dummy variable equal to 1 for most prestigious underwriters, and 0 otherwise. Most reputable 




Dummy variable equal to 1 for IPOs of Internet firms, and 0 otherwise. Internet firms are classified those 




Dummy variable: one for IPO firms with SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578 (computer hardware), 
3661, 3663, 3669 (communications equipment), 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679 (electronics), 
3812 (navigation equipment), 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (measuring and controlling devices), 3841, 
3845 (medical instruments), 4812, 4813 (telephone equipment), 4899 (communications services), and 
7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, and 7379 (software). 
Nasdaq Dummy variable equal to 1 for NASDAQ-listed IPOs, and 0 otherwise. 
HHI  
HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) is calculated by squaring the market share if each firm competing in 
a market and then summing the resulting numbers. 
R&D  The ratio of total R&D expense to total sales in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
Leverage The ratio of total liabilities over total assets in the fiscal year prior to IPO. 
EPS 
Dummy variable equal to 1 for positive earnings per share in the fiscal year prior to IPO, and 0 
otherwise. 
ROA 
It is the ratio of net income to total assets in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. High ROA is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if ROA is greater than the sample median, and 0 otherwise. 
Panel E: Other Firm Characteristics 
Market Return The compounded daily return on CRSP value-weighted index over the 20 trading days trailing the IPO. 
Board 
Governance  
Board Governance measure is constructed by taking the first factor of applying principal component 
analysis to the following variables: board independence measured as the ratio of the number of 
independent outside directors to the total number of directors; a dummy variable equal to one if the 
board has a nominating committee that is composed solely of independent directors, (and zero 
otherwise); the percentage of outside directors on the board that were appointed after the current CEO 
took office; the natural logarithm of the average number of other directorships held by independent 
directors serving on the board; a dummy variable, equal to one if the majority of outside directors on the 
board serve on three or more other boards; the natural logarithm of the number of board meetings; the 




Compensation committee quality is constructed by taking the first factor of applying principal 
component analysis to five proxies of remuneration committee index: the compensation committee 
independence; the percentage of outside directors on the compensation committee that were appointed 
after the current CEO took office; a dummy variable, equal to one if the majority of outside directors on 
the compensation committee serve on three or more other boards (and equal to zero otherwise); the 
natural log of the number of directors serving on the compensation committee; the number of 
compensation committee meetings. 
HHI 
HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) is calculated by squaring the market share if each firm competing in 
a market and then summing the resulting numbers. High HHI is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the HHI 
is greater the sample median, and 0 otherwise. 
Competition 
The number of CEOs operating in each industry-size group. High Competition is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the number of CEOs operating in each industry-size group is greater than the sample media, 













Table 1: Summary Statistics 
This table presents distributional statistics for a sample of 1,661 U.S. IPOs from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2016. The IPOs 
are described by issue-year in Panel A, whereas in Panel B the IPOs are distributed by industry. IPO deals are retrieved from the 
Thomson ONE Banker database. All compensation variables are expressed in thousands. 
Panel A: Yearly Distribution of IPOs 
 All IPOs Underpricing (%) Total Compensation Firm Pay Gap Industry Pay Gap Local Pay Gap 
2000 264 56.85 $643 $301 $31,074 $66,109 
2001 59 20.94 $1,156 $606 $29,560 $65,344 
2002 48 9.08 $885 $489 $23,447 $31,961 
2003 47 12.72 $1,088 $728 $21,182 $48,252 
2004 129 12.10 $718 $309 $25,960 $44,808 
2005 115 9.20 $1,272 $768 $22,362 $49,496 
2006 126 11.25 $1,205 $776 $22,461 $51,950 
2007 113 12.84 $1,428 $934 $25,883 $68,680 
2008 17 6.95 $1,030 $531 $31,688 $64,069 
2009 38 14.01 $2,082 $1,240 $23,664 $44,573 
2010 72 7.02 $1,851, $1,231 $23,538 $53,310 
2011 71 12.82 $3,776, $2,442 $23,319 $56,957 
2012 80 16.95 $1,853 $854 $23,712 $59,879 
2013 138 20.55 $2,997 $2,053 $22,956 $52,580 
2014 172 14.86 $1,783 $1,130 $23,776 $51,056 
2015 104 16.43 $1,584 $838 $25,428 $71,170 
2016 68 10.11 $2,302 $1,593 $24,058 $47,272 
Total 1,658 20.46 $1,547 $941 $25,281 $55,780 
Panel B: IPOs Distribution by Industry 
 
All IPOs Underpricing (%) 
Total 
Compensation 





Oil and Gas (13) 63 5.30 $1,635 $1,090 $10,660 $4,708 
Food Products (20) 18 10.45 $1,350 $843 $5,784 $5,893 
Chemical Products (28) 333 11.32 $1,193 $725 $20,353 $5,155 
Manufacturing (30-34) 36 19.07 $9,025 $5,782 $5,266 $3,973 
Computer Equipment & Services 
(35, 73) 
426 36.64 $3,516 $2,104 $34,616 $6,833 
Electronic Equipment (36) 139 40.43 $863 $434 $22,327 $5,793 
Scientific Instruments (38) 122 16.84 $675 $352 $33,817 $4,671 
Transportation & Public Utilities 
(41, 42, 44-49) 
130 9.98 $13,683 $10,227 $32,719 $4,460 
Wholesale & Retail Trade (50-59) 146 17.48 $16,422 $9,225 $9,102 $4,103 
Entertainment Services (70,78, 
79) 










Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the sample of 1,661 U.S. IPOs from 1 January, 2000 to 31 December, 2016. All 
IPOs are retrieved from Thomson Financial Database, Boardex, EDGAR and CRSP. The statistics provided include the mean for 
the dependent and all controls variables used in the regression analysis. Panel A presents the compensation variables. Panel B 
displays the CEO and board governance characteristics. Finally, Panel C illustrates firm fundamentals. All compensation variables 
are expressed in thousands. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Compensation Variables 
 Total Compensation Firm Gap Industry Gap Local Gap 
 High Low Diff. High Low Diff. High Low Diff. High Low Diff. 
 Mean  Mean p-val. Mean  Mean p-val. Mean  Mean p-val. Mean Mean p-val. 
CEO Salary  $467 $250 0.000 $448 $269 0.000 $347 $371 0.039 $339 $386 0.000 
CEO Bonus $307 $54 0.000 $291 $70 0.000 $159 $201 0.037 $188 $170 0.242 
CEO Stock 
Awards 
$558 $5 0.000 $537 $26 0.000 $344 $218 0.098 $309 $256 0.300 
CEO Option 
Awards 




$254 $19 0.000 $234 $39 0.000 $134 $136 0.457 $123 $157 0.094 
CEO Other $294 $13 0.000 $288 $20 0.000 $179 $119 0.130 $144 $164 0.354 
Panel B: CEO and Governance Characteristics 
CEO 
duality 
0.38 0.40 0.210 0.38 0.40 0.126 0.42 0.36 0.008 0.39 0.39 0.498 
Founder 0.23 0.40 0.000 0.27 0.39 0.000 0.34 0.29 0.016 0.34 0.30 0.043 
CEO 
Tenure 
3.14 3.67 0.004 3.25 3.56 0.059 3.25 3.60 0.043 3.56 3.16 0.019 
CEO Age 51.57 49.18 0.000 51.59 49.16 0.000 49.22 51.75 0.000 49.96 50.81 0.018 
Generalist 0.65 0.57 0.001 0.64 0.57 0.002 0.60 0.61 0.391 0.61 0.61 0.462 
Panel C: Firm Fundamentals 
Underpr. 17.56 23.36 0.003 17.73 23.20 0.005 25.58 14.44 0.000 25.38 14.48 0.000 
Firm Age 2.31 2.13 0.000 2.28 2.15 0.003 2.23 2.22 0.367 2.17 2.27 0.023 
VC 0.42 0.63 0.000 0.44 0.61 0.000 0.58 0.47 0.000 0.59 0.45 0.000 
Proceeds 4.93 4.04 0.000 4.76 4.20 0.000 4.42 4.54 0.012 4.40 4.58 0.001 
Overhang 4.15 4.31 0.308 4.06 4.40 0.133 4.79 3.58 0.000 4.75 3.64 0.000 
Underwriter 0.55 0.25 0.000 0.49 0.31 0.000 0.41 0.39 0.271 0.41 0.40 0.385 
R&D  0.10 0.07 0.000 0.08 0.10 0.004 0.07 0.10 0.000 0.10 0.07 0.000 
Leverage 0.38 0.36 0.161 0.38 0.36 0.101 0.36 0.39 0.060 0.37 0.37 0.485 
EPS 0.52 0.39 0.000 0.51 0.42 0.000 0.45 0.47 0.232 0.42 0.50 0.000 
Nasdaq 0.58 0.80 0.000 0.60 0.78 0.000 0.71 0.67 0.063 0.71 0.66 0.022 
Internet  0.10 0.10 0.432 0.09 0.11 0.162 0.16 0.02 0.000 0.11 0.09 0.119 
Technology  0.28 0.43 0.000 0.30 0.41 0.000 0.49 0.20 0.000 0.40 0.30 0.000 








Table 3: Determinants of Executive Compensation and Tournament Incentives 
This table reports results from OLS estimation using compensation and tournament incentive measures, as my dependent variables. 
T-statistics are included in the parentheses and are adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by year and 
industry. ***, **, And * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 













































































































































Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects  (FF 
17) 
Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted    0.3359 0.3361 0.3178 0.3092 









Table 4: Impact of Total Compensation on Underpricing 
This table displays the effects of CEO compensation on IPO first-day returns using ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. The 
sample consists of initial public offerings from 2000 to 2016 in the US stock market. The dependent variable is IPO first-day 
returns and calculated as the percentage change from the first day closing price to offer price. Total Compensation is the natural 
logarithm of the sum of salary, bonus, stock awards, option awards, non-equity incentives and other compensation elements in 
the fiscal year prior to the IPO. Short-term compensation is the natural logarithm of the sum of salary and bonus. Long-term 
compensation is the natural logarithm of the sum of stock awards, option awards, non-equity incentives and other compensation 
elements. R&D is the ratio of total R&D expense divided by total sales in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. Leverage is the ratio of 
total liabilities over total assets in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. Proceeds are the natural logarithm of gross proceeds raised by 
the IPO estimated as shared offered times the offer price. EPS is a dummy variable equals to 1 for positive earnings per share in 
the fiscal year prior to the IPO, otherwise is 0. VC is a dummy variable equals to 1 for venture capital-backed firms, otherwise is 
0. Technology is a dummy variable equals to 1 for IPO firms which are into the technology industry, otherwise is 0. Internet is a 
dummy variable equals to 1 for Internet firms, otherwise is 0. Underwriter is a dummy variable equals to 1 for most prestigious 
underwriters, otherwise is 0. Nasdaq is a dummy variable equals to 1 for Nasdaq-listed IPOs, else 0. Overhang is the ratio of 
shares retained by the pre-IPO shareholders over shares issued in the offering. HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of 
each firm competing in a market and then summing the resulting numbers. Board Governance Measure is constructed by 
employing principal component analysis to several corporate governance measures (see Appendix A for details). Models (1), (2), 
and (3) include total compensation, short-term compensation, and long-term compensation. Model (4) includes both short- and 
long-term compensation. T-statistics are included in the parentheses and are adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors 
clustered by industry and year. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 




   
































































































































Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects 
(FF17) 
Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted    0.2422 0.2451 0.2310 0.2341 





Table 5: Impact of Internal Gap on Underpricing 
This table displays the effects of CEO compensation on IPO first-day returns using ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. The 
sample consists of initial public offerings from 2000 to 2016 in the US stock market. The dependent variable is IPO first-day 
returns and calculated as the percentage changes from the first day closing price to offer price.  Firm Gap is the natural logarithm 
of the difference between CEO’s total compensation and the total compensation of the median VP (Kale et al., 2009). Short-term 
Firm Gap is the natural logarithm of the difference between CEO’s short-term compensation and the short-term compensation of 
the median VP. Long-term Firm Gap is the natural logarithm of the difference between CEO’s long-term compensation and the 
long-term compensation of the median VP. R&D is the ratio of total R&D expense divided by total sales in the fiscal year prior 
to the IPO Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities over total assets in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. Proceeds are the natural 
logarithm of gross proceeds raised by the IPO estimated as shared offered times the offer price. EPS is a dummy variable equals 
to 1 for positive earnings per share in the fiscal year prior to the IPO, otherwise is 0. VC is a dummy variable equals to 1 for 
venture capital-backed firms, otherwise is 0. Technology is a dummy variable equals to 1 for IPO firms which are into the 
technology industry, otherwise is 0. Internet is a dummy variable equals to 1 for Internet firms, otherwise is 0. Underwriter is a 
dummy variable equals to 1 for most prestigious underwriters, otherwise is 0. Nasdaq is a dummy variable equals to 1 for 
Nasdaq-listed IPOs, else 0. Overhang is the ratio of shares retained by the pre-IPO shareholders over shares issued in the 
offering. HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in a market and then summing the resulting 
numbers. Board Governance is constructed by employing principal component analysis, to several corporate governance 
measures (see Appendix A for details). Models (1), (2), and (3) include firm gap, short-term firm gap, and long-term firm gap. T-
statistics are included in the parentheses and are adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by year and 
industry. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 
A. 







































































































Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects (FF17) Y Y Y 
Adjusted    0.2162 0.2194 0.2050 







Table 6: Impact of External Gap on Underpricing 
This table displays the effects of CEO compensation on IPO first-day returns using ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. The 
sample consists of initial public offerings from 2000 to 2016 in the US stock market. The dependent variable is IPO first-day 
returns and calculated as the percentage changes from the first day closing price to offer price. Industry Gap is the natural 
logarithm of the difference between the CEO’s total compensation and the second highest CEO’s total compensation of that size-
adjusted industry following Coles et al., (2017). Local Gap is the natural logarithm of the difference between the CEO’s total 
compensation and the second highest CEO’s total compensation of that size-adjusted industry following Yin (2017).  R&D is the 
ratio of total R&D expense divided by total sales in the fiscal year prior to the IPO Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities over 
total assets in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. Proceeds are the natural logarithm of gross proceeds raised by the IPO estimated as 
shared offered times the offer price. EPS is a dummy variable equals to 1 for positive earnings per share in the fiscal year prior to 
the IPO, otherwise is 0. VC is a dummy variable equals to 1 for venture capital-backed firms, otherwise is 0. Technology is a 
dummy variable equals to 1 for IPO firms which are into the technology industry, otherwise is 0. Internet is a dummy variable 
equals to 1 for Internet firms, otherwise is 0. Underwriter is a dummy variable equals to 1 for most prestigious underwriters, 
otherwise is 0. Nasdaq is a dummy variable equals to 1 for Nasdaq-listed IPOs, else 0. Overhang is the ratio of shares retained by 
the pre-IPO shareholders over shares issued in the offering. HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm 
competing in a market and then summing the resulting numbers. Board Governance is constructed by employing principal 
component analysis, to several corporate governance measures (see Appendix A for details). Models (1), (2), include industry 
and pay gap and model (4) includes industry and local gap together. T-statistics are included in the parentheses and are adjusted 
for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by year and industry. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 








































































































Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects (FF17) Y Y Y 
Adjusted    0.2363 0.2482 0.2465 











Table 7: Two Stage Least Squares Regressions 
This table reports results from TSLS estimation in which IPO first-day returns of investors is my dependent variable and Total 
Compensation, Firm Gap and Industry Gap are my independent variables of interest. IPO first-day returns are calculated as the 
percentage changes from the first day closing price to offer price. Total Compensation is the natural logarithm of the sum of 
salary, bonus, stock awards, option awards, non-equity incentives and other in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. Firm Gap is the 
natural logarithm of the difference between CEO’s total compensation and the total compensation of the median VP (Kale et al., 
2009). Industry Gap is the natural logarithm of the difference between the CEO’s total compensation and the second highest 
CEO’s total compensation of that size-adjusted industry following Coles et al., (2017). Industry Gap is the natural logarithm of 
the difference between the CEO’s total compensation and the second highest CEO’s total compensation of that size-adjusted 
MSA following Yin (2017). Control variables include: R&D, Leverage, Proceeds, EPS, VC, Technology, Internet, Underwriter, 
Nasdaq, Overhang, HHI, Market Return, and Board Governance. Board Governance is constructed by employing principal 
component analysis to several corporate governance measures (see Appendix A for details).  Models (1), (2) and (3) include total 
compensation, firm gap, industry gap and local gap. For brevity year and industry dummies are included but not tabulated in all 
regressions. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) (3) 






    




















































































































































































Tests of endogeneity, relevance, and validity of instruments 
First-Stage partial F-Statistic 
Median Total Compensation 9.82**   
Median Firm Gap  8.48**  
Ind CEO Comp   272.64*** 
Hausman Test for exogeneity 0.0276 0.0198 1.3082 
Adjusted    0.1094 0.1403 0.1507 








Table 8: Heckman Two-Step Treatment Effect Model of Compensation and Tournament Incentives 
This table displays the effects of CEO compensation on IPO first-day returns using the Two-Step Heckman procedure. The 
sample consists of initial public offerings from 2000 to 2016 in the US stock market. T-statistics are included in the parentheses 
and are adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by year and industry. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 Total Compensation Firm Gap Industry Gap Local Gap 
 Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome 






      
Firm Gap    
-2.32 
(-1.55) 
    


















































































































































































































































Pseudo R2 0.1025  0.1128  0.1155  0.1125  
Adjusted R2  0.2115  0.2060  0.2010  0.2145 
























Table 9: Endogeneity Control – Propensity Score Matching 
This table illustrates the average treatment effect of the treated for IPO initial returns in high and low total compensated CEOs 
(Firm Gap and Industry Gap, respectively), controlling for the endogeneity of CEO Total Compensation (also, Firm Gap, Industry 
Gap and Local Gap) using propensity score matching. The sample consists of initial public offerings from 2000 to 2016 in the US 
stock market. As for the binary feature of total compensation (High Total Compensation), I calculate the total compensation Total 
Compensation is the natural logarithm of the sum of salary, bonus, stock awards, option awards, non-equity incentives and other 
elements of compensation in the fiscal year prior to the IPO; if the total compensation is above the median, then High Total 
Compensation is set to 1, otherwise is 0. The outcome variable is IPO first-day returns, calculated as the percentage changes from 
the first day closing price to offer price. The variables used for matching are: R&D, Leverage, Proceeds, EPS, VC, Technology, 
Internet, Underwriter, Nasdaq, Overhang, HHI, Market Return, Board Governance, Year and Industry Dummies. Models (1), (2), 
(3) and (4) include total compensation, firm gap, industry gap and local gap. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 10: Alternative Definitions 
This table reports results from OLS estimation using alternative definition schemes, in which IPO first-day returns is my 
dependent variable and Total Compensation, Firm Gap, Industry Gap and Local Gap are my independent variables of interest. 
Panel A presents results from OLS estimation using alternative key measures and Panel B displays the findings using revision as 
dependent variable. Panel C reports the findings using alternative industry definition. Control variables are: R&D, Leverage, 
Proceeds, EPS, VC, Technology, Internet, Underwriter, Nasdaq, Overhang, HHI, Market Return, and Board Governance. Models 
(1), (2), include Stock Awards, CEO Slice, and models (3) and (4) include Industry Gap Ratio and Local Gap using the highest 
paid-CEO (Panel A). T-statistics are included in the parentheses and are adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors 
clustered by year and industry. ***, **, And * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Alternative Key Measures 




   









Local Gap (highest CEO)    
1.79*** 
(3.72) 
Control Variables Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects  (FF 17) Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted    0.2419 0.2488 0.2445 0.2232 
N 1,658 1,658 1,658 1,658 
Panel B: Alternative Dependent Variable 




   








Local Gap    
0.94*** 
(4.35) 
Control Variables Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects  (FF 17) Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted    0.2071 0.2073 0.2092 0.1794 
N 1,658 1,658 1,658 1,658 
Panel C: Alternative Industry Definition 




   









Local Gap    
1.29*** 
(2.65) 
Control Variables Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects  (FF 30) Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted    0.2559 0.2581 0.2476 0.2566 






Table 11: Cross-sectional tests 
This table reports results from OLS regressions in which Underpricing is my dependent variable and Total Compensation, Firm 
Pay Gap, Industry Pay Gap and Local Pay Gap are my independent variables of interest. IPO first-day returns are calculated as the 
percentage change from the first day closing price to offer price.  Control variables are: R&D, Leverage, Proceeds, EPS, VC, 
Technology, Internet, Underwriter, Nasdaq, Overhang, HHI, Market Return, and Board Governance. T-statistics are included in 
the parentheses and are adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by year and industry. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Impact of Several Factors on Total Compensation 
 
High ROA  Low ROA Founder 
Non-
Founder 


























Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry 
Fixed Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted    0.3110 0.2394 0.2957 0.2518 0.2247 0.2588 0.3262 0.2592 
N 833 825 604 1,054 845 813 274 1,384 
Panel B: Impact of Several Factors on Firm Gap 
 High Cash 
Flow 
 Low Cash 
Flow 

























Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted    0.2433 0.3169 0.3186 0.1857 0.3507 0.2443 0.2630 0.2499 
N 822 836 816 842 604 1,054 755 903 






































Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry 
Fixed Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted    0.3113 0.2213 0.2587 0.2338 0.2767 0.2204 0.2482 0.2554 
N 866 792 755 903 831 827 364 1,294 
Panel D: Impact of Several Factors on Local Gap 
















Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry 
Fixed Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted    0.2705 0.2537 0.2859 0.2489 0.3086 0.2311 





Supplemental File  
“Executive Compensation and Tournament Incentives around 
IPOs” 
 
This Appendix reports supplemental and robustness tests to accompany the results in “Executive 
Compensation and Tournament Incentives around IPOs” Section A1 reports the measurements of 
corporate governance quality, compensation committee quality and general managerial ability 
index. Section A2 displays the trend of remuneration and its components as well as that of 
underpricing. Section A3 presents the results using adjusted turnover to proxy for investor 
heterogeneous beliefs. Section A4 presents an indicative example of highly and poorly 
compensated top managers. Section A5 reports the effect of internal and external tournament 


















A1. Measurement of Board Governance, Compensation Committee Quality, and General 
Ability Index 
A1.1 Board Governance Measure 
My board governance measure is based on five categories: (a) board committee 
independence (B_INDDIR); (b) CEO power over the director nomination process (B_%APPOINT 
and IND_NOM); (c) time commitment of directors (‘’board committee busy status’’and B_BUSY); 
(d) board committee diligence (LnB_OTHDIR); (e) board committee size (LnB_SIZE); (f) board 
committee meetings (LnB_MEET). B_INDDIR is defined as the ratio of the number of independent 
outside directors to the total number of directors. IND_NOM equals one if the board has a 
nominating committee that is composed solely of independent directors, and zero otherwise. 
B_%APPOINT is measured as the percentage of outside directors on the board committee, that 
were appointed after the current CEO took office. Outside directors joining the board after the 
current CEO took office are assumed to be appointed by the CEO because most CEOs have 
influence in the director nomination process. LnB_OTHDIR, is the natural log of the average 
number of other directorships held by independent directors serving on the board compensation 
committee. B_BUSY is a dummy variable, equal to one if the majority of outside directors on the 
board committee, serve on three or more other boards, and equal to one otherwise. LnB_SIZE is the 
natural log of the number of directors serving on the board committee. Finally, LnB_MEET is the 
natural log of the number of board meetings. 
Table IA1 shows the results of the principal component analysis for the proxies of corporate 
governance quality. Using this method I obtain only one component with an eigenvalue higher than 
one (eigenvalue of 1.5426). All the variables have scores and are positively associated with the 
index. Therefore, higher levels of board governance are reflected in a higher value of the index. The 
index gives close to equal weights to the number of independent outside directors as well as to the 
percentage of outside directors on the board committee and a lower weight the number of board 
meetings. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of the components of the board governance 
measure. More than a half of the firms of the sample have outside directors, while around 40% of 
the directors of each board characterized as busy, Furthermore, the average number of board 
members is five, and, on average, each firm held five meetings on the year prior to the IPO. 
 
A1.2 Compensation Committee Quality Index 
I construct compensation committee quality index by using five proxies: the compensation 
committee independence (C_INDDIR); the percentage of outside directors on the compensation 
committee that were appointed after the current CEO took office (C_%APPOINT); a dummy 
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variable, equal to one if the majority of outside directors on the compensation committee serve on 
three or more other boards (and equal to zero otherwise) (C_BUSY); the natural log of the number 
of directors serving on the compensation committee (LnC_SIZE); the number of compensation 
committee meetings (LnC_MEET). C_INDDIR measures compensation committee independence 
defined in the same manner as B_INDDIR. C_%APPOINT are measured as the percentage of 
outside directors on the compensation committee, that were appointed after the current CEO took 
office.   C_BUSY is a dummy variable, equal to one if the majority of outside directors on the 
compensation committee, serve on three or more other boards, and equal to one otherwise. 
LnC_SIZE is the natural log of the number of directors serving on the compensation committee. 
Finally, LnC_MEET is the natural log of the number of compensation committee meetings. 
Table IA2 reports the results of the principal component analysis for the proxies of 
compensation committee quality. Using this method, I obtain only one component with an 
eigenvalue higher than one (eigenvalue of 2.6976). All the variables have scores and are positively 
associated with the index. Therefore, higher levels of compensation committee quality are reflected 
in a higher value of the index. The index gives close to equal weights to the number of independent 
outside directors as well as to the percentage of outside directors on the compensation committee 
and a lower weight the number of compensation committee meetings. Panel B displays the 
descriptive statistics of the components of the compensation committee quality index. More than 
one third of the firms have busy members into the compensation committee, which consists of an 
average of three members. Each firm holds around three compensation committee meetings. 
 
A1.3 General Managerial Ability Index 
To create general ability index, I follow Custodio et al. (2013) and use five key proxies 
based on the CEO’s lifetime work experience. These variables are: number of positions, number of 
firms, number of industries, CEO experience dummy (whether a CEO held a CEO position at 
another firm), and a conglomerate (multi-division firm) experience dummy. The index gives close 
to equal weights to the number of firms, and industries, and a lower weight to the CEO 
conglomerate experiences. On average, CEOs have worked in two firms, and for five different 
positions. One fifth of the top managers of my sample have prior work experience as CEO, and 
approximately 50% have experience from complex firms.  
 
A2. Distribution of Executive Compensation and Underpricing 
In the main text I support my hypotheses mainly through some descriptive statistics and 
multiple regressions. In this section, I highlight the trends of the key variables of this study, such as 
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the IPO first-day returns, total CEO compensation and its components. Figure 1 shows that CEO 
remuneration has an increasing pattern. From 2000 to 2008 this pattern is mainly due to cash 
compensation (salary and bonus), while after 2008 this trend is mainly attributed to the long-term 
compensation plans. On the other hand, IPO underpricing has a decreasing trend.  
 
A3. Heterogeneity in Investor Beliefs 
Table IA4 reports the results of my OLS regression tests on the impact of executive 
compensation and tournament incentives on investor beliefs. I follow Chemmanur and Yan (2017) 
and use adjusted turnover as a proxy to measure investor heterogeneous beliefs. My results suggest 
that, firms with high internal incentives are associated with lower degree of investors’ 
heterogeneous beliefs. With respect to the external incentives, my findings do not show any 
significant association.  
 
A4. Indicative Example with Top and Bottom Ten Compensation Awarding Companies 
Table IA5 presents an indicative example with ten high and low paying companies to CEOs 
for the years employed in my analysis. Panel A shows that firms which provide high remuneration 
packages to their top executives exhibit low underpricing levels, while Panel B indicates that firms 
with poorly compensated CEOs tend to have high underpricing levels. For example, Air Lease Corp 
offered around $58 million for its top manager on 2010, and after one year that it became public, its 
IPO first-day returns was only 5.47%. On the other hand, Workday Inc had a poorly compensated 
CEO with approximately $34,780 and an underpricing of 73.89%. 
 
A5. The Effect of Compensation and Tournament Incentives on Management and 
Underwriting Fees 
Table IA6 presents the results of my OLS regression tests on the effect of internal and 
external incentives on management and underwriting fees. Panel A shows that internal incentives 
(total CEO pay and firm pay gap) are negatively associated with management fees, which means 
that firms with either highly compensated CEOs or high pay disparities pay lower management 
fees. Moreover, external incentives (industry and local pay gap) are positively related to 
management fees. Thus, large pay disparities between the second-highest CEO in the same in 
industry-year (or MSA-year) of the firm and the CEO of each firm lead to higher management 





Chemmanur, T., and Yan, A. 2017. Product Market Advertising, Heterogeneous Beliefs, and the 
Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings. Journal of Corporate Finance 46, 1-24. 
Custodio, C., Ferreira, M., and Matos, P. 2013. Generalists versus Specialists: Lifetime Work 

























Table IA1: Board Governance Measure 
This table presents the results of applying principal components analysis to seven proxies of board governance quality (board 
independence, nominating committee, percentage of outside directors, busy directors, percentage of other directorships, board 
size, and number of board meetings). Scoring coefficients using the regression method, and eigenvalue and proportion of 
variation explained by the first factor are presented. The index is calculated by applying the scores to the standardized general 
ability components. The index is standardized to have zero mean and a standard deviation of one.  
Panel A: Principal Component Analysis 
 B_INDDIR IND_NOM B_%APPOINT B_BUSY LnB_OTHDIR LnB_SIZE LnB_MEET 
Scores 0.5162 0.2191 0.5317 0.3458 0.4340 0.2803 0.1276 
Proportion 
Explained 
0.3873       
Eigenvalue 1.5426       
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean SD Min Max 
B_INDDIR 0.69 0.32 0 1 
IND_NOM 0.34 0.47 0 1 
B_%APPOINT 0.55 0.26 0 1 
B_BUSY 0.43 0.50 0 1 
B_OTHDIR 2.74 1.64 0.14 12.67 
B_SIZE 5.07 3.67 1 22 
B_MEET 6.48 4.52 0 34 
 
Table IA2: Compensation Committee Quality Index 
This table presents the results of applying principal components analysis to seven proxies of board governance quality 
(compensation committee independence, percentage of outside directors, busy directors, compensation committee size, and 
number of compensation committee meetings). Scoring coefficients using the regression method, and eigenvalue and 
proportion of variation explained by the first factor are presented. The index is calculated by applying the scores to the 
standardized general ability components. The index is standardized to have zero mean and a standard deviation of one. 
Panel A: Principal Component Analysis 
 C_INDDIR C_%APPOINT C_BUSY LnC_SIZE LnC_MEET 
Scores 0.5631 0.5796 0.2511 0.5120 0.1477 
Proportion 
Explained 
0.5395     
Eigenvalue 2.6976     
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean SD Min Max 
C_INDDIR 0.74 0.37 0 1 
B_%APPOINT 0.68 0.35 0 1 
B_BUSY 0.36 0.48 0 1 
C_SIZE 2.69 1.13 1 13 











Table IA3: General Managerial Ability Index 
This table reports the results of applying principal components analysis to five proxies of general managerial ability based on 
a CEO past work experience (number of positions, number of firms, number of industries, CEO experience, and conglomerate 
experience). Scoring coefficients using the regression method, and eigenvalue and proportion of variation explained by the 
first factor are presented. The index is calculated by applying the scores to the standardized general ability components. The 
index is standardized to have zero mean and a standard deviation of one. Variable definitions are provided in Table A1 in the 
Appendix.  
Panel A: Principal Component Analysis 









Scores 0.4883 0.5642 0.5192 0.3173 0.2702 
Proportion Explained  0.4883    
Eigenvalue  2.441    
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Number of Positions 4.95 3.25 0 22 
Number of Firms 2.30 1.60 0 15 
Number of Industries 2.92 1.78 0 18 
CEO Experience 0.21 0.40 0 1 
Conglomerate 
Experience 




















Table IA4: Investor Heterogeneous Beliefs 
This table displays the effects of CEO compensation on Adjusted Turnover using ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. The 
sample consists of initial public offerings from 2000 to 2016 in the US stock market. The dependent variable is the Adjusted 
turnover. Adjusted Turnover is the log ratio of trading turnover (trading volume/shares outstanding) to the market average 
turnover in the relevant stock exchange. Management Fees is the ratio of management fees to gross proceeds. T-statistics are 
included in the parentheses and are adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by industry and year. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 




   
































































































































Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects 
(FF17) 
Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted    0.1854 0.1836 0.1885 0.2003 









Table IA5: Indicative Example: Top and Bottom Ten Compensation Awarding Companies 
This table reports the top and bottom paying companies to CEOs for the years employed in my analysis. The sample consists of 
1,658 IPOs that floated U.S. stock exchanges from the 1st of January 2000 to the 31st of December 2016. I relied on the Securities 
Data Company (SDC) Database to retrieve information on IPO deals. Data on CEO compensation were hand-collected from 
EDGAR.  
Panel A: Top Ten Compensation Awarding Companies 
IPO Date Company Initial Return Age at IPO Total Compensation Pre-IPO 
18/4/2011 Air Lease Corp 5.47% 0.69 $57,768,057 
9/3/2011 HCA Holdings Inc 3.40% 3.18 $38,201,047 
25/1/2011 Demand Media Inc 33.24% 2.89 $25,141,924 
16/11/2011 Delphi Automotive PLC -3.04% 0.00 $21,134,503 
5/11/2013 Barracuda Networks Inc 19.72 0.69 $19,125,316 
26/9/2013 Violin Memory Inc -22.00% 2.20 $18,175,738 
16/10/2014 Zayo Group Holdings Inc 15.79% 2.08 $17,931,597 
26/7/2016 Kadmon Holdings LLC 0.00% 2.08 $16,263,399 
30/9/2009 Talecris Biotherapeutics Hldg 11.32% 1.61 $16,154,671 
26/7/2016 Trinseo SA 6.58% 0.69 $16,058,057 
Panel B: Bottom Ten Compensation Awarding Companies 
24/6/2002 BioDelivery Sciences Inc -4.76% 2.08 $3,404 
31/7/2000 Western Multiplex Corp 16.67% 3.09 $8,333 
14/12/2006 US BioEnergy Corp 7.86% 0.69 $15,000 
14/12/2011 Mid-Con Energy Partners LP 0.00% 0.00 $15,361 
5/6/2014 Radius Health Inc 0.12% 1.95 $18,750 
27/10/2005 Accentia Biopharmaceuticals -9.38% 1.39 $20,000 
25/10/2012 Xplore Technologies Corp -5.00% 2.83 $29,881 
5/11/2013 Arc Logistics Partners LP 0.00% 0.00 $32,558 
13/10/2005 PokerTek Inc -6.82% 1.10 $33,333 









Table IA6: Management and Underwriting Fees 
This table reports results from OLS estimation using management and underwriting fees as my dependent variables. Management 
Fees is the ratio of management fees to gross proceeds. Underwriting Fees is the ratio of underwriting fees to gross proceeds. T-
statistics are included in the parentheses and are adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by year and 
industry. ***, **, And * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Management Fees 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total CEO Compensation 
-0.01*** 
(-4.12) 
   








Local Pay Gap    
0.01** 
(2.11) 
Control Variables Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects  (FF 17) Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted    0.1990 0.1903 0.4238 0.3845 
N 813 813 813 813 
Panel B: Underwriting Fees 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total CEO Compensation 
-0.01 
(-1.64) 
   








Local Pay Gap    
-0.01 
(-0.17) 
Control Variables Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects  (FF 17) Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted    0.3541 0.3705 0.3547 0.3057 












Figure IA1: Compensation in IPOs (2000-2016) 
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Panel B: Total Compensation Vs Underpricing 
Total CEO Compensation Cash CEO Compensation Underpricing
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Chapter 3: Managerial Incentives and Firm Survival: 
Rent Extraction or Optimal Contracting? 
1. Introduction 
The dramatic rise in executive pay of U.S. public firms over the last decades has fueled an 
intense debate over the adequacy of executive compensation packages. In response to this, 
academics argue that the litmus test of an effective compensation program is whether it provides 
sufficient incentives to motivate qualified managers to perform in accordance with the long-term 
objectives of shareholders (e.g., Frydman and Jenter, 2010; Murphy, 2013). Despite the 
considerable academic interest, existing findings on the link between executive rewards and 
corporate performance outcomes are mixed (for a survey, see Edmans et al., 2017). Notably, this 
research stream is primarily directed towards large and established organizations.  
I bring new insights to this debate by analyzing the incentive effect of executive pay in the 
context of small, fast-growing, entrepreneurial firms, namely, the Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). 
IPOs are crucial determinants of a healthy economy and a vibrant financial market (Fama and 
French, 2004; Bhattacharya et al., 2015). Nevertheless, our knowledge about the efficacy of their 
pay-setting practices is limited, since IPO firms operate in a substantially different contracting 
environment compared to mature publicly-listed organizations (Filatotchev and Allcock, 2013).  
Unlike seasoned firms, IPO executives typically hold high ownership stakes (Certo et al., 
2001). Large ownership positions serve to align executive actions with shareholder interests (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Thus, the traditional incentive devices of large, established corporations may 
matter less for the newly listed firms. Yet, such ownership positions can limit the managers’ ability 
to diversify risk, thereby inducing them to reject risky but value enhancing projects (Devers et al., 
2007). Also, the increased tendency of IPOs to fail in the aftermarket increases the risk of job loss 
and reputational damage in the labor market for executives (Fama and French, 2004). As such, 
either due to undiversified portfolios or career concerns, IPO executives can become risk-averse 
and develop strong motives to underinvest. 
Furthermore, the substantial equity ownership allows self-serving executives to exercise 
greater control (Certo et al., 2001). Some IPO managers, thus, can engage in empire-building and 
invest the IPO proceeds in value destroying projects (overinvestment, as in Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006). Alternatively, some other IPO managers may prefer a quiet life and avoid costly 
efforts towards increasing firm efficiency (Bertrand and Mullianathan, 2003). This myopic behavior 
allows the status quo to persist, thereby exacerbating underinvestment or overinvestment. 
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How can IPO firms mitigate these agency problems? One solution could be to setup reliable 
monitoring mechanisms. However, it is well documented that, compared to mature firms, IPOs 
have unsophisticated and underdeveloped governance structures (Filatotchev and Allcock, 2013; 
Jain et al., 2013). A plausible alternative would be to resort to effective incentive compensation 
plans. This begs several follow-up questions. Are the pay-setting practices of IPO firms able to 
motivate the managers to optimize value and act in the long-term interests of shareholders? If so, 
what is the most-effective pay structure for such young firms? Also, compared to managers with 
weak incentives, what do managers with high-powered incentive contracts do differently? 
To address these questions, I focus on the compensation arrangements of the top 
management team. In doing so, I utilize IPO prospectuses and manually collect information about 
the level and composition of pay awarded to the CEO and the other senior executives of IPO firms. 
Using this data, I analyze whether compensation contracts at the time of the offering affect the long-
term failure (survival) rates
17
 and the related corporate polices in the post-IPO period. 
I develop my theoretical framework based on two competing views: the efficient contracting 
view and the rent-extraction view. According to the efficient contracting view, executive pay 
mitigates agency problems arising from divergences of interests and risk preferences between 
shareholders and managers (Murphy, 2013). Compensation contracts’ effectiveness can be 
improved either by increasing CEO pay or by increasing the Pay Gap between the CEO and the 
other subordinate executives. The former increases compensation-based incentives for the CEO 
(Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004), whereas the latter captures the promotion-based tournament 
incentives for the other senior executives (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). If the pay-design process in 
IPOs is driven by shareholder concerns, then both of these incentive measures will encourage 
executives to exert greater effort and undertake risky but value enhancing projects. In addition, 
greater emphasis will be placed to forms of pay that tie closely managerial actions with long-term 
firm performance (such as equity-based compensation elements). These, in turn, will mitigate 
agency problems associated with suboptimal investment or short-termism and improve the chances 
of firm survival in the post-IPO market. 
In contrast, the rent-extraction view postulates that CEO pay is influenced by the CEOs 
themselves or by ineffective boards that have succumbed to powerful CEOs (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2004). In this respect, higher observed CEO pay or a larger Pay Gap is not an outcome of an 
efficient process; rather, it represents rent-extraction at the expense of shareholders or other 
                                                          
17
 The IPO failure rate or the IPO failure risk is defined as the probability of a firm delisting from a major stock 
exchange within five years of its IPO event (Demers and Joos, 2007). In turn, the term “IPO survival” refers to the 
opposite of IPO failure, and as such, it is calculated as = (1 – the IPO failure rate).  
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executive members (Chen et al., 2019). In this case, powerful self-interested CEOs will inflate their 
pay (and also the Pay Gap) and they will do so by choosing forms of pay that are more difficult to 
value such as stock option awards (Kuhnen and Zwiebel, 2009). Thus, under the rent-extracting 
view, higher CEO pay or larger Pay Gap implies more severe agency problems associated with 
suboptimal investment or short-termism, and hence, lower chances of IPO survival. 
I conduct empirical tests to distinguish between these competing hypotheses, and I find that 
IPO firms with generously compensated CEOs and/or large pay disparities have better chances of 
survival.
18
 Economically, firms with CEO pay (Pay Gap) in the 75
th
 percentile have a failure risk 
that is, on average, 20.84% (20.55%) lower than the failure risk of firms with CEO pay (Pay Gap) 
in the 25
th
 percentile. These results are primarily driven by the equity-based components of pay 
(stock and option awards, and other long-term incentive elements), rather than the cash-based 
components (salary and bonus). This suggests that, an important objective of executive 
compensation arrangements of private firms that are about to go public, is to motivate managers to 
undertake long-term actions that minimize the risk of premature delisting.  
By the nature of my data, the incidence of delisting takes place after I observe the pay-
setting practices of IPO firms. This reduces the bias arising from simultaneity. Nevertheless, the 
pay-design process is a voluntary choice made by firms. Hence, drawing causal inferences is not 
straightforward for various reasons. One reason is that my estimates may be biased due to omitted 
variables that affect both my executive pay measures and firm survival in a similar manner. To deal 
effectively with omitted variable bias and the related endogeneity arising from differences in 
observable characteristics between firms with and without high-powered incentives, I apply the 
entropy balancing technique of Hainmueller (2012). This approach achieves covariate balance 
between the treated (firms with high-powered incentives) and control samples (firms with weak 
incentives) by reweighting observations such that the post-weighing distribution of treated and 
control observations are virtually identical (Wilde, 2017; Jacob et al., 2018; Chapman et al., 2019).  
I further reduce the possibility of spurious links between executive pay and IPO failure risk 
by implementing an instrumental variable (IV) approach that exploits the fact that firms set their 
compensation packages by mimicking their industry peer groups (Faulkender and Yang, 2010; 
Bizjak et al., 2011). Kale et al. (2009) argue that, while industry pay practices directly affect a 
                                                          
18
 I focus on firm survival because it is a salient measure of long-term performance in the IPO context. Unlike more 
narrowly defined performance measures, firm survival captures the aggregate effect of all positive and negative factors 
influencing firm outcomes (Chadwick et al., 2016). In this respect, it encompasses all channels (risk- or return-related) 
through which the top management team might affect corporate viability (Jain and Kini, 2000). Most importantly, it 
acknowledges the possibility of recent IPO firms having a different objective function than their seasoned counterparts, 
since they are generally more concerned with their ability to maintain their access to financial markets and fund risky 
projects rather than demonstrating a stream of positive profits (Klepper, 2002). 
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firm’s pay design process, there are no economic reasons to expect that they affect the relative firm 
performance within the industry. My instrumental variable analysis suggests that endogeneity 
concerns due to unobservable factors are not the main driver of my findings.  
Overall, the results suggest that there is a robust relationship between executive pay and IPO 
survival probability. This is intuitive because even if the board endogenously selects a CEO by 
management style, the CEO would need to be sufficiently incentivized to implement the intended 
policies. A natural conclusion that emerges from my findings is the following: If managerial pay of 
IPO firms is indeed structured in line with shareholder value maximization considerations, its 
impact on firm survival should vary in ways predictable by the efficient contracting theory. To 
examine the validity of this argument, I follow a sample partitioning approach and find that the 
CEO pay effect is more pronounced for firms with low agency conflicts (i.e., with specialist or 
relatively young CEOs, strong governance mechanisms, and high institutional ownership), whereas 
the influence of the CEO Pay Gap is strengthened among firms where the top executives have a 
higher likelihood of promotion to the CEO position (i.e., when the CEO is non-founder, generalist, 
or close to retirement). 
While firm survival is a comprehensive measure of performance that captures the 
cumulative impact of managerial incentives on both risk and return, it does not inform us on how 
exactly well-incentivized executives manage to reduce IPO failure risk. Additional analysis reveals 
that firms with high-powered incentives are associated with higher investment efficiency, larger 
investment scale (capital expenditures and R&D), and superior firm performance. Interestingly, 
these firms also tend to avoid potentially risky earnings management practices that can result in 
earnings restatements and even firm failures (Hribar and Jenkins, 2004).   
The above findings add to the literature on the efficacy of executive pay schemes. Prior 
literature has explored whether compensation-based incentives affect either corporate performance 
(e.g., Kale et al., 2009; Bebchuk et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2013; Brisker et al., 2014) or risk taking 
behavior (Kini and Williams, 2012). Previous studies have also focused on large, established public 
corporations. Given that firm-survival is an all-encompassing measure of firm “success” it offers a 
sharper test of the efficacy of the compensation structure. Importantly, my focus on IPOs considers 
a contractual setting which is substantially different from that of the typical publicly-traded 
company. By doing so, I show that in firms transitioning from the private to the public domain a 
meaningful part of executive compensation is largely driven by optimally-set executive incentives 
rather than weak boards. In this respect, my findings speak to the debate over the effectiveness of 
corporate incentive mechanisms in various settings.  
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In addition, my work is related to previous studies focusing on the interrelationships 
between corporate governance and the aftermarket performance of IPO firms. This line of research 
has identified a wide range of governance mechanisms that can reduce the extent of adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems, including board characteristics, the strategic role of founder 
CEOs, and the governance role of early stage investors (Jain and Kini, 2000; Butler et al., 2014). To 
the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to establish a link between executive pay incentives 
(CEO compensation and the CEO Pay Gap) and the long-term prospects of newly-public firms. In 
this regard, it adds a new dimension to the nascent literature focusing on the determinants of IPO 
failure risk (Demers and Joos, 2007; Yung et al, 2008). Namely, it establishes CEO pay and 
tournament incentives as an additional driver of this type of risk.    
My work is also closely related to a limited number of studies that examine the association 
between executive incentives and IPO outcomes. Lowry and Murphy (2007) and Chahine and 
Goergen (2011) consider whether IPO option grants relate to underpricing, while Certo et al. (2003) 
study the impact of options on IPO valuation. These studies focus on the price discovery process, 
and particularly, on investor perceptions about the efficacy of equity-based incentives at the time of 
the IPO. My study differs in two primary dimensions. First, by investigating the link between 
compensation-based incentives and firm survival I acknowledge that managerial compensation 
incentives do not play only a symbolic role (as reflected in investor perceptions, underpricing, and 
short-term IPO performance) but also a substantive role (as reflected in their impact on the long-
term viability of newly listed organizations). Second, I demonstrate that, in addition to 
performance-based incentives, promotion-based incentives of the lower ranked executives also 
matter in IPOs. In doing so, I provide a more complete picture of how the internal incentive 
structures of relatively younger ventures and entrepreneurial firms can serve as an effective 
governance tool. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. The next section discusses the hypothesis 
development. Section 3 and 4 provide an overview of the sample selection procedure and outline 
the survival analysis methodology. Section 5 presents preliminary statistics as well as the empirical 
findings about the impact of total CEO pay and the CEO Pay Gap on the probability of failure of 
IPO firms in periods subsequent to the initial offering. Section 6 contains several tests of robustness 
and endogeneity. Section 7 analyzes the differential impact of CEO compensation and tournament 
incentives across several governance and CEO characteristics. Section 8 presents the impact of 





2. Related Literature and Testable Predictions 
2.1 The Nature of Agency Problems in IPOs 
Initial public offerings (IPOs) enable firms to sell equity shares to outside investors. This 
watershed event enhances corporate visibility and legitimacy (Certo, 2003). Notably, it provides 
access to considerable financial resources that firms can use to finance growth or to reconcile 
current obligations (Pagano et al., 1998; Brau and Fawcett, 2006). However, it results in a 
separation of ownership and control, and hence, to a reduction in the incentives of managers to 
work hard and expend the required effort to pursue the best interests of the shareholders (Chahine 
and Goergen, 2011).  
Arguably, firms helmed by managers pursuing their own well-being without (adequately) 
considering the goals and risk preferences of the shareholders are subject to moral hazard problems 
that might be detrimental to firm value (Chahine and Goergen, 2014). But what are the underlying 
mechanisms that may give rise to these problems in the IPO context?  
Certo et al. (2009) argue that the typically high ownership stakes of IPO executives may 
induce them to become risk averse and pass up risk-increasing projects that would be beneficial to 
shareholders. This behavior is broadly consistent with underinvestment arising from risk-averse 
undiversified manages who are reluctant to accept risky but value enhancing projects (Amihud and 
Lev, 1981). Relatedly, the increased propensity of newly public firms to underperform in the 
aftermarket imposes career related costs on managers in the form of job security and/or reputation 
capital (Welbourne and Andrews, 1996; Fama and French, 2004), thereby encouraging them to 
forgo risky but positive net present value (NPV) projects. Again, this induces managers to become 
“too conservative” and take fewer risks than desired by shareholders (excessive policy conservatism 
à la Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991 and Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992). 
While the above arguments imply that executives may underutilize the IPO proceeds due to 
undiversified portfolios, risk aversion, or career concerns, one could also argue that some 
executives might gain private benefits by overinvesting. For instance, empire-building executives 
might prefer to direct the IPO proceeds in unproductive projects that harm shareholder value 
(Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Dong et al., 2010). Alternatively, some managers might prefer a 
quiet life in the post-IPO period and avoid costly efforts that would otherwise increase productive 
efficiency (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). Since this myopic behavior allows the status 
quo to persist, it would exacerbate both underinvestment and overinvestment problems.  
Therefore, firm managers have both the opportunities and the motives to engage in actions 
that jeopardize the interests of their employers. The main objective of IPO issuers, however, is to 
ensure a smooth transition to the public domain and to efficiently deploy the proceeds from the 
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offering. Hence, how can the shareholders constrain undesired behaviors that might threaten the 
viability of their newly-public firm? Could incentive contracts become part of the solution? 
 
2.2 The Role of Incentive Contracts in IPOs 
 One way to protect shareholder interests is to setup reliable monitoring mechanisms (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). However, IPOs tend to suffer from a major disadvantage when compared to 
more mature firms. As they are young and have limited resources, they are less likely to attract 
independent boards with sufficient experience and expertise to effectively perform their duties 
(Filatotchev and Allcock, 2013; Chahine and Goergen, 2014; Larcker and Tayan, 2018).  
To overcome this challenge, IPO issuers are likely to resort to incentive compensation 
schemes (Allcock and Filatotchev, 2009). Do such pay practices indeed motivate managers to 
optimize value and act in the interests of shareholders? While there is a vast literature on the nature 
of the pay-setting process and the outcomes it produces, the empirical literature has not yet 
conclusively determined whether the observed patterns and pay practices are beneficial for 
shareholders (see, for instance, the review by Frydman and Jenter, 2010). Relatedly, most of the 
existing evidence solely focuses on large and established corporations, leaving thus the field of IPO 
pay-setting practices largely unexplored.  
In this study, I add to this debate by focusing on the efficacy of IPO pay practices. I argue 
that the IPO market is very suitable for studying the effectiveness of incentive contracts. As Engel 
et al. (2002) point out, due to the inherent uncertainty and high information asymmetry surrounding 
the IPO process, principals do not generally have a strong sense of what actions an agent could and 
should be pursuing. Hence, compared to mature firms, the role of incentive contracts is even more 
consequential for firms that are about to establish a separation of ownership and control. Perhaps, 
more importantly, the IPO event constitutes the first time when the firms become serious about 
developing a formal compensation system (Larcker and Tayan, 2018). This system would set a 
precedent for the newly-listed firm to follow for the years to come in the public domain (Gao and 
Jain, 2011). Thus, unlike pay packages of established firms, IPO compensation arrangements are 
more likely to represent a structural response to transformational challenges (i.e., the transition from 
the private to the public domain) rather than an outcome of past performance (Baker and Gompers, 
2003). As such, my study has the potential not only to yield new insights about the efficacy of 




2.3 Hypothesis Development 
In order to analyze the role of pay practices on IPO survival, I draw on studies that focus on 
the causes and effects of compensation. The literature advances two dominant perspectives about 
executive compensation. The first perspective views executive compensation contracts as the 
outcome of shareholder value-maximizing firms that strive to align the interests of principals and 
agents (the efficient contracting perspective).
19
 The second perspective, which I call the rent-
extraction view, sees CEO pay as a consequence of rent-extraction by a powerful CEO.  
 
2.3.1 Efficient Contracting View of CEO Pay 
Under the efficient contracting view, the agency problems between shareholders and 
executives can be mitigated by choosing executive contracts that discourage self-interested 
managers to pursue ulterior motives at the expense of shareholder value (Murphy, 2013). 
Conceptually, IPO firms can achieve this goal by designing incentive plans that have two distinct 
effects on managerial behavior: motivate managers to expend additional effort and promote a risk-
taking behavior that optimizes long-term shareholder value. To do so, they can increase the 
sensitivity of CEO wealth to firm value by resorting to incentive-based forms of pay (i.e., such as 
stock options, restricted stocks, or long-term incentive plans). The convex payoff structure of 
variable pay components, and particularly, stock-options, enables firms to directly tie remuneration 
with firm performance, thereby mitigating manager’s aversion to investing in risky but positive 
NPV projects (Bolton et al., 2015).
20
  
                                                          
19
 To be more precise, the efficient contracting view argues that compensation contracts are chosen to maximize value 
for shareholders, taking into account the need to provide adequate incentives as well as the desire to attract and retain 
highly-skilled managers. In other words, high pay does not stem exclusively from powerful incentives, but also from 
greater managerial ability and effort. In support of this idea, several studies argue that pay design is the result of a 
process that reflects the scarcity of CEO talent. For instance, Gabaix and Landier (2008) document a strong firm-size-
CEO-pay relation and interpret this as an outcome of a process that reflects a positive assortative mechanism, whereby 
more talented CEOs are matched with larger firms, where their value-added is greater. Chang et al. (2010) argue that 
CEO pay reflects differences in managerial ability and/or labor market opportunities, as they show that upon CEO 
departure, higher CEO’s pay is associated with a negative stock price reaction and with a higher probability of 
subsequent labor market success for the CEO. Similarly, Falato et al. (2015) show that executive pay is positively 
related to proxies of reputation and managerial ability. Further, Engelberg et al. (2013) suggest that a CEOs’ rolodex is 
an important driver of the pay premium, whereas Song and Wan (2019) document that variation in the observed levels 
of CEO compensation are more consistent with managerial talent than managerial power. This strand of the literature 
provides a wealth of evidence supporting the idea that pay accounts for need to attract and retain talented managers. 
Therefore, it considers only the level of pay, but not the structure of the contract, which we argue is an important 
mechanism driving managerial incentives. For this reason, our hypotheses rely on the literature concerned with the 
“incentive” role of pay rather than it being a reflection of managerial “ability”. 
20
 It should be noted that rational executives should value equity grants well below their fair market values. The value of 
equity grants is determined by diversified investors in financial markets. In contrast, executives receive performance-
linked pay and have often large holdings of company stock and options that are highly correlated with their firm-
specific human capital. Therefore, given the inherent riskiness of the payoffs of equity-based instruments, executives 
will naturally demand a “risk premium” for accepting stock options in lieu of safer forms of compensation, and this risk 
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I conjecture that, if the pay-setting process of IPOs is dominated by shareholder concerns, 
greater importance will be assigned to equity-based forms of pay. Such compensation instruments 
allow firms to align managers’ and shareholders’ interests as they encourage managers to exert 
greater effort as well as to adopt a long-term perspective. Consistent with this logic, Beatty and 
Zajac (1994) show that options-based pay alleviates IPO managers’ risk aversion. Furthermore, 
Certo et al. (2003) and Sanders and Boivie (2004) show that investors value pay structures that 
align executive incentives with shareholder interests, whereas Chahine and Goergen (2014) 
document a positive effect of pay-performance sensitivity on post-IPO outcomes.  
Therefore, I predict that an effective compensation contract of an IPO firm’s CEO should 
attach greater importance to equity-based compensation. This practice will alleviate agency 
problems associated with suboptimal investment (underinvestment and/or overinvestment), 
operational inefficiencies, and short-termism. This, in turn, can lead to superior firm performance, 
and eventually, to higher chances of survival – which is the ultimate goal of IPOs. This reasoning 
yields the following hypothesis. 
 
Efficient Contracting Hypothesis of CEO Pay. The level of CEO pay is positively related to IPO 
survival. This relationship is mainly driven by the equity-based component of CEO pay.  
 
2.3.2 Rent-Extraction View of CEO Pay  
While the efficient contracting theory views executive pay as mitigating agency problems 
between executive and shareholders, the rent-extraction view maintains that both the level and the 
composition of CEO pay do not reflect incentives designed to optimize firm value; instead, it is a 
consequence of increased bargaining power during the pay-setting process (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2003, 2004). 
The rent-extraction view starts with the observation that, in practice, executive pay is set by 
the board of directors and its compensation committee. Then, it adds another layer of complexity: 
the ability of self-interested executives to influence (at least partly) both the level and composition 
of their own compensation, often (if not invariably) at the expense of the shareholders (Core et al., 
1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Bebchuk et al., 2002; Sun et al., 2009). Since 
compensation committee members have their own agenda, they may have incentives to curry favors 
with executives. Such behavior is facilitated by the absence of effective monitoring mechanisms 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
premium will increase when they are risk-averse and have undiversified wealth portfolios. Recognizing that, directors 
routinely agree to pay more (than necessary) to compensate for the increase risk (Edmans et al., 2017). 
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and market forces (i.e., capital and product markets, the market for corporate control, and the 
managerial labor market) that would restrict deviations from efficient contracting (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2003, 2004). 
This view is motivated by several compensation practices, as well as specific cases of 
outrageous and excess pay packages where boards appear to have succumbed to managerial power 
(Murphy 2013). It is also supported by some observational studies documenting a tendency of 
powerful CEOs to intervene in compensation arrangements and extract economic rents through 
forms of pay that are less observable or more difficult to value such as stock options (Murphy, 
2002; Hayes et al., 2012), perquisites (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2004), and severance pay (Goldman and Huang, 2014). Interestingly, while these studies 
(implicitly or explicitly) rely on market inefficiency arguments, Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2009), 
demonstrate analytically that CEOs can extract unobservable benefits (hidden pay) even under 
equilibrium. This is likely to happen because firing is costly, and any CEO replacement is also 
expected to extract rents. The authors also theoretically confirm that hidden pay is more likely to 
involve options and restricted stock rather than salary and bonus. 
If self-serving CEOs influence the contract design process, then the resulting compensation 
packages may provide, for instance, an amount of salary that is hard to justify. They may also result 
in a weaker link between CEO incentives and firm performance. The former cost is direct, easily 
observable, but relatively small compared to the total firm value. In contrast, the latter, i.e., cost 
related to the incentive-based pay component can be quite substantial, because it provides 
insufficient incentives to the CEO to exert effort or refrain from empire building (e.g., Bergstresser 
and Philippon, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Dong et al., 2010).  
To sum up, I predict that, if the pay-setting process in IPOs is dominated by powerful self-
serving executives, then it will lead to large increases in pay, which are often unrelated to 
performance. In this case, IPO firms, and especially, those with complex forms of compensation 
(i.e., equity-based pay), would exhibit various agency problems, such as over- or underinvestment, 
short-termism, lower profitability, and eventually lower survival rates.   
 
Rent-Extraction Hypothesis of CEO Pay: The level of CEO pay is negatively related to IPO 







2.3.3 Tournament Theory and CEO Pay Gap 
The literature discussed above focuses predominantly on the CEO and does not usually 
consider the incentives of the other top executives that are at the next step down the corporate 
ladder. In addition to the traditional performance-based incentives, non-CEO executives respond to 
incentives stemming from the opportunities for promotion to the highest level of the corporate 
hierarchy, the position of CEO (Baker et al., 1988). In such a tournament, the agents have strong 
incentives to expend effort to perform well, because the best relative performer could become the 
firm’s next CEO and receive the tournament prize, which includes higher pay, more privileges, and 
greater prestige (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1986; Murphy, 1999).  
Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Prendergast (1999) note that the effort expended by agents 
will increase with the magnitude of the promotion prize, i.e., the Pay Gap between the CEO and the 
other subordinate executives. Hence, the payoff from this greater effort will translate to better 
chances of promotion, which at the same time, should deliver superior firm performance and higher 
shareholder value. Several empirical papers provide evidence to this effect (e.g., Lee et al., 2008; 
Kale et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2011; Burns et al., 2017).
21
 Furthermore, because a large intra-firm 
tournament prize motivates senior executives to stay with the firm and invest in firm-specific 
capital, it helps to build a large pool of skilled internal CEO candidates. This reduces the need for 
an external CEO (i.e., a manager with relatively less firm-specific capital) and decreases the 
bargaining power of the incumbent CEO (Masulis and Mobbs, 2011), thereby alleviating the moral 
hazard problems associated with CEO turnover and CEO succession risk.   
In addition to the managerial effort, the option-like features of intra-organizational CEO 
promotion tournaments imply that another way to increase the managerial output is to promote 
managerial risk-taking. Goel and Thakor (2008) model the link between tournament incentives and 
risk-taking behavior and show theoretically that, in equilibrium, each executive has an incentive to 
undertake projects riskier than the current portfolio in order to increase her output and promotion 
probability. Kini and Williams (2012) empirically support this proposition as they find a 
significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives. 
Overall, rank-order tournament incentives provided by the board may have two distinct 
effects on managerial behavior: they motivate managers to expend additional effort and/or to 
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 Masulis and Zhang (2013) provide an additional explanation for the existence of large pay gaps, which is also 
consistent with the optimal contracting framework. They argue that differences in talent, ability, and effort between the 
CEO and subordinate senior executives may also explain the observed corporate pay disparities. Consistent with this 
productivity-based explanation of pay disparities, Chang et al. (2010) find that departures of CEOs from firms with high 
CEO pay disparity experience negative stock price responses around the announcement of the departure. They interpret 
this finding as consistent with the view that financial markets tend to associate high CEO pay disparity with a higher 
managerial contribution to firm’s value. 
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promote risk-taking behavior. To the extent that these incentives are an optimal response to the 
opportunities and constraints facing the firm, I anticipate that they provide a (partial) solution to the 
agency problems emanating from monitoring issues, especially in firms in which the agency costs 
of managerial discretion can be hazardous, such as in the case of IPOs (Henderson and Fredrickson, 
2001). In this respect, I predict that, the presence of a large Pay Gap between the CEO and other 
senior executives in IPOs, and particularly, the equity-based component of this disparity, will 
mitigate various agency costs and managerial short-termism. It should also result in higher 
productivity and investment efficiency (lower underinvestment or overinvestment), and eventually, 
higher rates of survival. Based on these considerations, I develop the following hypothesis for CEO 
Pay Gap: 
 
Tournament Hypothesis of Pay Gap. The level of CEO Pay Gap is positively correlated with IPO 
survival. This relationship is mainly driven by the equity component of the CEO Pay Gap 
 
  2.3.4 Rent-Extraction View of CEO Pay Gap 
Although large pay disparities between the CEO and other senior executives may be 
regarded as a part of an optimal labor contract, it is also important to consider why this might not be 
always the case. Several researchers predict analytically and empirically that, while agents may 
respond to tournament incentives by increasing their effort, this behavior can lead to dysfunctional 
responses (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992). Some studies suggest that stronger 
tournament-based incentives are associated with a higher propensity to engage in fraudulent 
activities (Wang et al., 2010; Haß et al., 2015), a greater likelihood of securities action lawsuits (Shi 
et al., 2015), and more frequent manipulation or misreporting of firm performance (Park, 2017). 
Furthermore, corporate tournament contests can be detrimental to the firm if they lead to excessive 
managerial risk-taking. This is evidenced by Bebchuk et al. (2011) and Chen et al. (2013) who 
show that large pay disparities are associated with certain dimensions of risk-taking which are 
indicative of governance problems.  
Collectively, the rent-extraction view of tournament incentives postulates that large 
executive pay disparities promote unethical CEO behavior and greater risk-taking at the expense of 
shareholders. Therefore, if stronger tournament incentives do not result in a better alignment of the 
interests of principals and agents, they will exacerbate agency problems, investment inefficiency, 
short-termism, and thus leading to lower post-IPO performance and worse survival rates. This 
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phenomenon will be primarily driven by the equity-based component of Pay Gap because it permits 
CEOs to camouflage rent-extraction. This reasoning implies the following hypothesis: 
 
Rent-Extraction Hypothesis of Pay Gap. The level of CEO Pay Gap is negatively correlated with 
IPO survival. This relationship is mainly driven by the equity faction of the CEO Pay Gap. 
 
3.  Sample Selection and Methodology 
I retrieve initial public offerings (IPOs) from the Thomson ONE Banker database. My 
sample period starts from 2000 and tracks all IPO issuers until 31 December 2017 to determine 
whether or not they get delisted. Because my minimum survival window is five years, my 
population of IPOs cover the period from 2000-2012.
22
 Following the common filtering criteria in 
the IPO literature (e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 2004), I eliminate financial institutions, American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs), closed-end funds, unit offers, and any other non-common stock type 
of shares. In addition, I eliminate any IPOs with an offer price below $5.  
I obtain IPO background and issuance information from Thomson ONE Banker, including 
the issue data, offer price, total proceeds raised, whether the firm is backed by venture capitalists, 
and the details of the underwriters involved. For the underwriter prestige ranking, the study 
employs Jay Ritter’s measures of underwriter quality.
23
 Accounting data are retrieved from the 
Compustat database, whereas stock prices are obtained from the Center for Research and Security 
Prices (CRSP). 
Data regarding the executive compensation (e.g., salary, bonus, restricted stock, options, and 
long-term incentive plans) and CEO equity ownership were carefully hand collected from the IPO 
prospectuses (S-1) in the EDGAR database of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC).
 
I also use the IPO prospectuses to construct the biographical profiles of CEOs (e.g., CEO 
duality, age, tenure, education degrees) and the BoardEx database for information about their work 
experience. After merging the data from these databases and eliminating IPOs with missing values, 
my final sample consists of 1,178 IPO firms.   
CRSP provides delisting codes to indicate the status of the issuing firm, specifically, 
whether the firm is still trading and the specific reasons for delisting. Based on the three-digit CRSP 
delisting codes, I divide the IPO firms into two broad groups: (1) voluntary deaths (acquired firms: 
codes 200-290), and (2) involuntary deaths (liquidated firms: codes 400-490 or dropped: codes 500-
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 For example, a firm that went public in 2000 is tracked for 17 years compared to only five years for a firm that went 







 For my baseline tests, all delistings – either voluntary or involuntary – within five years 
from the IPO are treated as failures (Jain and Kini, 2000; Demers and Joos, 2007). This process 
yields 274 voluntary deaths (274 acquired firms) and 84 involuntary deaths (82 dropped firms and 2 
liquidated firms). By definition, all the remaining firms that continued to operate independently as 
public corporations within the same period are treated as survivors (i.e., 814 active firms with codes 
100-171 and 6 exchanged firms with codes 300-390).  
Note that not all voluntary IPO delistings result necessarily in a reduction of shareholder 
wealth. In this respect, it is not clear a priori whether and which M&A delistings should be regarded 
as a positive or a negative outcome for IPO investors (Yung et al., 2008). For example, while Fama 
and French (2004) argue that low-quality IPO firms are more likely to merge, Zingales (1995) 
suggests that the IPO event may be just the first step in a gradual sale of the company (i.e., not a 
failure). In section 6.2, I explicitly address this concern by treating M&A delisting either as genuine 
survivors or as censored survivors (Espenlaub et al., 2016). Since the results from this treatment are 
more robust than the one from the baseline tests, in my baseline analysis, I adopt a conservative 
approach and maintain my view of M&A delisting as failures. 
 
4. Research Design 
4.1 Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
To assess my hypotheses, and specifically, whether the survival profile of my IPO firms is a 
function of executive compensation incentives set at the pre-IPO year, I employ a nonparametric 
approach, namely, the Cox (1972) proportional hazard model. Unlike ordinary least squares (OLS) 
and binary dependent variable models, the hazard function follows the firm over a specific time 
period that identifies precisely when a company experiences an event of interest (i.e., the event of 
delisting). In my context, it allows us to take into account the length of time that a company 
survives (Hensler et al., 1997). This is particularly useful for censored data, i.e., events that either 
have different time horizons or have yet to occur (Jain and Kini, 2000).
 25
 I estimate the following 
model: 
                                                          
24
 Liquidation involves the termination of a firm’s operation and forced sales of its remaining assets. Unlike liquidation, 
however, a firm can be dropped from the exchange due to its inability to cope with the demands of public trading, that 
is, unlisted trading privileges, insufficient number of market makers, insufficient number of shareholders, price fell 
below acceptable level, insufficient capital, surplus, and/or equity, insufficient (or noncompliance with rules of) float or 
assets, and company’s request for liquidation and deregistration. A detailed explanation of the CRSP delisting codes 
can be found here: http://www.crsp.com/products/documentation/delisting-codes. 
25
 In my study, the survival time of IPO firms is right-censored because many firms that went public are still trading. 
Also, the time window is different for each firm depending on its IPO date.  
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 (     (                                                                         (1) 
 
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function, and t is the time to failure (the duration to the delisting 
date). The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether the firm delists 
within five years of the IPO date (failure risk).
26
  
The managerial pay incentives variables are the total CEO compensation (Total CEO Pay) 
and Total Pay Gap (tournament incentives). I define the total CEO compensation as the natural 
logarithm of the sum of (1) short-term CEO compensation in the form of salary, bonus, and other 
fixed annual payments, and (2) long-term or equity-based CEO compensation in the form of stock 
grants, option awards, and other long-term incentive pay-outs (Kale et al., 2009; Murphy, 2012). 
Specifically, 
                 (                                     
    (                                                 
    (                                   
                                    
(2) 
I measure the strength of tournament-based incentives (i.e., the pay disparity) as the natural 
logarithm of the difference between the CEO’s compensation and the median pay of the other 
senior executives (Bognanno, 2001; Kale et al., 2009). I compute three versions of this gap: Total 
Pay Gap, which is based on total compensation, Short-Term Pay Gap, which is based only on 
short-term compensation, and Long-Term Pay Gap which is based only on short-term 
compensation. Specifically, 
                 (                         
                                                                    
  (3) 
I compute log (Short-Term Gap) and log (Long-Term Gap) in an analogous manner. In line 
with Kale et al. (2009), I require at least three non-CEO managers for the calculation of the Pay 
Gap measures. Due to instances in which the Pay Gap is negative, I monotonically transform all 
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 A negative (positive) coefficient indicates that an increase in managerial incentives leads to a decrease (increase) in 
the probability of delisting. The hazard ratio for each independent variable is computed as the exponentiated coefficient 
for the variable; it measures the increase in failure risk for a unit increase in the value of the independent variable. If the 
hazard ratio is above one, then an increase in the covariate increases the failure rate, while a hazard ratio of less than 
one indicates that an increase in the covariate decreases the failure rate (Jain and Martin, 2005). Because I use 




observations by adding a constant equivalent to the absolute value of the minimum gap to each 




4.2 Control Variables 
 I control for a variety of CEO-specific, IPO-specific, and firm-specific characteristics that 
are indicated by prior literature as important determinants of IPO survival. Starting from the CEO 
attributes, several studies suggest that firms helmed by a CEO who is also the founder, the 
chairperson, or long-tenured obtain better valuations and survive longer after the IPO (e.g., Nelson, 
2003; Adams et al., 2005; Gounopoulos and Pham, 2018). I control for these role- and experience-
related effects by considering the following variables: CEO founder, CEO duality, and CEO tenure. 
 I recognize that it is essential to control for incentive- or monitor-related factors that are not 
necessarily an explicit part of a compensation plan but potentially affect CEO behavior. Towards 
this end, I rely on CEO’s personal wealth concentration, and particularly, on CEO equity ownership 
(CEO Ownership). Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) argue that ownership helps to incentivize 
CEOs to work hard and increase firm value, thereby aligning the interests between shareholders and 
managers. However, Certo et al. (2001) underscore a dark side of ownership. On the one hand, 
entrenchment of CEOs with large equity stakes exacerbates self-serving actions, making it difficult 
for shareholder to effectively discipline them (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). On the other hand, the 
accumulation of equity wealth makes the manager more risk averse, thereby misaligning risk-taking 
incentives (Amihud and Lev, 1981). Therefore, it is unclear how CEO equity ownership should 
affect IPO failure rates.
28
 
Following Laksmana (2008), I utilize the common factor of a wide array of governance 
mechanisms that ensure the effectiveness of the board of directors in terms of monitoring and the 
provision of advice (Board Governance). These governance devices capture several aspect of 
governance such as the degree of overall independence in the board and the nomination committee, 
the number of directors that were in place before the incumbent CEO, the business of independent 
directors, and board size.   
As for the IPO specific variables, I account for the positive effects of underpricing (Initial 
Returns) on IPO failure (Hensler et al., 1997). Following Schultz (1993), Jain and Kini (2000) and 
Hahn et al. (2013), I consider the role of reputable underwriters (Underwriter) as well as the 
involvement of venture capitalists (VCs) and prestigious auditors (Big 4 Auditor) in the IPO 
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 Eliminating cases with negative Pay Gap does not alter my inferences. The regression results are almost identical if, 
instead, I assign a value of zero and include these observations. 
28
 CEO equity ownership is measured as the percentage of equity retained by a CEO after the IPO (e.g., Certo et al., 
2001; Chahine and Goergen, 2011). The results are the same if CEO equity ownership is measured before the IPO. 
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process. I anticipate that the presence of these key IPO players improves the survival profiles of 
newly listed firms. I also control for the shares retained by pre-IPO shareholders over the shares 
issued in the offering (Overhang). 
Furthermore, my hazard model incorporates an array of standard firm-level control variables 
suggested by Demers and Joos (2007), Jain and Kini (2008), and Yung et al. (2008), such as firm 
size (Size), firm age (Firm Age), and profitability (EPS). A potential source of uncertainty and 
future growth opportunities lies in the firm’s financial and investment decisions (Jain and Kini, 
2008), and so I control for the firm’s borrowing capacity (Leverage) as well as the intensity in 
research and development (R&D Intensity) expenditures and capital expenditures (Capital 
Expenditure). To ensure that I adequately control for risk, I consider whether the IPO firm is in the 
Internet or technology sector and whether it is listed in Nasdaq. Also, I account for the external 
economic environment by incorporating the degree of product market competitive pressures (HHI). 
Finally, I include both time-fixed effect and industry-fixed effect dummy variables in all 
regressions. 
 
4.3 Entropy Balancing  
An important concern about equation (1) is that the relation between executive pay 
incentives and failure risk is driven by factors that are likely to influence the managerial incentives 
but are not adequately controlled for in my models (due to missing variables problem or due to 
functional form misspecification), resulting thus, in incorrect inferences (Shipman et al., 2017). For 
instance, it might be the case that firms that follow particular policies (i.e., those with a 
conservative or aggressive financial or investment style) choose to hire managers with the desirable 
skill set to implement these policies. It could also be the case that CEOs having idiosyncratic 
management styles tend to be matched with firms that present a good fit. If this is true, my pay-
survival link may not reflect only the incentives that lead to extra effort or aligned risk preferences, 
but rather it can also capture the need for superior skills and managerial preferences that are 
correlated with compensation.  
To eliminate such endogeneity issues and to ensure that firms with high-powered incentives 
(treatment group) and weak managerial incentives (control group) are comparable across the 
observable firm characteristics associated with probability of delisting, I employ entropy-balancing 
matching of Hainmueller (2012). Entropy balancing is a relatively new matching technique 
designed to achieve covariate balance between the treatment and the control group through a 
reweighing process such that the distributional properties of treatment and control observations are 
virtually identical (Jacob et al., 2018; Chapman et al., 2019). This reweighing scheme ensures that 
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the differences of control variables across the treated and control groups that might have occurred 
due to a latent variable (missing variable) problem are no longer a factor impeding proper 
inferences. Furthermore, this technique is more flexible than traditional propensity score matching 
(PSM) algorithms, because it is not sensitive to matching parameters that can alter the conclusions, 
such as choice of the caliper width, matching with/without replacement or with/without common 
support, etc. Notably, it preserves the entire sample, thereby retaining information and improving 
model efficiency.
29
 Thus, following Chapman et al. (2019), in all of my regression-based analyses, I 
work with samples where entropy balancing is already applied.
30
    
 
5.  Empirical Analyses and Results 
This section reports the results of my analysis on IPO survival. Firstly, I analyze the survival 
profile of IPO issuers. Then, I describe the properties of my sample across firms with strong vs. 
weak incentives. Finally, I focus on the duration analysis results from the Cox proportional hazard 
model. 
 
5.1 Survival Profile of IPO Issuers 
Table 1 utilizes the trading status of my sample firms and categorizes them into: voluntary 
delistings (acquired firms), involuntary delistings (dropped and liquidated firms), and survivors 
(active and exchanged firms). Then, it presents the distributional variability of these firm-groups by 
year and by industry. For example, Panel A of the table shows that in tracking for five years after 
the issue date, 69.61% of the firms survived (69.10% were active and 0.51% were exchanged), and 
30.39% failed either due to voluntary or involuntary delisting (23.26% were acquired, 6.96% were 
dropped, and 0.17% were liquidated).  
Panel B of Table 1 repeats the same exercise by year. The percentage of voluntary delistings 
(acquired firms) is highest in 2003 (31.91%) and 2012 (33.75%). The percentage of involuntary 
delistings (dropped and liquidated firms) is highest in 2000 (12.50%) and lowest in 2008 (11.76%). 
In general, more than half of the firms survive for at least five years after their IPO. The highest 
proportion of survived firms (77%) is observed for those listed in 2005, while the lowest proportion 
(62%) of survived firms is in 2012. Panel C, on the other hand, reveals that the sector with the 
highest percentage of voluntary delistings is scientific instruments (26.67%), followed by electronic 
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 For further details, please see the discussions in Haislip et al. (2017), Wilde (2017), and Chapman et al. (2019). 
Despite the advantages of entropy balancing over PSM, in our Internet Appendix I also conduct our main tests using 
PSM and confirm that our results are qualitatively similar. 
30




equipment (26.23%). Entertainment services (13.33%) and computer equipment and services 
(9.38%) are the industries with the highest percentage of involuntary delistings, while those with 
the lowest proportion are food products and wholesale and retail trade. It is worth noting that in all 
industries the percentage of survived firms does not fall below 57%.  
 
5.2 Univariate Analysis 
Table 2, Panel A, demonstrates that, over my sampling period the average total CEO 
remuneration is $1.297 million and the average Pay Gap is $0.9 million. Not surprisingly, both of 
these figures are considerably lower than those found in studies focusing on seasoned firms (e.g., 
Kale et al., 2009; Vo and Canil, 2016). The median compensation of non-CEO executives is around 
$0.5 million. Salary accounts for the largest proportion (53%), followed by option awards (18%) 
and bonus (17%). Panel B of the same table indicates that the average CEO is 50 years old with 
tenure of approximately four years. About one third of CEOs are also founders of the firm and 54% 
hold the chair position (CEO duality). Panel C reveals that around half of my IPO firms are VC-
backed, 35% of the IPOs are underwritten by top-tier investment banks, and 83% are audited by the 
Big 4 accounting firms.  
Next, I identify firms with high-powered incentives (i.e., those with values of managerial 
incentives above the sample median) and firms with weak incentives (those with values of 
managerial incentives below the sample median). Based on this sample partitioning, several 
interesting patterns emerge.
31
 The high pay packages are concentrated among CEOs that are older, 
chairpersons, and generalists (Custodio et al., 2013). Also, CEOs with higher intrinsic motivation 
(i.e., those who are founders and have larger equity ownership) tend to receive lower total 
compensation (He, 2008). The level of total CEO compensation is largely the outcome of variable 
forms of pay: option awards and bonuses. 
Consistent with previous studies, larger, older, and more profitable firms provide more 
generous remuneration packages than their counterparts (e.g., Coles et al., 2006; Gabaix and 
Landier, 2008). Finally, there is a positive link between well-compensated CEOs and reputable 
investment bankers, whereas the relationship between VCs and well-paid CEOs seems to be 




                                                          
31 For brevity, our analysis is based only on the total CEO pay. However, in Table IA1 of the Internet Appendix, I 
partition the sample based on the total CEO Pay gap, and reach similar conclusions. 
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5.3 Total CEO Compensation and the Hazard Model of IPO Failure  
Table 3 shows the impact of total CEO compensation on the probability of IPO survival 
using the Cox proportional hazards model after controlling for various firm and CEO attributes that 
may influence the long-term IPO prospects. Specification (1) in Panel A documents a strong and 
significant negative coefficient for total CEO compensation, suggesting that IPO firms with better 
remunerated CEOs have a lower probability of failure. This finding supports my efficient 
contracting hypothesis of CEO pay (Hypothesis 1) that stronger incentives enhance the survival 
chances of newly public firms. The economic effect is substantial: firms with CEO pay in the 
75
th
 percentile of CEO pay have a failure risk that is, on average, 20.84% lower than that of firms 





In specifications (2) - (4) we examine the possibility that the incentive effect of CEO pay is 
mainly driven by its equity component. The decomposition of total compensation into its cash and 
equity components reveals that, while both components relate negatively to IPO failure, only the 
effect of the equity-based component is distinguishable from zero. This finding suggests that equity 
instruments of a CEO compensation package help IPO firms align the interests between 
shareholders and managers. It is also consistent with the idea that optimally-set long-term horizon 
incentives induce CEOs to take long-term actions to prevent firm failures (delistings).
33
  
Focusing on the remaining control variables, their sign and significance is generally 
consistent with prior literature in all specifications. In particular, I find that firms with CEOs who 
are founders, chairpersons, or long-tenured tend to lower probability of failure (Adams et al., 2005). 
Also, CEO ownership and board governance are negatively but insignificantly related to IPO failure 
risk. Regarding the IPO-specific variables, first-day returns, overhang, and VCs; they relate 
positively to IPO failure, possibly because these variables reflect more risky business models. In 
contrast, prestigious underwriters and Big 4 auditors seem to increase the chances of survival.  
Somewhat surprisingly, larger firms exhibit higher failure rates, while firm age and pre-IPO 
profitability is negatively but insignificantly related with the risk of delisting in subsequent periods. 
Regarding financial and investment decisions, only R&D activities relate reliably to IPO failure risk 
(Demers and Joos, 2007). 
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 This estimate represents the change in the hazard rate for a firm that moves from the 25
th
 to the 75
th
 percentile of the 
distribution of the natural logarithm of total CEO compensation (13.99-12.76) and is calculated as follows: exp(-0.19 x 
1.23) -1 = -20.84%. 
33
 Detailed investigation of the effect of each incentive component (options, stocks, etc.) can be found in Section A3 of 
our Internet Appendix. 
96 
 
5.4 Total Pay Gap and the Hazard Model of IPO Failure 
Next, I continue my analysis by replacing the total CEO compensation with the total Pay 
Gap. Specification (1) of Panel B (Table 3) indicates that, the coefficient for total Pay Gap is 
negative and significant at the 1% level. In economic terms, the magnitude of the coefficient 
estimate suggests that firms with pay gaps in the 75
th
 percentile have a failure risk that is, on 




 This result is 
consistent with the tournament view of pay gap that firms optimally set intra-firm tournaments in 
order to induce senior executives to work harder and invest in firm-specific capital, which can 
alleviate certain agency problems. 
 Specifications (2) - (4) of Panel B provide further insights by examining the impact of 
short-term and long-term pay disparities on IPO survival. As in the case of CEO pay, the coefficient 
for the short-term Pay Gap is negative but insignificant, whereas the coefficient for the long-term 
Pay Gap is negative and significant at the 1% level. Therefore, the compensation incentives in IPO 
are set in accordance with the shareholders’ long-term interests. With respect to the coefficients and 
the significance of the remaining covariates, the results are comparable to those of the preceding 
sub-section across all specifications.  
Overall, the evidence in this section supports the efficient contracting hypothesis of CEO 
pay as well as the tournament view of pay disparities, given that firms with powerful incentives – in 
terms of either higher CEO pay or stronger tournament incentives – are more likely to survive 




6.  Further Investigations and Robustness Analysis 
6.1 Does CEO Dismissal after the IPO Period Affect my Inferences? 
Since my study focuses on evaluating the effect of pre-IPO executive pay on firm survival, 
an important methodological issue to consider is the treatment of sample firms where CEO turnover 
occurs during the (post-IPO) window over which firm survival is being evaluated. For example, 
assessing the effect of executive pay on firm survival over a five-year post-IPO window, whereas 
CEO departure occurs earlier (i.e., within the first or second year of going public), can overstate or 
understate the effects of pay structure on firm survival.   
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 The change in the hazard rate for a firm that moves across the interquartile range of the distribution of the natural 
logarithm of pay gap (13.55-11.78) is calculated as follows: exp(-0.13x 1.77) -1 = -20.55%. 
35 In additional untabulated robustness checks I repeat all of my baseline regressions after clustering the 
standard errors by either industry or year. I find that both of these options increase the statistical significance 
of my managerial incentives variables. 
36
 I perform additional tests in our Internet Appendix by using the Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) method and my 
findings are consistent with the results of Cox models (see Section A2). 
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To analyze the effect of CEO replacement on my results, I examine CEO turnovers that 
occur within five years of the IPO date. As shown in Panel A of Table 4, a total of 605 (out of 1,178 
CEOs) CEO departures occur within five years of going public. The highest frequency of CEO 
departure occurs in the second and the third year following the IPO, while the lowest is in the first 
year following the IPO.
37
 Hence, the post-IPO CEO’s tenure does not always coincide with the 
period over which survival is assessed, and it is possible that my baseline results are affected by 
this.  
To address this issue, I follow Gao and Jain (2011) and consider a new tracking window that 
ensures that the pay-survivorship link is assessed over a (post-IPO) period where the CEO remains 
in the firm. In doing so, I follow each firm from the IPO date until the earlier of its delisting date, 
CEO departure date, or the fifth anniversary after the listing. My new tracking period is the 
minimum of the following three variables: the difference between the IPO date and CEO departure 
date, the difference between IPO date and delisting date, or 5 years since the IPO date. Within this 
new tracking period, I investigate whether and when the firm is delisted. The results in Panel B of 
Table 4 reveal that under this specification the effect of executive pay on IPO survival is in 
essentially the same as in my baseline tests. 
As an alternative robustness check, I re-examine the impact of managerial incentives by 
excluding all firms where CEO turnover occurs prior to the five-year IPO anniversary. Panel C of 
Table 4 reports the results. Columns (1) – (4) display the results for different CEO turnover rates 
and demonstrate that both of my managerial incentives measures continue to be negatively 
associated with firm failure throughout all the post-IPO period. 
 
6.2 Are M&As Failure or Success? 
In this subsection, I investigate whether my results are robust to alternative definitions of 
IPO failure. When examining the existence of a systematic relationship between managerial pay 
and firm survival, I classify all mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as genuine delistings, i.e., failures. 
But not all M&A delistings are necessary bad news (see Fama and French, 2004). Alternatively, I 
could position M&A delistings at the other end of the spectrum by treating them as survivors. 
However, this approach is subject to a certain criticism: not all M&As are beneficial for the 
shareholders (Loughran and Vijh, 1997). Thus, I adopt a more sophisticated approach by 
reclassifying the M&A delistings as “censored survivors” based on a set of performance indicators 
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 Our sample yearly average CEO turnover rate is approximately 11%, which is close the CEO turnover rate of public 
firms (9.63%) reported in Gao et al. (2017). 
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before the IPO year or the acquisition year (Espenlaub et al., 2016).
38
 As indicated by Table 5, my 
qualitative conclusions remain unchanged after adjusting for the alternative treatment of M&As. In 
the Internet Appendix (Table IA4), I also evaluate whether my results are sensitive to limiting the 
window of failure from five to three years after the IPO. Again, my main conclusions remain the 
same. 
  
6.3 Alternative Measures of Pay Gap 
Another potential concern is whether my measure of Pay Gap is affected by an uneven 
distribution of pay among the senior executives. Because it is based on the median executive pay, it 
is possible that it could overestimate (underestimate) the strength of tournament-based incentives. 
In addition, it could be highly correlated with firm size, a major determinant of CEO compensation. 
To alleviate these concerns, I recalculate the Pay Gap using the mean compensation instead of the 
median compensation of the senior executives. Then, I replace it with the CEO pay slice, calculated 
as the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the top three executives paid to the CEO (Bebchuk 
et al., 2011) None of these tests alter my main inferences. Table IA4 in The Internet Appendix 
describes in detail these robustness tests. 
 
6.4 Alternative Explanations and Identification Concerns 
My results, so far, establish a robust positive relationship between managerial pay incentives 
and firm survival. The logical question arises as to why all firms do not raise these incentives and, 
thereby, increase the chances of survival. Of course, if firms had done so, then I would not have 
observed the data that gives rise to the estimated positive relation between executive pay and firm 
survival in the first place (Coles et al., 2017). Under that optimal scenario, no firm would be able to 
improve survivorship by altering its executive compensation arrangements.  
Following the logic in Coles et al. (2011) and Coles et al. (2017), at least two alternative 
explanations for a relation between pay incentives and firm survival could be conceived. One is that 
the observed positive relation represents equilibrium covariation driven by one or more omitted 
variables. In the other words, cross-sectional differences in optimal incentives between firms are 
caused by heterogeneity in the fundamental inputs to the organizational process. A second potential 
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 To identify the censored survivors, I acknowledge that, because of poor performance or financial difficulties, some 
M&A delistings are typically less attractive to target shareholders than other. Following Espenlaub et al. (2012, 2016), I 
seek to differentiate such poorly performing M&A stocks from the remainder by imposing a performance criterion. To 
do so, I locate M&A delisting of well-performing companies either in the year prior to their IPO or in the year prior to 
their acquisition by ranking companies on the basis of four performance measures: cash to total assets, total liabilities to 
total assets, operating income to total assets, current assets to current liabilities. Companies that rank above (below) the 
median based on all four indicators are considered censored survivors (non-survivors or failures). 
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explanation is that transaction costs, including those arising from other organizational 
considerations, prevent frictionless adjustment by firms of executive pay. In this case, the empirical 
estimates reflect an upward-sloping segment of the relation between firm survival and executive 
pay incentives. The last argument is particularly plausible for IPOs, because compared to 
established public firms, newly listed corporations have access to a narrower pool of executive 
talent, underdeveloped governance structures and less sophisticated incentive devices. 
Note that my entropy balancing (partially) accounts for such omitted drivers of the 
relationship between survival and executive incentives. Nevertheless, in what follows, I provide 
some additional empirical evidence inconsistent with a pure endogeneity explanation of my results, 
suggesting that, at least part of the managerial pay incentives-survival relationship is causal. 
 
6.5. Omitted CEO and Firm Heterogeneity 
The aforementioned endogeneity concerns imply that any empirical correlation between 
CEO incentives and long-term firm performance is a mix of differences in fundamentals and the 
causal effect of incentives. For instance, the optimal level of CEO pay and CEO Pay Gap for a 
given firm may depend on the degree of diversification and its ability to attract, retain, and motivate 
talent. In this respect, one could argue that diversified firms are likely to demand extraordinary 
talent and skill from the executive team and pay accordingly, whereas firms with ineffective 
compensation committees may not be able to set competitive pay packages.   
This reasoning suggests that better controls for CEO quality and firm quality should 
dissipate the managerial incentive pay effects. I account for an array of variables associated with 
CEO risk aversion, experience, power, talent, and education. Namely, I control for CEO general 
managerial skills (Custodio et al., 2013), CEO gender (Faccio et al., 2016), CEO age (Serfling, 
2014), CEO power (Adams et al., 2005), and CEO academic attainments (MBA, PhD, JD or MD). 
Furthermore, I incorporate in my baseline model the degree of diversification (Diversified Firms) of 
the firm’s operations, the number of CEOs within the same industry as the focal firm, and the 
quality of the compensation committee (Compensation Committee Quality) (Sun et al., 2009). 
In Column (1) of Table 6 I re-estimate the baseline regression after including the additional 
CEO and firm characteristics. The results indicate that these controls do not meaningfully affect the 
managerial pay effect, thus alleviating to some extent the concern that omitted firm and/or CEO 
characteristics are driving my results.
39,40 
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 In the Internet Appendix, I further explore the selection bias problem by using the Two-Stage Heckman approach. 
My results are upheld. This method indicates that the treatment effect of managerial pay on firm survival exists even 
after I control for selection effects. 
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6.6 Instrumental Variables 
Another source of endogeneity can be traced to unobservable factors that affect both the 
nature of the pay-setting process and firm survival in a similar manner. This introduces the 
possibility of reverse causality which, in turn, could render my pay-survival link spurious. To adjust 
for this particular type of endogeneity (a joint determination of compensation-based, tournament-
based incentives, and IPO survival), I employ an instrumental variable (IV) approach. In doing so, I 
seek to identify instruments that can potentially meet both the relevance and exclusivity criteria in 
my IV-probit regression models. To satisfy the relevance criteria, my selected instruments should 
be correlated with CEO pay and Pay Gap after controlling for all other (second stage) regressors. 
Additionally, my instruments should satisfy the exclusion criteria, which means that they should 
impact the dependent variable only through my managerial incentives measures.  
To identify potential instruments for both CEO pay and tournament incentives, I draw upon 
the literature on the external labor market for managerial incentives. In particular, I focus on the 
industry dynamics of executive pay along three dimensions: (1) the pay practices of comparable 
peer firms, (2) the pay level of the industry leader CEO, and (3) the industry’s ability to pay fair 
wages.  Bizjak et al. (2011) study argues that industry norms are an important determinant of the 
level and structure of managerial compensation (peer effects). This suggests that industry-wide pay 
practices may set the standard for designing compensation-based incentives and tournament-based 
promotion incentives of any given firm in the industry (Murphy, 1999). Extending this reasoning, I 
utilize median industry values of CEO pay and Pay Gap to instrument for the strength of CEO and 
tournament incentives, accordingly (e.g., Kale et al., 2009; Kini and Williams, 2009). These 
instrumental variables are defined as the natural logarithms of the median values of the 
corresponding incentive measures for IPO firms in the same two-digit industry and in the same 
year, after excluding the firm in question. I conjecture that it is unlikely that industry-level practices 
are affected by individual firms, nor that they have a direct impact on firm risk policies, at least 
after adjusting for industry and year fixed effects. Hence, they are more likely to be orthogonal to 
the residuals in the second stage regression. 
In order to obtain additional heterogeneity, I utilize the CEO compensation of the highest-
paid CEO within the same industry-size group (Leader CEO Pay). Dickens and Katz (1986) 
empirically observe that when maximal CEO pay is relatively high in an industry, other CEOs in 
that same industry tend to be highly paid. Coles et al. (2017) argue that this practice puts an upward 
pressure on CEO pay, especially for effective, high-ability CEOs. Irrespective of the typical and 
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 In the Internet Appendix, we also add delta and vega as control variables and my results remain the same. I do not 
include them in my baseline regressions as they significantly reduce my sample. 
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maximal pay level within an industry, a firm should also be able provide “fair wages.” I account for 
this effect by using the industry aggregate pay (Aggregate Pay) (Coles et al., 2017; Huang et al., 
2019). 
41, 42
   
The above dynamics can affect the level of CEO pay and the pay of other senior executives 
alike. This would predict a positive link between industry pay levels and the CEO pay. However, in 
the terms of the Pay Gap (relative pay among executives), it is unclear whether it should be 
positively or negatively related to Leader CEO pay and Aggregate pay, as industry standards can 
affect all executives’ pay. While I expect that these industry-based instruments to be more strongly 
related to CEO pay rather than the median non-CEO pay, there is no economic reason that suggests 
that these instruments would affect CEO behaviour through any other channel than the 
compensation.  
 Following Bhattacharya et al. (2015), I perform a two-stage instrumental probit (IV) 
regression. In the first step of my IV regression analysis, I compute the predicted values of CEO 
compensation and total Pay Gap by including a standard set of compensation determinants. The 
results from the first stage regression are presented in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7. An 
inspection of Column (1) reveals that both CEO pay and CEO Pay Gap are positively and 
significantly affected by their respective instruments, consistent with the intuition provided above.
43
 
In the first stage regression, I also compute the F-test for the relevance of the instruments. 
The rule of thumb establishes that the instruments are not weak if the first-stage F statistic (  : 
coefficients of all instruments = 0) is greater than zero (Staiger and Stock, 1997). In my case, the 
first stage F-statistics are statistically significant, which implies that my instruments are relevant 
and not weak. Panel B of the table reports the Wald test of the exogeneity of the instrumented 
variables. The tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that managerial incentives measures are 
exogenous. 
 The results from the second stage regression are presented in Columns (1) and (2) of Panel 
B (Table 7). Even when instrumented, the managerial pay measures significantly affect the 
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 When constructing these industry-wide instruments, I make sure that these proposed measures are calculated after 
removing the CEO in question from the industry sample. Hence, the direct influence of a firm’s pay practices on Leader 
CEO pay and Aggregate pay is minimal. This approach also allows the instrument to vary across firms within the same 
industry. 
42
 According to Wooldridge (2002), using several instruments for one endogenous variable is a desirable situation in an 
IV regression, as it creates over-identified conditions. Even if one of the instruments is irrelevant, the other instruments 
are enough for proper identification (see Section 5.1.2 of that book).   
43
 It is worth noting that CEO pay is positively correlated with proxies for the firms’ demand for a high-quality CEO 
(such as firm size, diversification, and managerial ability), while there is no significant association with standard 
determinants of governance quality (CEO tenure, CEO duality, and Corporate governance). Interestingly, founders are 
negatively related to managerial pay. These results suggest that it is mostly equilibrium forces that explain variation in 
IPO pay setting practices. 
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probability of being delisted. Thus, I confirm that even after accounting for simultaneity bias, firms 




7.  Cross Sectional Variation in Compensation and Tournament Incentives 
In this section, I explore the cross-sectional variation in the importance of CEO 
compensation and pay disparities on IPO survival along different dimensions of CEO 
characteristics and corporate governance.  
 
7.1 CEO Characteristics 
To evaluate whether the strength of the CEO pay-survival link varies in a manner that is 
predictable by the efficient contracting view, I consider three CEO characteristics: general 
managerial skills, CEO age, and founder-CEOs.  
A commonly cited reason for the secular increase in CEO pay over the last decades is the 
increasing demand for CEOs with general managerial skills (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004; Frydman, 
2007). Crossland et al. (2014) show that generalist CEOs have higher mobility in the job market, 
thereby increasing their bargaining power during the pay setting process. Therefore, it is 
conceivable that hiring generalist CEOs might have some undesirable consequences for 
organizational outcomes. In support of this view, several papers document that generalists are 
associated with risky but uncertain outcomes (Hambrick et al., 1993; Zimmerman, 2008). Similarly, 
Gounopoulos and Pham (2018) find that generalists increase IPO failure rates, whereas Mishra 
(2014) shows that generalist CEOs exacerbate agency problems. As a result, I anticipate that the 
negative relationship between CEO pay and IPO failure is weakened (strengthened) for firms with 
generalist (specialist) CEOs.  
Regarding CEO age, several studies point out that it captures career concerns (Gibbons and 
Murphy, 1992). Since the role of career concerns varies inversely with age, we expect younger 
CEOs to deliberately adjust their investment behavior in order to favorably influence the labor 
market perceptions of their abilities, reputation and future prospects (Li et al., 2017). In other 
words, the effort exerted by younger CEOs is generally higher than that of older CEOs. This 
implies a greater responsiveness of young CEOs to compensation schemes. As for the founder-
CEOs, it is widely shared that they have a strong psychological attachment and identification within 
the organization, greater firm specific skills, and longer investment horizons relative to non-founder 
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 For robustness, I also adjust for the endogeneity bias by performing bivariate probit estimation (for a detailed 
analysis, please refer to the Internet Appendix). Our results are upheld. 
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CEOs (e.g., Certo et al., 2001; Nelson, 2003). In this respect, extrinsic motivation devices – such as 
incentive pay – may be less effective to founder-CEOs than professional CEOs.   
In Panel A of Table 8, I examine the strength of the link between CEO pay and IPO failure 
across the subsamples formed by sorting the aforementioned variables. My findings suggest a 
significant and negative association between total CEO compensation and IPO failure risk that is 
concentrated among firms with CEOs who are specialists, young, and non-founders. 
 
7.2 Governance and Monitoring Mechanisms  
Apart from the CEO attributes, a more direct way to assess the cross-sectional variation in 
the effectiveness of pay-practices is through corporate governance practices. In this regard, I 
consider the following aspects of a firm’s governance: board independence, quality of the 
remuneration committee, and institutional ownership.  
Since independent boards help mitigate the agency problems caused by the divergent 
objectives of senior management and shareholders (Ryan and Wiggins, 2004), I anticipate that they 
should enhance the effectiveness of CEO awards in increasing the chances of IPO survival. This 
argument is based on the notion that powerful CEOs may shape their compensation. This is possible 
if the board is friendly to the CEO. Therefore, more independent boards are less likely to succumb 
to powerful CEOs. In these situations, I anticipate that the structure and the level of CEO pay will 
be closer to its optimum. This means that CEO compensation will be better tied to firm value and 
its level is less likely to be regarded as excess. Similarly, the quality of the remuneration committee 
should ensure appropriate reward structures for board members and the top management team 
(Daily et al., 1998). As a result, compensation packages should become more effective incentive 
devices in the presence of strong, as opposed to weak, remuneration committees. 
On the contrary, firms in which the CEO has excess power (CEO power) are more likely to 
structure CEO compensation at the expense of shareholders. This should be the case, for example, 
when the role of CEO, chairperson, and President is combined (Bebchuk et al., 2002). In these 
cases, I predict that the pay-survival link will be weakened. In a similar vein, I expect that in the 
absence of effective monitoring, CEOs have weaker incentive to purse shareholder interests. This 
could be the case, for instance, when the concentration of institutional ownership is relatively low 
(Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Chen et al., 2019). As such, I hypothesize that the negative association 
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In Panel B of Table 8, I examine in which subsample the link between CEO pay and IPO 
failure is strengthened or weakened. My findings suggest a significant and negative association 
between total CEO compensation and IPO failure risk that is concentrated among firms with 
stronger governance structures and more intense monitoring. 
 
7.3 Tournament-Based Promotion Incentives 
Kale et al. (2009) argue that, holding constant the magnitude of the tournament prize, the 
effectiveness of the Pay Gap as a motivator is strengthened if the probability of promotion to the 
CEO position is relatively high. I evaluate this hypothesis in the IPO context by considering the 
following factors: generalist CEOs, CEO age, and founder-CEOs. 
Giannetti (2011) notes that because the skills of generalist CEOs are easily transferable 
across firms and industries, such CEOs are more likely to take advantage of a promising job market 
and undertake job-hopping. They are also more easily recruited, as they are increasingly sought 
after in the executive labor market (Custodio et al., 2013). Similarly, I expect that when the CEO is 
old, and close to retirement, the likelihood of replacement, and thus, the chances of promotion for 
the other top management members increase. Thus, my expectation is that the negative association 
between the firm pay Gap and IPO failure is strengthened in firms with CEOs who are generalists 
or close to retirement (i.e., above the age sample median).  
In contrast, founder-CEOs possess high firm-specific capital and are more psychologically 
committed to the long-term viability of their firm than professional CEOs (Yan and Rajagopalan, 
2004). Because their long-term interests are closely tied to their firm’s future prospects, I anticipate 
that they are less likely to leave the firm they established. Hence, the probability of promotion for 
lower-ranked executives should be lower in founder-led CEO firms, which in turn, implies a less 
negative relationship between CEO pay Gap and firm delisting.  
Panel C of Table 8 examines the relationship between Pay Gap and IPO failure across the 
aforementioned subsamples. Consistent with my expectations, firms with high pay disparities tend 
to have lower failure rates if they also have a CEO who is non-founder, generalist, and close to 
retirement. 
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 In untabulated analysis I use the presence of VCs instead of institutional ownership, as an alternative proxy for 
monitoring and I find that the negative relationship between CEO compensation and firm failure is more pronounced 
among VC-backed firms. 
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8. The Channels: The Policies and the Decisions of Well-Incentivized Managers 
My results thus far indicate a positive relationship between CEO incentives and firm 
survival. As stated earlier, the probability of survival is a comprehensive measure for IPO success, 
because it captures the combined impact of a wide set of corporate decisions (Chadwick et al., 
2016). Nevertheless, this metric does not inform us which managerial decisions are most affected 
by high-powered incentive structures. My final set of tests explores how CEO incentives affect IPO 
firms along the following dimensions: the nature of investments and investment efficiency, 
operating performance and value creation, and financial reporting quality (reduction of earnings 
restatement risk and short-termism). These are some of the channels through which CEOs can 
reduce IPO failure probability.  
If high-powered incentives are set according to value-maximization concerns, they should 
align the interests, as well as the risk preferences, of shareholders and managers. In that case three 
things might happen. First, managers should select better projects. Assuming decreasing returns to 
scale, better projects are those characterized by a larger net present value (NPV) for any given 
scale. This implies a larger equilibrium scale of investment. Second, managers will purse risky but 
value-adding projects. Third, managers will expend greater effort in order to run the firm more 
efficiently. This implies lower levels of under-investment, over-investment, or both.  
In Table 9 I explore these hypotheses. Panel A reveals that both CEO pay and Pay Gap are 
associated with higher levels and changes of capital expenditures and R&D spending. Furthermore, 
Panel B shows that stronger pay and tournament incentives relate positively to investment 
efficiency, and negatively to both underinvestment and overinvestment (Biddle et al, 2009). It 
seems that high-powered CEO incentives promote efficiency and investment policy conservatism.   
Does higher investment efficiency translate to higher returns? If managers with stronger 
incentives expend greater effort to run firms efficiently, they should also be able to deliver superior 
long-term performance and better valuations to shareholder. Panels A and B of Table 10 examine 
this conjecture. The results suggest that higher values of my managerial pay measures are correlated 
with superior performance, and most importantly, with greater improvements (changes compared to 
the pre-IPO year) in performance. In addition, the results indicate that firms with either higher CEO 
pay or Pay Gap are positively associated with Tobin’s Q. 
Finally, I investigate if stronger incentives mitigate short-termism and reduce earnings 
restatement risk. Towards this end, I focus on the quality of financial reporting decisions, and 
particularly, on the level of discretionary accruals and real earnings management at the firm in the 
IPO year. The selection of these metrics is motivated by influential studies arguing that IPO issuers 
have strong motives to manipulate accounting figures in order to mislead investors and obtain better 
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valuations (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998). Prior studies document that any benefits from such actions are 
temporary, as they increase the risk of earnings restatements (Hribar and Jenkins, 2004), which in 
turn, can lead to premature post-IPO delisting (Alhadab et al., 2014).     
Panel A of Table 11 demonstrates that firms with highly paid CEOs are negatively 
associated with both the level of discretionary accruals and the level of real earnings management 
(see Appendix A for details on the construction of these measures). Panel B of the same table 
presents a similar pattern for the Pay Gap. Thus, it seems that IPO firms with stronger managerial 
incentives are less likely to engage in short-termism that can increase earnings restatement risk. 
 
9.  Conclusion 
The design of executive compensation arrangements is one of the most contentious 
corporate decisions (Edmans et al., 2017). This study adds to this debate by focusing on the 
incentive mechanisms in the context of IPO events. I document that IPO firms with better paid 
CEOs are more likely to survive in the aftermarket. The relationship between CEO incentives and 
IPO survival is stronger in environments with lower agency conflicts and stronger monitoring. 
Further, I document that greater managerial pay is associated with more effective and long-term 
oriented policy decisions, such as lower incidences of earning management, more efficient 
investment choices, and superior operating performance in the post-IPO market. The findings also 
suggest that, on average, pay disparities  among top managers signal the provision of incentives that 
are value enhancing and supportive of IPO survival odds. This is consistent with the findings of 
Kale et al. (2009), Kini and Williams (2012), and Coles et al. (2017), who report evidence of 
achieving value enhancement through stronger tournament incentives.  
My findings suggest that investors and corporate boards of newly public firms would do 
well to pay close attention not only to compensation captured by the firms’ top executives, but also 
to how this compensation is divided among them. My conclusions are also of relevance to market 
regulators, policy makers, and other stakeholders interested in the role of pay distribution in 
stimulating economic growth through entrepreneurship.  
Overall, my study focuses on a setting that is substantially different from that of mature 
corporations, which yields some unique insights into the effectiveness of CEO incentives in an 
entrepreneurial setting. By doing so, it provides a fresh perspective to the CEO compensation 
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Appendix A: Definitions of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: IPO Pricing 
Initial Returns 
The difference between the first secondary market closing price available in CRSP and IPO offer price, 
divided by IPO offer price. 
Panel B: Compensation Variables 
CEO Salary 
The logarithmic value of cash awarded to the CEO as cash compensation in the fiscal year prior to the 
IPO. 
CEO Bonus The logarithmic value of cash awarded to the CEO as bonus in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
CEO Stock 
Awards 
The logarithmic value of stock granted to the CEO evaluated at grant date using firms’ own estimates. 
CEO Option 
Awards 
The logarithmic value of options granted to the CEO prior to the IPO year. 
CEO All Other 
Compensation 
The logarithmic value of all other compensation awarded to the CEO in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
Total CEO Pay 
The logarithmic value of the sum of all the above compensation elements awarded/granted to the CEO in 








Dummy variable set to 1 if the total CEO pay is below the sample median, and 0 otherwise. 
Total Pay Gap 
The natural logarithm of the difference between the total CEO compensation and the median 
compensation of the other senior executives (Kale et al., 2009). 
Large Pay 
Disparities 
Dummy variable set to 1 if the total pay gap is above the sample median, and 0 otherwise. 
Small Pay 
Disparities 
Dummy variable set to 1 if the total pay gap is below the sample median, and 0 otherwise. 
CEO Slice 
The fraction of the aggregate compensation of the top 3 executives paid to the CEO (Bebchuk et al., 
2011). 
Panel C: Governance Characteristics 
CEO Duality Dummy variable set to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairperson, and 0 otherwise. 
CEO Triality Dummy variable set to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairperson and the President, and 0 otherwise. 
CEO Ownership Percentage of shares owned by the CEO in the after the IPO. 
General Ability 
Index 
First factor of applying principal components analysis to five proxies of general managerial ability: 
Number of roles, Number of firms, Number of industries, CEO experience dummy, Conglomerate 
experience dummy (Custodio et al., 2013). 
Generalist 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO is a generalist, and 0 otherwise. A CEO is classified as a generalist if 
his or her general ability index is equal to or above the sample median. 
CEO Founder Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the founder, and 0 otherwise. 
CEO Power 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO Power Factor score is above the sample median. The CEO Power 
Factor score is the first principal component from the following factors: CEO tenure, CEO ownership, 
CEO Duality and CEO Triality. 
CEO Age 
Age of CEO (in years). Old CEOs are those who have age over the sample median (51) and young CEOs 
are those who have age lower than the sample median. 
CEO Gender Dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO is male, and 0 otherwise. 
CEO Tenure 
Number of years working as CEO in the firm until the IPO. CEOs with High Tenure are defined those 
with tenure above the sample median. 
CEO Turnover Dummy variable equal to 1 if the incidence of a CEO departure occurs within five years after the IPO. 
New CEO Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO tenure is smaller than 2 years, and 0 otherwise 
MBA Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO holds an MBA degree, 0 otherwise. 
PhD Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO holds a PhD, 0 otherwise. 
JD Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO holds a JD degree, 0 otherwise. 
MD Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO holds an MD, 0 otherwise. 
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Panel D: Firm Fundamentals 
Firm age 
The number of years elapsed since firm’s foundation to IPO date, using foundation dates from Thomson 
Financial database as well as from the Field-Ritter dataset. The variable is transformed into the 
regressions by adding 1 and taking the natural logarithm. 
VC  Dummy variable equal to 1 for venture capital-backed firms, and 0 otherwise. 
Proceeds 
The natural logarithm of gross proceeds raised by the IPO estimated as shared offered times the offer 
price. 
Size The natural logarithm of total assets for the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
Overhang The ratio of shares retained by the pre-IPO shareholders over shares issued in the offering. 
Underwriter  
Dummy variable equal to 1 for most prestigious underwriters, 0 otherwise. Most reputable underwriters 
are those with a ranking score of 9.0 or above based on Jay Ritter’s underwriter (prestige) rankings. 
Internet  
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 for IPOs of Internet firms, and 0 otherwise. Internet firms are classified those 




Dummy variable: one for IPO firms with SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578 (computer hardware), 
3661, 3663, 3669 (communications equipment), 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679 (electronics), 
3812 (navigation equipment), 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (measuring and controlling devices), 3841, 
3845 (medical instruments), 4812, 4813 (telephone equipment), 4899 (communications services), and 
7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, and 7379 (software). 
Big 4 Auditor 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is audited by a big four audit firm, and zero otherwise. Big four 
audit firms include Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
Nasdaq Dummy variable equal to 1 for NASDAQ-listed IPOs, and 0 otherwise. 
R&D Intensity It is the ratio of total R&D expense to total sales in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
Capital 
Expenditure 
It is the ratio of total capital expenditures to total sales in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
Leverage The ratio of total short-term and long-term leverage over total assets in the fiscal year prior to IPO. 
EPS 
Dummy variable equal to 1 for positive earnings per share in the fiscal year prior to IPO, and 0 
otherwise. 
Panel E: Other Firm Characteristics 
Delist Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is delisted within five years after the IPO, and 0 otherwise. 
Survival Time The natural logarithm of the time to delist (survival time) which is measured in months. 
Board 
Governance  
Board Governance measure is constructed by taking the first factor of applying principal component 
analysis to the following variables: board independence (the ratio of the number of independent outside 
directors to the total number of directors); a dummy variable equal to one if the board has a nominating 
committee that is composed solely of independent directors and zero otherwise; the percentage of 
outside directors on the board that were appointed after the current CEO took office; the natural 
logarithm of the average number of other directorships held by independent directors serving on the 
board; a dummy variable equal to one if the majority of outside directors on the board serve on three or 
more other boards; the natural logarithm of the number of board meetings; the natural logarithm of the 
number of directors serving on the board. 
Board 
Independence 
The ratio of the number of independent outside directors to the total number of directors. High Board 





Compensation committee quality is constructed by taking the first factor of applying principal 
component analysis to five proxies of remuneration committee quality: the compensation committee 
independence (the ratio of the number of independent outside directors to the total number of directors in 
the compensation committee); the percentage of outside directors on the compensation committee that 
were appointed after the current CEO took office; a dummy variable equal to one if the majority of 
outside directors on the compensation committee serve on three or more other boards and equal to zero 
otherwise; the natural log of the number of directors serving on the compensation committee; the 
number of compensation committee meetings. High Compensation Committee Quality is a dummy 




HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in 
a product market (2-digit SIC industry) and then summing the resulting numbers. 
Diversified Index 
The Factor score from Principle Component Analysis (PCA) using the natural logarithm of sales, the 
natural logarithm of the number of segments, the natural logarithm of the number of geographic 
segments, and the natural logarithm of firm age. 
Diversified Firms  




It is the absolute value of residuals of the investment model proposed by Gomariz and Ballesta (2014) 
multiplied by negative one 
Overinvestment 
It is the positive residuals of the investment model proposed by Gomariz and Ballesta (2014) multiplied 
by negative one 
Underinvestment It is the negative residuals of the investment model proposed by Gomariz and Ballesta (2014). 
High Institutional 
Ownership 




Dummy variable equal to one if the institutional ownership is smaller than the sample median, and zero 
otherwise. 
DACC 
Discretionary accruals in the offering year, computed through the cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) 
model adjusted for performance (Gounopoulos and Pham, 2017). 
REM1 
Aggregate level of real earnings management in the offering year, calculated as the sum of abnormal 
production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses (Gounopoulos and Pham, 2017). 
REM2 
Aggregate level of real earnings management in the offering year, calculated as the sum of abnormal 


































Table 1: IPO Distribution by Year and Industry 
This Table presents the distribution of the of our IPO firms based on their listing status: involuntary deaths (liquidated, and 
dropped), voluntary deaths (acquired), and survived firms (active and exchanged). Liquidated firms are those that are 
delisted due to company liquidation (CRSP delisting code 400 to 490). Dropped firms are those that are delisted because 
they are dropped (CRSP delisting code from 500 to 599). Acquired firms are those that are delisted due to mergers and/or 
acquisitions (CRSP delisting code from 200 to 299). Exchanged firms are those that are continue to trade in a different stock 
exchange (CRSP delisting code 300 to 390). Active firms are those that are still trading five years after the issue date (CRSP 
delisting code of 100). Panel A presents the distributions of IPOs by trading status, while Panel B reports the distribution of 
IPO trading status by year. In Panel C the IPOs are distributed by industry. 
Panel A: Distribution of IPOs by Trading Status from 2000-2012 
 From the IPO date to five years after the offering 
 N % 
Liquidated 2 0.17 
Dropped 82 6.96 
Acquired 274 23.26 
Survived 820 69.61 
Total 1,178  
Panel B: Distribution of IPO Trading Status by Year 




Dropped Liquidated Acquired Exchanged Active 
N % % % % % 
2000 264 12.12 0.38 23.86 0.38 63.26 
2001 59 6.78 0.00 22.03 0.00 71.19 
2002 48 6.25 0.00 22.92 0.00 70.83 
2003 47 4.26 0.00 31.91 0.00 63.83 
2004 129 2.33 0.00 27.91 0.00 68.99 
2005 115 7.83 0.78 15.65 0.00 76.52 
2006 126 3.97 0.00 24.60 1.59 69.84 
2007 112 5.36 0.00 22.32 0.89 71.43 
2008 17 11.76 0.00 5.88 5.88 76.47 
2009 38 2.63 0.00 26.32 0.00 71.05 
2010 72 9.72 0.00 16.67 0.00 73.61 
2011 71 8.45 0.00 16.90 0.00 74.65 
2012 80 2.50 0.00 33.75 1.25 62.50 
Note: Delisting is tracked for five years after the IPO 
Panel C: Distribution of IPO Trading Status by Industry from 2000 to 2012 
Industry (two-digit SIC codes) 
All IPOs Dropped Acquired Survived 
N % % % 
Oil and Gas  (13) 47 6.38 12.77 74.47 
Food Products  (20) 13 0.00 23.08 69.23 
Chemical Products  (28) 175 8.00 22.29 66.29 












90 5.56 26.67 63.33 
Transportation & 
Public Utilities  
(41, 42, 44-49) 
103 4.32 14.38 78.57 
Wholesale & Retail 
Trade  
(50-59) 
100 2.19 19.37 64.70 
Entertainment 
Services  
(70, 78, 79) 
14 13.33 0.00 86.67 





Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
This Table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of U.S. IPOs over the period from 2000 to 2012. Total CEO 
compensation and its components are presented in Panel A. CEO characteristics are illustrated in Panel B. Firm and offering 
characteristics are reported in Panel C. Tests on differences in means between the two sub-samples of IPO firms with a 
highly compensated CEO (high-powered incentives) and those with a poorly compensated CEO (weak incentives) are based 
on t-tests. The sample partitioning is based on the sample median of total CEO compensation. The number of observations 
for each variable is 1,178. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: CEO Pay Components 
 All IPOs 
IPOs with a highly 
compensated CEO 
IPOs with a poorly 
compensated CEO 
Difference 
 Mean Mean Mean p-value 
CEO Total Pay  $1,297,351 $2,252,664 $342,038 0.0000 
Firm Pay Gap  $941,074 $1,466,525 $44,304 0.0000 
Other Executives’ Median 
Total Pay 
$541,937 $786,139 $297,734 0.0000 
Salary/Total Pay  0.53 0.32 0.71 0.0000 
Bonus/Total Pay 0.17 0.19 0.13 0.0000 
Stock Awards/Total Pay 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.0000 
Option Awards/Total Pay 0.18 0.25 0.09 0.0000 
Other Pay/Total Pay 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.0000 
Panel B: CEO Characteristics 
CEO Tenure 3.97 3.88 4.10 0.2045 
CEO Duality 0.54 0.62 0.47 0.0000 
CEO Founder 0.32 0.22 0.41 0.0000 
CEO Ownership 8.10 6.84 9.36 0.0022 
CEO Age 49.48 50.66 48.27 0.0000 
Generalist 0.60 0.63 0.57 0.0139 
Panel C: Firm and Offering Characteristics 
Firm Age 15.28 19.43 11.12 0.0000 
Proceeds 220.83 331.75 109.90 0.0000 
Size 4.82 5.46 4.04 0.0000 
Capital Expenditure 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.1752 
R&D Intensity 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.2176 
Leverage 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.3819 
EPS 0.50 0.56 0.44 0.0000 
Initial Returns 22.22 17.51 26.93 0.0003 
Overhang 4.46 4.19 4.75 0.0886 
Board Governance -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.4606 
HHI 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.2779 
Big 4 Auditor 0.83 0.86 0.78 0.0019 
VC 0.53 0.41 0.64 0.0000 
Underwriter 0.35 0.47 0.23 0.0000 
Technology 0.40 0.47 0.32 0.0000 
Internet  0.11 0.10 0.12 0.2023 












Table 3: Estimation of the Cox Proportional Hazards Model of Probability of Failure 
This Table illustrates the estimation of the Cox proportional hazards model of probability of failure after employing the 
entropy balance method (Hainmueller, 2012). The sample consists of IPOs from 2000 to 2012 in the U.S. stock market. 
Our dependent variable is whether or not a firm survived five years after its IPO. All IPOs are tracked until 31 December 
2017. Panel A reports the results of the effect of total CEO compensation (and its components) on failure risk, while 
Panel B presents the results of the effect of firm Pay Gap on failure risk. Regressions control for industry and year fixed 
effects whose coefficients are suppressed. Regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are 
suppressed. Z-statistics are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: The Effect of Total CEO Compensation (Pay) of Failure Risk 













Total CEO Pay 
-0.19*** 
(-2.83) 
0.825       
Short-Term CEO Pay   
-0.19 
(-1.44) 















































































































































































































































































Industry & Year FE Y  Y  Y    
Chi-Square 338.45  335.30  403.45  345.11  
Number of 
Observations 





Panel B: The Effect of Pay Gap on Failure Risk 













Total Pay Gap 
-0.13*** 
(-2.74) 
0.881       
Short-Term Pay Gap   
-0.04 
(-0.60) 















































































































































































































































































Industry & Year FE Y  Y  Y    
Chi-Square 292.50  339.70  333.30  322.80  
Number of 
Observations 









Table 4: CEO Departures on the Post-IPO Period 
This Table presents the occurrence of CEO departure within five years after the IPO date and how it affects the tracking window 
in which the incidence of delisting. Panel A reports the CEO turnover rates for the post-IPO period by year. Panel B displays the 
executive pay effect on IPO failure under the new tracking period which is equal to the minimum of the difference between the 
IPO date and CEO departure date, the IPO date and delisting date, and the fifth anniversary. Panel C presents the executive pay 
effect on IPO failure for the subsamples in which the CEO is retained. The probability of failure is estimated by Cox proportional 
hazards models after employing the entropy balance method (Hainmueller, 2012). Regressions control for industry and year fixed 
effects whose coefficients are suppressed. Z-statistics are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: CEO Turnover Rate 
Post-IPO Periods No. % 
1 74 6.28 
2 164 13.92 
3 143 12.14 
4 116 9.85 
5 108 9.17 
Total CEO Turnover 605 51.36% 
Panel B: Tracking Period Accounting for the Incidence of CEO Turnover 
 (1) (2) 




Total Pay Gap  
-0.18*** 
(-4.49) 
Control variables Y Y 
Industry & Year FE Y Y 
Number of Obs. 1,178 1,178 
Chi-Square 201.50 174.80  
Panel C: Exclusion of All Firms where CEO Turnover Occurs Prior to the Five-Year IPO Anniversary 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CEO Retention Rate CEO Retention Rate CEO Retention Rate CEO Retention Rate 
 
> 1 year > 2 years > 3 years > 4 years 


























Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry & 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of 
Obs. 1,104 1,104 940 940 797 797 681 681 












Table 5: Alternative Treatment of M&A Delistings 
This Table assesses the probability of delisting using alternative definitions of failure and/or survivorship. The sample consists of 
IPOs from 2000 to 2012 in the U.S. stock market. Our dependent variable is whether or not a firm survived five years after its IPO. 
All IPOs are tracked until 31 December 2017. The probability of failure is estimated by Cox proportional hazards models after 
employing the entropy balance method (Hainmueller, 2012).  Panel A and B display the results for total CEO compensation and 
Pay Gap from the Cox models, respectively. Specifications (1) and (2) in each panel treat M&A delisting as censored survivors 
based on two alternative treatments (Espenlaub et al., 2016). According to the first treatment, we rank all IPO firms before the IPO 
based on the following four variables: cash to total assets, total liabilities to total assets, operating income to total assets, current 
assets to current liabilities. According to the second treatment, we rank all IPOs before the M&A using the same four variables. 
Companies that rank above (below) the median based on these indicators are considered censored survivors (failures). Z-statistics 
are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: The Association Between Total CEO Compensation and Failure Risk using Alternative Measures of Failure Risk 
 First Alternative Definition Second Alternative Definition 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio 







Control Variables Y  Y  
Industry & Year FE Y  Y  
Chi-Square 279.65  229.41  
Number of 
Observations 
1,178  1,178  
Panel B: The Association Between Total Pay Gap and Failure Risk using Alternative Measures of Failure Risk 
 First Alternative Definition Second Alternative Definition 
  (1) (2) 
 Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio 







Control Variables Y  Y  
Industry & Year FE Y  Y  
Chi-Square 227.24  158.42  
Number of 
Observations 


















Table 6: Controlling for CEO and Firm Characteristics  
This Table illustrates the estimation of the Cox proportional hazards model of probability of failure. The sample consists of IPOs 
from 2000 to 2012 in the U.S. stock market. Our dependent variable is whether or not a firm survived five years after its IPO. All 
IPOs are tracked until 31 December 2017. The probability of failure is estimated by Cox proportional hazards models after 
employing the entropy balance method (Hainmueller, 2012). Models (1) and (2) control for additional CEO and firm 
characteristics: CEO Gender, CEO Age, CEO Power, CEO educational attainments (MBA, PhD, HD, and MD), Compensation 
Committee Quality, and Diversified Firms. Regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are 
suppressed. Z-statistics are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio 



















































































Other Control Variables  Y  Y  
Industry & Year FE Y  Y  
Chi-Square 339.42  288.05  

















Table 7: Endogeneity Test-Instrumental Variable-Probit 
This Table reports results from Instrumental Variable-Probit estimation in which failure risk is our dependent variable and 
Total Pay and Pay Gap are our main independent variables. Failure risk is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm 
survived five years after its IPO. Panel A presents the first-stage results, while Panel B displays the second-stage results. 
Regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. T-statistics are included in the 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
Panel A: First-Stage Results of IV-Probit 
 (1) (2) 




Industry Median Total Pay Gap  
0.66*** 
(7.85) 


























































































Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y 
N 1,178 1,178 
Adjusted    0.4020 0.2931 
Panel B: Second-Stage Results of IV-PROBIT 
 (1) (2) 




Total Pay Gap  
-0.24** 
(-2.62) 
Control Variables Y Y 
Industry & Year FE Y Y 
Wald Test of Exogeneity (p-value) 1.34 (0.2479) 0.36 (0.5492) 
F-statistic 66.22*** 43.14*** 





Table 8: Cross-Sectional Tests 
This Table illustrates the estimation of the Cox Proportional Hazards Models of Probability of failure after employing the entropy 
balance method (Hainmueller, 2012). Panel A and B present sub-sample results on the effect of CEO compensation on failure risk 
using a set of CEO and governance characteristics, while Panel C displays sub-sample results of Pay Gap on failure risk using 
characteristics indicative of promotion probability to the CEO position. Regressions control for industry and year fixed effects 
whose coefficients are suppressed. Z-statistics are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Effect of CEO Attributes on Total CEO Pay 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Generalist Specialist Young Old Founder Non-Founder 















Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry & Year 
FE 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Chi-Square 250.78 128.38 194.85 162.95 145.85 238.53 
Number of 
Observations 
588 590 585 593 377 801 
Panel B: Effects of Governance Characteristics on Total CEO Pay 








































Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry & Year 
FE 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Chi-Square 186.40 175.50 66.18 232.20 441.32 475.35 254.75 222.55 
Number of 
Observations 
678 500 807 371 554 624 594 584 
Panel C: Cross-Sectional Tests: Total Pay Gap 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Founder Non-Founder Generalist Specialist Young Old 















Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry & 
Year FE 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Chi-Square 161.45 215.15 232.32 98.50 164.80 160.21 
Number of 
Observations 













Table 9: The Effect of Managerial Incentives on Firm Investment Policies 
This Table shows the results of additional tests using alternative post-IPO investment outcomes as dependent variables after 
employing the entropy balance method (Hainmueller, 2012). Panel A and B display the results of the impact of total CEO 
compensation and Firm Pay Gap, respectively. R&D is the ratio of research and development expenses to total assets. CAPEX is 
the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. ΔR&D is the change in the levels of R&D between each post- issue year and the pre-
IPO fiscal year. ΔCAPEX is the change in the levels of CAPEX between each post-issue year and the pre-IPO fiscal year. All 
measures are industry adjusted at the two-digit SIC (Standard Industry Classification) system and averaged over the next three 
years after the IPO. We apply the investment model of Gomariz and Ballesta (2014) to compute investment efficiency, 
overinvestment, underinvestment, and average these measures over the next three years after the IPO. Control variables are the 
same as in Table 3. T-statistics are included in the parentheses, are adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors and 
clustered by industry and year. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Impact of Total CEO Pay on Firm Investment Policies 
 R&D ΔR&D CAPEX ΔCAPEX 
 (1) (2 (3) (4) 









Control variables Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
N 612 612 612 612 
Adjusted    0.6354 0.6455 0.6168 0.6170 
Panel B: Impact of Total Pay Gap on Post-Operating Performance 
 R&D ΔR&D CAPEX ΔCAPEX 
 (1) (2 (3) (4) 









Control variables Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
N 612 612 612 612 
Adjusted    0.6265 0.6364 0.6270 0.6263 
Panel C: Impact of Total CEO Pay on Investment Efficiency 
 Investment Efficiency Overinvestment Underinvestment 
 (1) (2) (3) 







Control variables Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
N 612 612 612 
Adjusted    0.1144 0.1155 0.1160 
Panel D: Impact of Total Pay Gap on Investment Efficiency 
 Investment Efficiency Overinvestment Underinvestment 
 (1) (2) (3) 







Control variables Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
N 612 612 612 
















Table 10: The Effect of Managerial Incentives on Post-IPO Operating Performance 
This Table shows the results of additional tests using three post-IPO performance measures as dependent variables after employing 
the entropy balance method (Hainmueller, 2012). Panel A displays results of the impact of Total CEO Pay. Panel B presents results 
of the impact of Total Pay Gap. Our first measure, Tobin’s Q, is the ratio of market value of assets to book values of assets . Our 
second measure, ROA, is operating income divided by total assets. Finally, our third measure, ΔROA, is the change in the levels of 
ROA between each post-issue year and the pre-IPO fiscal year, i.e.,     –               , where t represent a post-IPO fiscal 
year end. All performance measures are industry adjusted at the two-digit SIC (Standard Industry Classification) system and 
averaged over the next three years after the IPO. Control variables are the same as in Table 3. T-statistics are included in the 
parentheses, are adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors, and clustered by industry and year. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Impact of Total CEO Pay on Post-Operating Performance 
 Tobin’s Q ROA ΔROA  
 (1) (2) (3) 







Control variables Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
N 588 588 497 
Adjusted    .0.3152 0.5811 0.2130 
Panel B: Impact of Total Pay Gap on Post-Operating Performance 
 Tobin’s Q ROA ΔROA  
 (1) (2) (3) 







Control variables Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
N 588 588 497 



























Table 11: The Effect of Managerial Incentives on Financial Reporting Process 
This Table shows the results of impact of managerial incentives on earnings quality after employing the entropy balance method 
(Hainmueller, 2012). Panel A displays results of the impact of Total CEO Pay. Panel B presents results of the impact of Total Pay 
Gap. DACC (Discretionary accruals) is computed using the cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) model in the offering year, 
adjusted for performance. REM1 is the aggregate level of real earnings management in the offering year, calculated as the sum of 
abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses. REM2 is the aggregate level of real earnings management in the 
offering year, calculated as the sum of abnormal cash flow from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses. Control variables 
are the same as in Table 3. T-statistics are included in the parentheses, are adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors, 
and clustered by industry and year. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Impact of Total CEO Pay on Real Earnings Management 
 DACC REM1 REM2 
 (1) (2) (3) 







Control variables Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
N 686 686 686 
Adjusted    0.0817 0.1453 0.1688 
Panel B: Impact of Total Pay Gap on Real Earnings Management 
 DACC REM1 REM2 
 (1) (2) (3) 







Control variables Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
N 686 686 686 
Adjusted    0.0937 0.1436 0.1696 
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Supplemental File  
“Managerial Incentives and Firm Survival: Rent Extraction 
or Optimal Contracting?” 
 
This Appendix reports supplemental and robustness tests to accompany the results in “Managerial 
Incentives and Firm Survival: Rent Extraction or Optimal Contracting?” Section A1 provides 
additional descriptive evidence by analyzing the sample’s statistical properties based on firm groups 
of high-powered and weak managerial incentives. In addition, it displays the trend of CEO 
compensation and its structure by year as well as the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates and Nelson-
Aalen cumulative hazard estimates for CEO pay. Section A2 complements the baseline inferences 
based on the Cox proportional hazard models by presenting the results from the Accelerated Failure 
Time (AFT) method. Section A3 decomposes the long-term incentive component of our managerial 
incentive measures and reports the corresponding results from the Cox proportional hazard model 
of probability of failure. Section A4 presents the results from the Cox proportional hazards model 
of probability of failure based on robustness tests. Section A5 presents supplementary tests for 
endogeneity after employing a Heckman Two-Stage Method, a bivariate probit estimation model, 
and propensity score matching. Section A6 presents the results for the impact of our managerial 
incentive measures on post-IPO market performance using the factor regressions as well as the buy-










A1.  Descriptive Analysis 
A1.1 Summary Statistics 
Panel A of Table IA1 partitions the sample based on the median value of Total Pay Gap and 
compares the values of our compensation variables over two samples: firms with large and firms 
with small pay gaps. Panel B of Table IA1 describes the average CEO profile for the large and 
small pay gaps sub-samples, respectively. Panel C of Table IA1 presents the average firm and IPO 
characteristics for the sub-samples of firms with large and small pay disparities, respectively.  
Panel B shows that older CEOs, who also are the Chairperson, are concentrated in firms 
with large pay gaps, while founder-led firms have lower pay gaps. Panel C shows that, while older 
firms employ strong tournament incentives, this is not the case for larger firms.  It is also worth 
noting that firms with large pay disparities attract top-tier investment banks and have less backing 
by VCs. In addition, firms with large pay disparities are associated with lower initial aftermarket 
returns and have less risky business models (as indicated from Technology, Internet, and Nasdaq). 
Panel D of Table IA1 presents the cumulative survival rates (using the non-parametric 
Kaplan-Meier method) of our sample as well as those with highly and poorly compensated CEOs 
for one, three, and five years after IPO. The findings demonstrate a substantial degree of variation 
according to the year of issue with one-year survival rates ranging from 88.23% to 100%. In 
particular, survival rates drop from the maximum of 100% recorded in 2001 to 88% recorded in 
2008. It is also worth noting that cumulative survival rates over one, three and five years following 
IPO are higher for firms with highly remunerated CEOs in most of the years (except 2004, 2008, 
and 2010). 
 
A1.2 Dynamic Evolution of Managerial Pay and Plots of Hazard and Survival Functions 
In the main text, we provided some cross-sectional evidence about the managerial pay and 
firm or CEO characteristics. What is more interesting, perhaps, is how our managerial pay measures 
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evolve over time and how their dynamic behavior interacts with the probability of delisting. Figure 
IA1 and Figure IA2 suggest that an increased reliance on contingent forms of compensation such as 
stock options. Are these patterns an outcome of staggered boards or equilibrium in the labor 
market?  
We explore this question using graphical depictions based one hazard and survival functions 
for firms with highly versus low absolute (Total CEO Pay) and relative CEO pay (Total Pay Gap). 
The plots of the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard and Kaplan-Meier survival estimates are provided 
in Figures IA4 and IA5, respectively. In Figures IA4a and IA5a, the hazard functions of IPO firms 
with a highly compensated CEO (or a large pay disparity) are below than those of firms with a 
poorly compensated CEO (or small pay disparity). The gaps widen slightly but steadily as the 
length of time beyond the issue year increases. On the other hand, as can be seen from Figures IA4b 
and IA5b, the survival functions of IPO firms with highly compensated CEOs (or large pay 
disparities) are consistently above those firms with poorly compensated CEOs (or small pay 
disparities). Also, the difference between the survival functions for both total CEO compensation 
and firm pay gap widens after 2005. Overall, the plots of survival and hazard functions indicate that 
IPO firms with a highly compensated CEO (large Pay Gaps) have a more attractive survival profile 
than firms with a poorly compensated CEO (low Pay Gap). 
 
A2. Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) 
 For robustness checking and comparison purposes, we also use another survival model, the 
Accelerated Failure Time (AFT), to examine the determinants of the survival rates. In contrast with 
the Cox model, the AFT method allows the impact of the independent variables on survival time to 
vary over the post-IPO period depending on the length of time since listing (Hensler et al., 1997; 
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Jain and Kini, 2000). The AFT model is a parametric model typically expressed in terms of a log-




  (                                                                     (1) 
 
where Ln(Ti) is the natural logarithm of the survival time or time-to-failure (measured in months). 
In this model, the exponential of the coefficient is an ‘acceleration factor’, also known as the time 
ratio. The time ratio measures the extent to which changes in the independent variables speed up or 
slow down the occurrence of delisting. A positive coefficient represents a time ratio greater than 
one, indicating that an increase in the covariate increases survival time, while a negative coefficient 
(a time ratio below one) shows that an increase in the covariate decreases survival time (Espenlaub 
et al., 2012, 2016).  
 
A2.1 Results from AFT Method 
In Table IA2, we present both the coefficient estimates and the time ratios together with 
their associated p-values. The results indicate a positive association between total CEO 
compensation and survival time. The coefficient for total CEO remuneration is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. On average, the survival time of firms with CEO pay in the 75
th
 
percentile increases by 39.39%, which translates to an increase of 18.76 months of survival time, 
compared to firms with CEO pay in the 25
th
 percentile. Similarly, the coefficient on the Pay Gap is 
positive and significant at the 5% level. Specifically, the survival time of firms with pay gaps in the 
75
th
 percentile is increased by 30.41%, which translates to an increase of 14.49 months of survival 




 The results regarding the control 
                                                          
46
 Being parametric models, AFT models require a specific underlying distribution (i.e., Weibull, Gama, lognormal 
etc.). Unreported results for the Akaike information criterion (AIC) identify Weibull as the most appropriate 
distribution with the lowest AIC value. 
47
 The first estimate represents the change in the time ratio for a firm that moves from the 25th percentile to the 
75th percentile of the distribution of the natural logarithm of total CEO compensation and is calculated as follows: 
exp(0.27 x 1.23) -1 = 39.39%. Similarly, the change in the time ratio for a firm that moves in the interquartile range of 
the distribution of the natural logarithm of pay gap is calculated as follows: exp(0.15 x 1.77) -1 = 30.41%. This 
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variables and their impact on time-to-failure are similar but opposite in sign to those in the Cox 
models.  
 
A3. Decomposition of Incentive Pay 
In the baseline tests, we show that the negative relationship between CEO pay and firm 
failure is driven by the long-term component of CEO compensation. In this section, we dig deeper 
to explore the effect of all incentive components on failure risk and how they shape this association. 
Our findings in Table IA3 suggest that the link between compensation and IPO survival is driven by 
the option awards component of long-term compensation. 
 
A4. Robustness Tests 
In this section, we examine the robustness of our results in various ways. We begin by 
adopting alternative definitions of the dependent variable (i.e., survivors versus non survivors) 
followed by alternative definitions for the tournament-based incentives variable. 
 
A4.1 Alternative Definitions of Survival 
An alternative definition of survival is concerned with the time to delisting following the 
issue date. Bhattacharrya et al. (2015) show that, in contrast to the common perception that survival 
risk decreases as a firm ages, public firms need to survive for three years after their IPO before their 
survival rate starts diminishing. Based on this finding, the authors suggest that the first three years 
after a firm goes public are critical to its long-term survival. Following this suggestion, we re-
evaluate the relationship between managerial incentives and IPO survival by restricting our event 
window to three year instead of give years after the IPO. The results of our robustness checks are 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
translates into 18.76 months for CEO pay (i.e., 39.39% x 47.64 months for survival time in the 25th percentile) and 
14.49 months for CEO pay gap (i.e., 30.41% x 47.64 months for survival time in the 25th percentile). 
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shown in column (1) of Panel A and B (Table IA4) and are qualitatively similar to our baseline 
findings.  
Notwithstanding the above evidence, one might still argue that true failures should be 
considered as cases of firms that involve delisting only for negative reasons (i.e., liquidated or 
dropped). Following Jain and Kini (2000), we consider all M&A delistings as survivors, and hence, 
classify as failures only the companies that were liquidated or dropped. We continue to find that 
CEO compensation and CEO pay gap have a significant negative impact on failure risk.  
 
A4.2 Alternative Measures of Tournament-Based Incentives   
In the baseline tests, we have used the CEO pay-gap measure of Kale et al. (2009) as our 
proxy for tournament-based incentives, which is calculated as the natural logarithm of the 
difference between a CEO’s total compensation and the median value of the compensation of the 
firm’s other senior executives in a given fiscal year. This approach has intuitive appeal as it roughly 
captures the increase in a non-CEO executive’s compensation after winning a tournament (i.e., “the 
typical size of the prize”). Nonetheless, we acknowledge that the use of the median executive pay 
could overestimate (underestimate) tournament-based incentives if only one or two executives have 
significantly higher (lower) compensation and higher (lower) chances of obtaining promotions than 
the remaining top executive members (Masulis and Zhang, 2013). To eliminate this error in our pay 
disparity measure, we use the natural logarithm of the difference in pay between the CEO and the 
mean of the other members of the top management team.  
 Another potential concern with our main measure of tournament-based incentives is that it 
may be highly correlated with a particular major determinant of CEO compensation, firm size, since 
pay differentials tend to increase with firm size (Gabaix and Landier, 2008). A pay-gap-based 
promotion metric is therefore subject to the concern that the link between tournament incentives 
and IPO failure is contaminated by firm size. To mitigate such concerns, we disentangle the pay 
138 
 
disparity measure from firm size by using an alternative pay disparity measure:  the CEO pay slice 
(CPS), calculated as the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the top three executives paid to 
the CEO (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2011).   
Our results in Panel C (Table IA4) remain unchanged, as we continue to find significant 
results (at the 5% level) for the mean gap between the CEO and the next tier of executives, both in 
the Cox and the AFT models. The results in Panel D of Table IA4 reveal that an increased CPS 
decreases IPO failure rates and increases survival time.  
 
A4.3 Alternative Industry Definitions 
In our baseline tests, we used the Fama-French 17 industry classification scheme to control 
for time-invariant unobservable industry characteristics that may be driving the association between 
compensation-based incentives and IPO survival. To examine the robustness of our main results we 
use alternative industry definitions, specifically, the Fama-French 30 and Fama-French 49 industry 
classifications or exclude the industry fixed effects. In Table IA5, we compare the results under 
these schemes and find that our reported results are not materially affected by alternative industry 
classification schemes. 
 
A4.4 Do Delta and Vega Affect our Inferences? 
Our study examines how incentives affect IPO survival based on incentive contracts which 
are set prior to the IPO. This choice is justified because we adopt an investment perspective. 
Otherwise, we could consider compensation-based incentives that utilize information after the 
initiation of trading (i.e., in the post-IPO period). This process introduces look-ahead bias, and as 
such, cannot be used for forecasting in our context. Nevertheless, there are some IPO papers that 
utilize the delta and vega, i.e., the incentives based on changes of firm price and volatility of 
returns. For instance, Baker and Gompers, 2003; Chahine and Goergen, 2014 delta improves IPO 
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performance (e.g., Jain and Kini, 1994; Certo et al., 2003; Chahine and Goergen, 2014), whereas 
other studies on seasoned firms suggest that vega is positively associated risk-taking incentives and 
some others document that delta increases firm performance and capital expenditures (Coles et al., 
2006; Kini and Williams, 2012; Coles et al., 2017).  
Following these papers and the extant literature on seasoned firms (e.g., Core and Guay, 
2002; Coles et al., 2006) we control for the sensitivity of compensation incentive contracts to 
changes in share prices and stock return volatility by incorporating in our models the delta and 
vega.
48
 These variables reduce our observations by half. Nevertheless, as shown in Table IA6, our 
baseline results remain qualitatively the same. 
 
A5. Robustness Checks for Endogeneity  
A5.1 Two-Stage Heckman Process 
To further address the issue of endogeneity and self-selection bias associated with our 
managerial incentive variables, we follow Espenlaub, 2016 and estimate a two-stage Heckman 
(1979) model. In the first-stage, we estimate two probit models: one modelling for the likelihood of 
a given IPO having a highly compensated CEO, and a second modeling of the likelihood of having 
large disparity in the pay distribution of the top management team. The sample partitioning is based 
on the median value of Total CEO compensation and Total Pay Gap, respectively. 
In the second stage of our selection model, the Inverse Mills Ratios (IMR) from each first-
stage probit model is included as an additional variable in our baseline Cox model. The results of 
the second-stage of the selection model are reported in Panel B of Table IA7. They show that 
sample selection bias is not a concern in our baseline analysis, because neither of the two IMRs is 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Also, our managerial pay measures continue to be 
significant. 
                                                          
48
 I thank Lalitha Naveen for making vega and delta data available. 
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A5.2 Bivariate Probit Estimation 
Arguably a generous CEO compensation package or a large Pay Gap (i.e., high-powered 
incentives) is a choice made voluntarily by firms. If this choice is based on factors that also affect 
firm survival, then our analysis could suffer from simultaneity or reverse causality. However, this is 
unlikely because delisting takes place in our data after we observe the presence of a highly 
compensated CEO or large pay disparity (i.e., at the pre-IPO fiscal year). On the other hand, it is 
possible that an omitted variable, such as unobservable management skills or attitudes toward risk, 
could drive both firm survival and managerial incentives such that the estimated association 
between firm survival and managerial incentives is spurious. To evaluate the empirical relevance of 
endogeneity in our analysis, we follow Chadwick et al. (2016) and run a bivariate probit model that 
simultaneously estimates the case of high powered incentives with a model predicting firm survival.  
A desirable feature of the bivariate probit model is that it is always identified through its functional 
form (Wilde, 2000). 
In our bivariate probit estimations in Table IA8, either for the CEO pay of the Pay Gap, the 
Wald test fails to reject the hypothesis that the selection and outcome equations are independent. 
Moreover, the coefficients of the managerial pay measures continue to be negative and statistically 
significant. Therefore, endogeneity does not seem to be a concern for inferences regarding the 
relationship of the managerial incentives (CEO pay and pay disparity) and firm survival. 
 
A5.3 Statistics after Entropy Balancing Technique and Propensity Score Matching 
A5.3.1 Summary Statistics after Employing Entropy Balancing Technique  
CEOs and companies are not matched randomly. Rather the selection of a CEO is decision 
taken solely by the board of directors. The existence of an assortative matching mechanism between 
CEOs and firms could be justified, for example, if firms that follow conservative policies choose to 
hire managers who also possess conservative managerial styles or the desirable skill set to 
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implement these policies. It could also be the case that CEOs having an idiosyncratic preference for 
specific types of firms or particular corporate policies to be matched with firms that present a good 
fit. Hence, our results might be driven by such tendencies. 
To better identify how total CEO compensation (or total Pay Gap) affect firm survival, we 
utilize in our baseline tests a robust multivariate matching technique known as entropy balancing 
(Hainmueller, 2012; Chapman et al., 2018). This matching method ensures proper covariate balance 
between treated and control samples by weighing observations such that the post-weighing means 
and variances for treated and control firms are equal for each matching dimension. Table IA9 shows 
that after re-weighing the observations, the differences in means and variances of covariates is 
minimal and statistically insignificant, which suggests that proper entropy balancing was achieved. 
  
A5.3.2 Propensity Score Matching 
Another way to determine whether our conclusions are a statistical artifact stemming from 
distributional differences in CEO and firm characteristics between firms with high versus low 
managerial pay, is to employ a one-to-one propensity score matching. This technique involves the 
creation of pairs that are comparable for all covariates but differ only in Total CEO pay and Total 
Pay Gap. As a consequence, it ensures that the variation in IPO survival can be attributed to the 
variation in the test variables (managerial incentives) with greater confidence. 
 In implementing this method, we run a probit regression to estimate the propensity scores, 
i.e., the probability of receiving the treatment (i.e., high Total CEO pay or a large Pay Gap) 
conditional on a set of carefully selected variables. For each treatment firm with high-powered 
incentives, we select a matching control firm with weak managerial incentives based on the sample 
median of CEO pay and Pay Gap in the same year, with the requirement that the absolute difference 
in the propensity score between each pair does not excess 0.01. We employ this method without 
repetition and estimate the propensity score for each firm, after considering a set of controls that 
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essentially capture all the CEO and firm characteristics used in the baseline regression. We also 
include industry membership, since some industries are more likely to feature managers with high-
powered incentives. 
 This method yields 646 unique pairs of firms, i.e., approximately 55% of the initial 
sample.
49
 Panel A of Table IA10 reports difference-in-difference means of the control variables for 
firms with high versus low managerial incentives for both matched samples. As expected, the 
corresponding difference-in-difference means are statistically insignificant for the matched sample, 
confirming that the propensity score matching succeeds in making the sample of firms with high 
managerial incentives comparable to the sample with lower managerial pay. Based on the matched 
set of treatment and control firms, we re-run the Cox model of Table 3. The results on Panel B of 
Table IA10 confirm the significantly negative association between our managerial incentive 
measures and the incidence of failure.
50
 Overall, the propensity score results continue to support a 
robust positive relationship between managerial pay and IPO survival, reinforcing the baseline 
inferences that there is a systematic difference of the managerial pay effect on IPO survival rates. 
 
A6. Market Perceptions and IPO Compensation Arrangements 
A6.1 Factor Regressions 
A natural question that arises from the performance implications of compensation packages 
of IPO executives is whether the market accurately prices absolute and relative CEO pay and how 
these perceptions might vary for the optimal contracting and the managerial power hypothesis, 
respectively. 
In the absence of information asymmetry and under a regime of fully rational investors, the 
perceptions of market participants about the consequences of executive compensation arrangements 
should be fully incorporated during the initiation of trading. However, in a setting where the stock 
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 Following the same procedure for the total pay gap, this method yields 724 unique pairs of firms. 
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market is not always completely efficient, it is likely that it does not fully incorporate the effect of 
compensation packages instantaneously but only gradually over time (as the information 
asymmetry about the manager’s abilities and future actions). In that case, one should observe 
differences in the long-run stock return performance of firms with high-powered versus weak 
managerial incentives. Therefore, under optimal contracting, firms with better compensated CEO or 
high pay gaps within the top management team will also be characterized with higher future stock 
returns. On the contrary, if these arrangements are the symptom of weak governance structures, 
firms with such compensation packages are expected to underperform in the stock market.  
We assess the evaluation made by external investors using the four factor model of Carhart 
(1997) in order to calculate the abnormal stock returns for the IPO firms.
51
 Following Chemmanur 
and Yan (2017), we assign each IPO to a portfolio on a monthly basis and each IPO firm will be 
held in the portfolio in a holding period of two and a half years starting from the end of the sixth 
month after the IPO offer date. We avoid the first six months after the IPO offer date in order to 
better understand how compensation and tournament incentive affect the long run 
underperformance of IPO firms. At the end of each holding period, the IPO firm drops out of the 
portfolio. We then calculate the equally weighted returns for each portfolio in each calendar month. 
The results are presented in Table IA11 with total CEO compensation and firm pay gap 
measured in year t-1. In Panel A of Table IA11 we run the four-factor regression using the whole 
sample of IPO firms. In Panel B and C, we create two portfolios for the IPO firms with high and 
low compensated CEOs and two portfolios those with high and low pay gaps (based on the median 
value of these managerial incentive measures). We run separate regressions for these four 
portfolios. Our results show that the high CEO pay (Pay Gap) portfolio earns a positive abnormal 
return, while the low CEO pay (Pay Gap) portfolio earns a negative abnormal return over the two 
and a half years horizon subsequent to the IPO offer date. In both cases, the hedge (high-low) 
                                                          
51
 The main advantage of the factor models is that eliminate the problem of cross-sectional dependence among sample 
firms since their inference is derived from the time series of monthly calendar-time portfolios. 
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portfolio earns a positive abnormal return which is significant at the ten percent level. Overall, these 
results provide some support to the hypothesis that the market misprices the implications of 
managerial pay incentives in the post-IPO market.  
 
A6.2 Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns 
In the main text, we calculated long-run abnormal stock returns for IPO firms using factor 
models. In this section, we compute long-run abnormal stock returns using buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (BHAR): 
     ∏ (       ∏  (   (     
 
   
 
   
        (2) 
We compute BHAR for the one-year, two-year and three-year holding periods. Firms are 
included in the computation for the full holding period or until the IPO firm is delisted. In Panel B 
and C of Table IA12 we examine whether the managerial incentive measures affect stock 
performance in a multivariate setting. The results reveal that managerial pay is positively related 
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Table IA1: Descriptive Statistics 
The Table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of U.S. IPOs over the period from 2000 to 2012. Total CEO Pay and  
its’ components are presented in Panel A. CEO characteristics are illustrated in Panel B. Firm and offering characteristics are 
reported in Panel C. Panel D reports the cumulative survival rates calculated using the Kaplan-Meier method for one, three 
years, and five years after IPO across the subsamples of highly and poorly compensated CEOs. Tests of differences in means 
between the two sub-samples of IPO firms with large pay disparity and those with small pay disparity are based on t-tests. 
The number of observations for each variable is 1,178. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: CEO Pay Components 
 IPOs with large Pay Gaps IPOs with small Pay Gaps Difference 
 Mean Mean p-value 
CEO Total Pay  $2,181,300 $413,400 0.0000 
Salary/Total Pay  0.35 0.69 0.0000 
Bonus/Total Pay 0.19 0.13 0.0000 
Stock Awards/Total Pay 0.05 0.02 0.0000 
Option Awards/Total Pay 0.25 0.09 0.0000 
Non-Equity Incentive 
Pay/Total Pay 
0.06 0.04 0.0003 
Other Pay/Total Pay 0.08 0.04 0.0000 
Panel B: CEO Characteristics 
CEO Tenure 3.94 4.05 0.6997 
CEO Duality 0.60 0.49 0.0009 
Founder 0.20 0.42 0.0000 
CEO Ownership 12.60 12.80 0.1672 
CEO Age 50.69 48.25 0.0000 
Generalist 0.62 0.57 0.0655 
Panel C: Firm and Offering Characteristics 
Firm Age 18.89 11.66 0.0000 
Proceeds 242.37 199.28 0.3524 
Size 5.20 4.38 0.0000 
Capital Expenditure 0.05 0.04 0.1472 
R&D Intensity 0.31 0.30 0.1482 
Leverage 0.35 0.33 0.5617 
EPS 0.54 0.45 0.0013 
Initial Returns 17.70 26.74 0.0010 
Overhang 4.11 4.81 0.0936 
Board Governance -0.03 -0.03 0.6910 
HHI 0.30 0.30 0.8609 
Big 4 Auditor 0.84 0.81 0.0861 
VC 0.41 0.64 0.0000 
Underwriter 0.42 0.28 0.0000 
Technology 0.34 0.45 0.0000 
Internet  0.10 0.12 0.3084 











Panel D: Kaplan-Meier Survival Rates of Total CEO Compensation By Issue Year 
  
All IPOs 
Firms with Highly Compensated 
CEOs 
Firms with Poorly Compensated 
CEOs 
  Cumulative Survival Rate Cumulative Survival Rate Cumulative Survival Rate 
Year Obs 1 Yr 3 Yrs 5Yrs 1 Yr 3 Yrs 5Yrs 1 Yr 3 Yrs 5Yrs 
2000 264 95.45 74.62 63.26 94.85 76.57 62.86 96.63 70.78 59.55 
2001 59 100.00 81.36 71.19 100.00 84.37 75.00 92.59 70.37 66.66 
2002 48 97.92 81.25 70.83 96.43 82.14 75.00 100.00 80.00 65.00 
2003 47 95.74 82.98 63.83 96.00 76.00 72.00 95.45 90.90 54.54 
2004 129 98.45 86.82 68.99 96.36 87.27 67.27 100.00 86.48 70.27 
2005 115 98.26 86.09 76.52 96.55 87.93 82.76 100.00 84.21 70.17 
2006 126 99.20 84.13 69.84 98.33 91.66 78.33 100.00 77.27 62.12 
2007 112 97.32 84.82 70.53 98.44 85.94 73.43 95.83 83.33 66.66 
2008 17 88.23 76.47 76.47 100.00 72.73 72.73 100.00 83.33 83.33 
2009 38 97.37 81.58 71.05 96.77 83.87 74.19 100.00 71.43 57.14 
2010 72 94.44 87.50 73.61 91.11 86.66 73.33 100.00 88.88 74.07 
2011 71 94.36 83.10 73.24 93.62 85.11 78.72 95.83 79.17 62.50 
2012 80 95.00 90.00 62.50 92.98 75.44 70.01 100.00 91.30 54.50 
 
Table IA2: Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) Model 
This Table shows the estimation results of the Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model after employing the entropy balance 
method (Hainmueller, 2012). Our dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the time to delist (survival time) which is 
measured in months. The Weibull distribution was selected based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Time ratios are the 
exponentiated coefficients, exp(β), and measure the extent to which changes in covariates accelerate or decelerate the occurrence 
of event (delisting). A time ratio of above (below) one indicates that an increase in the covariate increases (reduces) the survival 
time. Regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The control variables are the 
same as in the baseline models. Z-statistics are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient Time Ratio Coefficient Time Ratio 
Total CEO Pay 
0.27*** 
(4.69) 
1.309   






Control Variables Y  Y  
Industry & Year FE Y  Y  
   (            798.25  676.42  
Number of Observations 1,178  1,178  
 
Table IA3: Incentive Components  
This Table displays the multivariate analysis using the Cox Proportional Hazards Models with the components of incentive 
compensation after employing the entropy balance method (Hainmueller, 2012). Models (1) and (2) are results using stock and 
option awards, respectively. Model (3) shows the result including both stock and option awards. The sample consists of IPOs from 
2000 to 2012 in the U.S. stock market. Regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. 
The control variables are the same as in the baseline models. Z-statistics are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) (3) 











Control Variables  Y  
Industry & Year FE  Y  
Chi-Square 210.10 148.85   220.25 





Table IA4: Additional Analysis 
This Table displays the multivariate analysis using the Cox Proportional Hazards Models using alternative definitions of delisted 
firms and survivorship after employing the entropy balance method (Hainmueller, 2012). The sample consists of IPOs from 2000 
to 2012 in the U.S. stock market. Panel A and B display the results for total CEO compensation and total Pay Gap from the Cox 
models, respectively. Specifications (1) and (2) present the results of the Cox model using the alternative measures of failed 
firms. In the first alternative definition, failed companies are only the dropped and liquidated (delisting codes from 500 to 599 
and 400 to 490). Lastly, following Bhattacharya et al. (2015), we classify a firm as survivor if it is still listed within three years 
after its IPO (instead of five). Panel C and D present the Cox results using initially the mean of other top executives to calculate 
the pay gap instead of the median, and then the CEO Pay Slice (Bebchuk et al., 2011). Z-statistics are included in the 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
Panel A: The Association Between Total CEO Compensation and Failure Risk using Alternative Measures of Failure Risk 
 First Alternative Definition Second Alternative Definition 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio 







Control Variables Y  Y  
Industry & Year 
FE 
Y  Y  
Chi-Square 131.41  301.18  
Number of 
Observations 
1,178  1,315  
Panel B: The Association Between Total Pay Gap and Failure Risk using Alternative Measures of Failure Risk 
 First Alternative Definition Second Alternative Definition 
  (1) (2) 
 Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio 







Control Variables Y  Y  
Industry & Year 
FE 
Y  Y  
Chi-Square 111.50  372.35  
Number of 
Observations 
1,178  1,315  
Panel C: Firm Pay Gap using the Mean Compensation instead of the Median Compensation of Other Senior Executives 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Time Ratio 







Control Variables Y  Y  
Industry & Year FE Y  Y  
Chi-Square 218.72  624.77  
Number of 
Observations 
1,178  1,178  
Panel D: CEO Slice as an Alternative Measure of Pay Gap 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Time Ratio 







Control Variables Y  Y  
Industry & Year FE Y  Y  
Chi-Square 263.61  768.07  
Number of 
Observations 









Table IA5: Robustness Analysis  
This Table displays the multivariate analysis using the Cox Proportional Hazards Models with alternative industry definitions after 
employing the entropy balance method (Hainmueller, 2012). Panel A illustrates the estimation of the Cox model using total CEO 
compensation as the main independent variable while Panel B reports the results of the Cox model using Pay Gap as the main 
independent variable. Models (1) and (2) employ alternative industry classifications (FF-30 and FF-49). Model (3) excludes 
industry fixed effects. The sample consists of 1,178 IPOs from 2000 to 2012 in the U.S. stock market. Regressions control for 
industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. Z-statistics are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Alternative Industry Definitions for Total CEO Compensation (Pay) 
 (1) (2) (3) 












Control Variables Y  Y  Y  
Industry & Year FE Y  Y  Y  
Chi-Square 576.17  589.37  537.76  
Number of 
Observations 
1,178  1,178  1,178  
Panel B: Alternative Industry Definitions for Pay Gap 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio 










Control Variables Y  Y    
Industry & Year FE Y  Y    
Chi-Square 490.05  503.05  459.84  
Number of 
Observations 
1,178  1,178  1,178  
 
Table IA6: Managerial Incentives and IPO Failure Risk 
This Table shows the results of additional tests using both managerial incentives, vega and delta measures on IPO failure risk after 
employing the entropy balance method (Hainmueller, 2012). Panel A and B present the results of the impact of total CEO 
compensation and total Pay Gap on IPO failure risk. Vega is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio 
for a 0.01 change in standard deviation of returns. Delta is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio for 
a 1% change in stock price (Core and Guay, 2002; Coles et al., 2006). Data for Vega and Delta are obtained from Lalitha Naveen 
website.Columns (1) and (2) report results for multivariate regressions of the effect of total CEO compensation and total Pay Gap 
on failure risk. T-statistics are included in the parentheses, are adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) 

















Control variables Y Y 
Industry & Year FE Y Y 
Number of Observation 474 474 







Table IA7: Heckman-Two Step Model 
This Table shows the estimation results of the Heckman Two-Step Model. Panel A presents the First-Stage results (probit models), 
while Panel B displays the second stage results (outcome) including the Inverse Mills Ratios obtained from Panel A as additional 
variables. Our dependent variables in Panel A are the Highly compensated CEOs and Large Pay Gaps, respectively. Highly 
compensated CEOs is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEOs have greater compensation than the sample median, and 0 otherwise. 
Large pay gap is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firms have pay disparity greater than the sample median, and 0 otherwise. Our 
dependent variable in Panel B is whether or not a firm survived five years after its IPO***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: First Stage Results 






















































































Industry & Year FE Y Y 
          0.1886 0.0959 
Number of Observations 1,178 1,178 
Panel B: Second-Stage Results 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio 





Total Pay Gap 
  -0.18*** 
(-3.47) 
0.835 




   
Inverse Mills (Total Pay Gap) 
  -0.40 
(-0.44) 
 
Control Variables Y  Y  
Industry & Year FE Y  Y  
Chi-Square 51.78  485.19  




Table IA8: Bivariate Probit Estimation 
This Table shows the estimation results of the Bivariate Probit Estimation. Failure risk is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm 
failed to survive five years after its IPO. Highly compensated CEOs is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEOs have greater 
compensation than the sample median, and 0 otherwise. Large firm gap is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firms have pay 
disparity greater than the sample median, and 0 otherwise. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Failure Risk 
High Total CEO 
Compensation 
Failure Risk Large Firm Gap 
Total CEO Pay 
-0.20** 
(-2.55) 
   






































































































































































Wald Test (p-value)  0.655 (0.4185)  2.368 (0.1238) 








Table IA9: Differences in Observables (covariates) after Entropy Balancing 
This table conducts my entropy balancing matching estimation that ensures better covariate balance between treatment (highly 
compensated CEOs) and control (poorly compensated CEOs) groups by weighing observation such that the post-weighing mean 
and variance for treated and control samples are equal along the matching estimation. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 Treated (589 IPOs) Control (589 IPOs) 
 Mean Variance Skewness Mean Variance Skewness 
Covariates        
CEO Tenure 3.925 22.83 4.034 3.925 12.02 0.7361 
CEO Duality 0.645 0.229 -0.607 0.645 0.229 -0.607 
Founder 0.236 0.181 1.24 0.236 0.181 1.24 
CEO Ownership 7.603 15.16 3.451 7.603 15.16 1.747 
CEO Age 50.88 63.92 0.011 50.87 59.46 0.209 
Generalist 0.636 0.232 -0.568 0.636 0.232 -0.568 
Board Governance -0.033 0.006 0.039 -0.033 0.007 0.374 
Firm Age 2.498 1.117 -0.004 2.498 0.991 -0.006 
Size 5.476 2.735 0.225 5.476 1.71 -0.152 
Proceeds 324.3 1,362,545 13.10 324.2 1,362,547 1.307 
Capital Expenditure 0.057 0.009 4.707 0.057 0.006 3.536 
R&D Intensity 0.241 0.183 1.212 0.241 0.183 1.212 
Leverage 0.335 0.120 1.780 0.335 0.201 2.272 
EPS 0.563 0.246 -0.256 0.563 0.246 -0.256 
Initial Returns 17.47 47.74 3.535 17.47 47.74 2.203 
Overhang 4.078 58.62 15.15 4.078 58.53 6.232 
Big 4 Auditor 0.867 0.116 -2.157 0.867 0.116 -2.157 
VC 0.421 0.244 0.318 0.421 0.244 0.318 
Underwriter 0.482 0.250 0.073 0.482 0.250 0.073 
Technology 0.329 0.221 0.723 0.329 0.221 .0728 
Internet  0.101 0.091 2.647 0.101 0.092 2.647 













Table IA10: Propensity Score Matching  
This table presents the analysis on the relation between Highly Compensated CEOs (Large Pay Gaps) and Failure Risk using the 
One-to-One Propensity Score Matching (PSM) procedure. Panel A reports univariate analysis for 323 firms with highly 
compensated CEOs and 323 firms with poorly compensated CEOs. The variables used to estimate differences in means are tested 
based on t-test. Panel B displays the estimation of the Cox proportional hazards model of probability of failure on the matched 
samples. Our dependent variable is whether or not a firm survived five years after its IPO. We use the following control variables 
for both cases (total compensation and firm pay gap): Firm Age, Size, CEO Tenure, CEO Duality, Generalist, Big 4 Auditor, 
Founder, Leverage, EPS, VC, Technology, Internet, Underwriter, and Nasdaq. Regressions control for industry and year fixed 
effects whose coefficients are suppressed. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Mean Differences Between Treatment and Control Group of PSM Sample (N=646) 
 Treatment Control Difference (p-value) 
CEO Tenure 4.25 3.78 0.2232 
CEO Duality 0.55 0.55 1.0000 
Founder 0.29 0.32 0.1365 
CEO Ownership 7.85 8.10 0.8418 
CEO Age 50.39 49.56 0.0752 
Generalist 0.58 0.59 0.8109 
Firm Age 13.97 13.04 0.4683 
Size 4.59 4.53 0.6500 
Proceeds 204.12 199.23 0.1655 
Capital Expenditure 0.05 0.04 0.1164 
R&D Intensity 0.25 0.30 0.1341 
Leverage 0.32 0.34 0.6753 
EPS 0.51 0.52 0.8136 
Initial Returns 22.97 25.29 0.5540 
Overhang 4.57 4.29 0.6332 
Big 4 Auditor 0.85 0.83 0.5270 
VC 0.58 0.55 0.3835 
Underwriter 0.27 0.30 0.2963 
Technology 0.45 0.42 0.4762 
Internet  0.12 0.13 0.7192 
Nasdaq 0.82 0.79 0.0798 
 
Panel B: Estimation of the Cox Proportional Hazards Model of Probability of Failure on Matched Samples 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio 
Total CEO Pay 
-0.24** 
(-2.10) 
0.782   




Control Variables Y  Y  
Industry & Year FE Y  Y  
Chi-Square 148.24  149.09  









Table IA11: Four Factor Regressions 
This Table reports the results from Carhart’s (1997) four-factor regressions for portfolios of IPO firms based on Total CEO Pay 
and Pay Gap of the year prior to the IPO. Portfolios with high or low total CEO pay (total pay gap) are those with Total CEO 
Compensation (Total Pay Gap) above or below the sample median, respectively. The regression model is:(            
  (                                 . Rpm is the monthly portfolio returns, Rfm is the one-month T-bill 
return, (Rkm-Rfm) is the monthly market risk premium. SMBm is the return on the small firms minus the return on the large firms in 
month m, and HMLm is the return on the high book-to-market stocks minus the return on the low book-to-market stocks, and 
UMDm is the return on the high momentum stocks minus the return on the low momentum stocks. ap is the monthly risk-adjusted 
abnormal return in percent and βp, sp, hp, and up are factor loadings. T-statistics are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Portfolio consists of all IPO firms 











Panel B: Portfolios are sorted by Total CEO Pay 

































Panel C: Portfolios are sorted by Total Pay Gap 


































Table IA12: Managerial Incentives and BHAR 
This Table shows the results of additional tests using post-IPO volatility measures after employing the entropy balance method 
(Hainmueller, 2012). Panel A and B present the results of the impact of total CEO compensation and total pay gap on Post-IPO 
Performance. The dependent variable BHAR is the 12-, 24- and 36 month (depending on the specification) buy-and-hold return 
calculated from the price at the end of the firm’s first day of trading through the end of the specified return window. Columns (1), (2) 
and (3) report results for multivariate regressions of the 12-, 24-, and 36-month post-IPO buy-and-hold returns. BHAR12, BHAR24, 
BHAR36 are adjusted for the one, two, and three year buy-and-hold value-weighted index return. T-statistics are included in the 
parentheses, are adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors and clustered by industry and year. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Impact of Total Compensation on Post-IPO Performance 
 (1) (2) (3) 







Control variables Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
N 705 634 596 
Adjusted    0.1636 0.1525 0.1325 
Panel B: Impact of Total Firm Gap on Post-IPO Performance 
 (1) (2) (3) 







Control variables Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
N 705 634 596 




Figure IA1: Time Trend of Compensation and Pay Gap 
 






















































Figure IA3: Components of Total CEO Compensation 
 
Figure IA4a: Survival Function of IPO Firms with a Highly (blue) 
or a Poorly Compensated CEO (red) 
Figure IA4b: Survival Estimates of IPO Firms with a Highly 
(blue) or a Poorly Compensated CEO (red) 
  
Figure IA5a: Survival Function of IPO Firms with Large (blue) or 
Small (red) Pay Disparities 
Figure IA5b: Survival Estimates of IPO Firms with Large 
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the impact of employment agreements on IPOs firm investment decisions as well as on short- 
and long-term performance. Second, this study adds to the literature on CEO turnover by 
introducing a measure of CEO change that improves the precision of turnover models. It further 
contributes to the IPO literature by demonstrating how employment agreements can provide 
incentives to the top managers and by indicating the long-run effects of each contract. Finally, 
this chapter enriches the empirical literature on CEO employment agreements by showing that 
CEO career concerns and corporate governance quality can strengthen the impact of at-will 
agreements on firm performance.  
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Chapter 4: CEO Contract Horizons around IPOs 
1. Introduction 
Recently, a limited but growing stream of literature has focused on whether CEO 
employment contracts are effective in alleviating agency conflicts arising due to differences in risk 
preferences and time horizon between shareholders and managers (e.g., Gillan et al., 2009; Zhao, 
2013; Cadman and Sunder, 2014; Gillan and Nguyen, 2016; Gonzalez-Uribe and Groen-Xu, 2017; 
Cziraki and Groen-Xu, 2019). The basic premise underlying this stream of research is that the 
inherent optionality present in stock-based instruments introduces convexity in managerial 
incentives. However, while such incentive mechanisms may motivate CEOs to pursue projects with 
significant upside, it is not clear how much they can help with profit-maximizing projects with 
considerable downside. As Jenter and Lewellen (2014) point out, risk-averse managers tend to 
avoid profit-maximizing actions with initially negative or volatile returns because they are 
detrimental to their reputation and their career prospects.  
A direct instrument to alleviate this form of risk aversion is to employ (long-term) 
employment contracts. Employment contracts theoretically set a long-term horizon by providing 
financial insurance against early termination to the CEO. Also, they offer CEOs protection from 
turnover by making premature dismissal more expensive for the firm. As such, their insurance 
character gives risk-averse CEOs incentives to invest in profit maximizing actions that are 
unobservable or risky in the short run (Holmstrom, 1982; Almaraz and Suarez, 2003; Manso, 2011). 
Do employment agreements matter in practice? Do they alleviate risk aversion and motivate 
value-creating decisions? If so, how, and to what extent? Zhao (2013) examines the role of CEO 
employment contracts in the context mergers and acquisitions and finds that fixed rather than at will 
contracts encourage value enhancing decision. Cziraki and Groen-Xu (2019) show that the time 
remaining to contract expiration is negatively related to the probability of CEO turnover. Gonzales-
Uribe and Groen-Xu (2017) show a positive relationship between innovation quality and 
managerial time horizon, measured by the time until the end of fixed-term CEO employment 
contracts. Also, Liu and Xuan (2019) document more earnings manipulations in the year before 
contract expiration. While these studies support the view that contracts provide insurance to 
downside risk and mitigate risk aversion, they largely focus on large, established firms giving far 
less attentions to small, young, entrepreneurial firms.  
I bring new insights to the literature on contractual incentives by focusing on the most 
entrepreneurial context, namely, Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). Unlike seasoned firms, the top 
management of IPOs typically holds high ownership stakes. This limits the ability of IPO managers 
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to diversify their holdings, thereby making them risk-averse and over-conservative in making 
investment decisions (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Certo et al., 2001; Chahine and Goergen, 2011). As 
such, the importance of contractual incentives is elevated in the IPO context. On the other hand, it is 
well documented that newly-listed firms have less sophisticated and underdeveloped governance 
structures, compared to mature firms (Filatotchev and Allcock, 2013; Chahine and Goergen, 2014; 
Larcker and Tayan, 2018). Hence, they are less capable to hire and retain qualified managers. This 
is particularly important because it opens a range of possibilities about the role of IPO employment 
contracts. For instance, it is possible that contractual agreements in IPOs are the outcome of a bad 
firm-CEO match. Therefore, they do not necessarily attempt to alleviate managerial risk aversion, 
i.e., their role may be limited to a particular task which may constitute a natural firm time horizon – 
the transition from the private to the public domain. It is also conceivable that contractual 
agreements around IPOs reflect managerial entrenchment, as they may insulate inferior managers 
with high bargaining power from discipline.  
The discussion above leads to several follow-up questions. Do IPO firms offer different 
employment agreements relative to mature firms, and if so, why? Should the IPO employment 
agreements be viewed as the outcome of optimal contracting or rent extraction/managerial power? 
Do employment agreements protect CEOs from dismissal? How do employment agreements affect 
the CEO outcomes as well as the future prospects of newly public firms? 
To address these questions I organize my discussion on two competing view that have 
proposed about the effectiveness of CEO employment contracts, namely the value enhancing view 
and the value-destroying view. According to the value enhancing view, employments agreements 
acknowledge that stock-based compensation allows the CEO to benefit only from the upside of 
risky strategies (Cziraki and Groen-Xu, 2019). In this respect, they protect managers from early 
dismissal by providing insurance against temporary low-performance states (i.e., downside risk). In 
other words, the key friction that long-term contracts can alleviate is transient volatility of 
ultimately profitable projects (Zhao, 2013; Song and Wan, 2017). The insurance character of such 
instruments can mitigate risk aversion by providing incentives for executives to take actions that are 
not reflected in performance until future periods (Gonzales-Uribe and Groen-Xu, 2017). 
As mentioned before, there is a burgeoning literature supporting the contractual role of 
employment agreements. For instance, Zhao (2013) documents a value enhancing role for fixed 
term contract in context mergers and acquisitions. Crizaki and Groen-Xu (2019) show that fixed-
term contracts protect CEO from premature dismissal, while Gonzales-Uribe and Groen-Xu (2017) 
find a positive relationship between innovation quality and managerial time horizon, measured by 
the time until the end of fixed-term CEO employment contracts. Also, Liu and Xuan (2019) 
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document more earnings manipulations in the year before contract expiration. Based on the 
aforementioned theoretical and empirical evidence, I anticipate that fixed term contracts effectively 
mitigate managerial risk aversion and short-termism, thereby they enhance the prospects of IPO 
issuers.  
In contrast, the value destroying view states that CEO contractual agreements are the 
outcome of weak boards succumbing to CEOs with high bargaining power (e.g., Bebchuck and 
Fried, 2004; Kuhnen and Zwiebel, 2009). Hence, instead of enhancing shareholder value by 
alleviating risk aversion, employment contracts may shelter an inferior CEO from discipline of the 
corporate control market and dismissal pressure (Zhao, 2013). This is possible because (long-term) 
fixed-term contracts increase the costs of dismissal and hence reduce the probability of CEO 
replacement due to shirking, low ability, or a bad match. As such, employment contracts may 
provide preserve incentives in managerial investment decisions.  
In line with this, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) find that following the adoption of anti-
takeover laws, managers of affected firms prefer a quiet life and avoid costly efforts and risky 
decision that would otherwise benefit the firm. In a similar vein, Meulbroek et al. (1990) suggest 
that anti-takeover provisions are negatively associated with R&D expenditures, suggesting that 
these provisions make more powerful the CEO. In addition, Muscarella and Zhao (2011) report that 
severance agreements insulate CEOs from discipline, induce managerial slack, and hinder patent 
innovation. Based on the above, I predict that if fixed-term contracts are shaped by entrenched 
managers, IPO CEOs with a contract are less likely to make risky value creating decisions that 
CEOs without a contract or with an at will contract. Note that the two competing hypothesis are not 
mutually exclusive, I attempt to unravel which effect dominates. 
Using a unique hand collected dataset of US IPO firms from 2000 to 2014, I initially find 
that CEOs with fixed-term contracts have lower retention rates, while CEOs with at-will contracts 
have lower probability of turnover. In economic terms, the CEO turnover rate of firms with at-will 
managers is 76% of the CEO turnover rate of firms without at-will managers. Furthermore, I 
document that post-IPO compensation is greater than pre-IPO, and this is mainly due to the equity 
compensation (stock and option awards). Interestingly, CEOs with at-will agreements have a 
greater increase in their compensation compared to those with fixed-term contracts.  
Consistent with the view that employment agreements constitute a signal for the firms’ 
prospects, I demonstrate that both types of contracts are negatively associated with underpricing but 
not significantly. My results suggest also that firms without employment agreements are associated 
with higher IPO underpricing. In particular, the average underpricing for IPO firms with non-
employment agreements increases by 7.19%. Further, I find a strong and positive association 
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between fixed-term CEOs and returns volatility, which is line with the idea that newly listed firms 
prefer to hire CEOs only to complete their issue.  
To gain more insight into the issue of risk, I examine the possible sources that could drive 
the association between contractual agreements and volatility. My findings regarding the at-will 
CEOs support the value-enhancing view, and specifically, they indicate that, that at-will CEOs are 
positively related to CAPEX and R&D. To get a sense of economic magnitude: the average R&D 
investment for firms with at-will CEOs increases by 3%. On the other hand, I document a negative 
association between fixed-term contracts and risky investments. 
In my last set of exploratory tests, I examine the impact that employment agreements might 
play in the aftermarket. Consistent with the notion that at-will CEOs adopt risky investments, I also 
find that this type of agreements is positively related to post-IPO operating performance. Survival 
analysis also shows that the risk of delisting due to negative reasons of IPO issuers with a fixed-
term contract is 84% higher of the delisting risk of firms without a fixed-term contract. I also 
uncover a number of interesting cross-sectional variations in the effects of contractual agreements 
on future firm performance. I investigate whether the effect of EAs should vary with the CEO 
career concerns and the corporate governance quality. I suggest that the positive at-will EAs- firm 
performance link is more pronounced in firms with high governance quality and of those with 
overconfident CEOs and more career concerns.  
 My study contributes to the literature in several ways. This is the first study to examine the 
impact of employment agreements on IPOs firm investment decisions as well as on short- and long-
term performance. In particular, I provide evidence that managers with at-will agreements are 
associated with higher investments and firm performance. Recent works have explored the effect of 
contractual agreements on CEO turnover and firm volatility (Cziraki and Groen-Xu, 2019), CEO 
compensation (Song and Wan, 2017), innovation (Gonzalez-Uribe and Groen-Xu, 2017), cost of 
debt (Mansi et al., 2016), and acquisition decisions (Zhao, 2013). Despite the literature on 
employment agreements, empirical studies which examine the effect of contractual agreements on 
newly listed firms are scant. The only exception is Cadman and Sunder (2014) who examine the 
association between shareholder investment horizon and CEO horizon incentives.  
Second, my work adds to the literature on CEO turnover by introducing a measure of CEO 
turnover that improves the precision of turnover models. My results strengthen the notion that 
CEOs with short horizon are risk averse, and suggest that CEO employment contracts are important 
determinants. Prior literature has mainly explored the effect of CEO turnover on firm performance 
(Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Bhagat et al., 2010), corporate governance (Weisbach, 1988; 
Fisman et al., 2015; Jenter and Kanaan, 2015; Jenter and Lewellen, 2015), corporate acquisitions 
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(De Cesari et al., 2016), risk (Bushman et al., 2010), and equity volatility (Clayton et al., 2005). I 
also contribute to the broad literature on the effect of CEO incentives, which, so far, has primarily 
focused on compensation incentives (Lowry and Murphy, 2007; Chahine and Goergen, 2011), pay 
disparity (Kale et al., 2009; Bebchuk et al., 2011; Kini and Williams, 2012), and delta and vega 
(Brockman et al., 2010). 
I further contribute to the IPO literature by demonstrating how employment agreements can 
provide incentives to the top managers and by indicating the long-run effects of each contract. 
Finally, my study enriches the empirical literature on CEO employment agreements by showing 
that CEO career concerns and corporate governance quality can strengthen the impact of at-will 
agreements on firm performance. My results are relevant to founders’ and top executives, because it 
indicates that, the effectiveness of employment contracts do not only affect firms’ risk policies but 
should also affect its future performance and longevity. 
My study is most closely related to the work of Almazan and Suarez (2003), Gillan et al. 
(2009), Rau and Xu (2012), Zhao (2013), Cadman and Sunder (2014), Brown et al. (2015), 
Goldman and Huang (2015), Mansi et al. (2016), Son and Wan (2017), Gonzalez-Uribe and Groen-
Xu, (2017), and Cziraki and Groen-Xu (2019). Gillan et al. (2009) examine the whether the 
association between a company and its top manager is ruled by a written or an implicit agreement. 
Building on this study, I suggest that not only written agreements exist but they also reflect career 
incentives by documenting effects on CEO outcomes (compensation and turnover). Cadman and 
Sunder (2014) investigate the relation between shareholder investment horizons and compensation 
contracts that influence CEOs horizon incentives. I update and complement their work by using a 
comprehensive sample of IPO companies and by examining the impact of contracts not only on 
CEO compensation but also on CEO turnover and both short- and long-term firm performance. 
Finally, my study expands and complements the work of Gonzalez-Uribe and Groen-Xu, (2017), 
and Cziraki and Groen-Xu (2019) by examining the CEO employment contracts on the IPO setting. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the background and the 
hypothesis development. Section 3 described the sample selection procedure. Section 4 and 5 
present preliminary statistics and the empirical findings of the effectiveness of employment 
agreements on firm risk and performance. Section 6 reports results from endogeneity tests. Sections 
7 analyses the impact of contracts across CEO career concerns and corporate governance. Section 8 
concludes the study. 
 
2. Prior Research on Employment Agreements (EA) and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Employment Agreements and CEO Turnover 
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It is more costly for a firm to dismiss a CEO with employment agreement protection, and 
hence the CEO will be better protected from short-term performance swing and job security threat, 
compared to CEOs without contractual protection. For example, Xu (2010) finds that the existence 
of CEO contractual agreements reduces the likelihood of CEO turnover, and Rustics (2006) 
suggests that the use of equity-based severance pay for CEOs is negatively associated with the 
likelihood of CEO turnover after poor performance. Another strand of literature (e.g., Dikolli et al., 
2009; Mergenthaler et al., 2012) suggest that failing meets earnings targets significantly increases 
the likelihood of CEO turnover. Moreover, long horizon employment agreements with high 
severance payments discourage the company from replacing the manager with a marginally better 
candidate early on and therefore create commitment. This commitment in turn changes the CEO’s 
incentives. These effects of fixed-term contracts on CEO compensation and incentives are presented 
independently of the specific reasons for CEO dismissals. 
 
2.2 Value-Enhancing Perspective 
Employment contracts can ensure managers their expected payoff even if a bad state occurs 
ex post (e.g., project failure and job replacement) and motivate managers to take risky-value 
enhancing action they might otherwise avoid (Almazan and Suarez, 2003; Ju et al., 2004). From the 
firm’s perspective, EA allows the firm to attract CEO candidates who otherwise would not consider 
the position. A short-time horizon implies that its holder prefers payoffs that materialize soon. 
When uncertainty about the quality of a project only resolves after a longer period of time, potential 
rewards can come too late to motivate the short-term oriented executive. This can reduce the 
incentives to invest into long-term projects.  
For instance, Manso (2011) finds that CEO employment agreements stimulate innovation by 
enhancing for early failure and reward for long-term success. Stein (1988, 1989) suggests that if 
managers have more information than the market about the prospects of the firm’s long-term 
prospects, then temporarily the low earnings may lead to underprice firm’s stock, and a takeover on 
the cheap. Gonzalez-Uribe and Groen-Xu (2018) find that long-horizon CEOs increase long-term 
investments such as R&D expenses and capital expenditures, while Cziraki and Groen-Xu (2019) 
notice that employment agreements should encourage managers to engage in risky projects. 
Therefore, since employment contracts protect CEOs in the event of takeovers and dismissals, they 
may improve CEO incentives for long-term, risky and positive NPV projects. 
In addition, in the signal jamming model of Stein (1989), CEOs facing a turnover threat 
want to boost their current performance. They forgo long-term investments to avoid spending 
earnings that can serve to signal quality instead. In contract, CEOs with a long horizon do not have 
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an incentive to send such signals, and therefore should not underinvest. Based on the findings of 
Antia et al. (2010), I argue that CEOs with short (investment) horizons may cut investment because 
they do not have an incentive to exert effort when rewards will not arrive before their horizons 
ends. In addition to that, Cadman and Sunder (2014) document that long-horizon CEOs are related 
to higher long-run performance. Thus, I expect that executives with short-horizon incentives take 
actions that benefit the firm in the short-run at the potential cost of long-term performance.  
On the other hand, an executive with a short horizon has little incentive to exert the effort 
necessary for starting a long-term project. Specifically, he also has little incentive to exert effort to 
work on the long-term project, even if started. In addition, lower-rank executives may have to 
reverse decision under new leadership. However, managers concerned about losing control or job 
replacement have incentives to sacrifice long-term value-increasing projects to boost earnings. 
Under the pressure to deliver short-term performance and to protect their personal benefits, these 
CEOs (with short-contracts) are more likely to engage in myopic behavior, provided that the board 
and/or investors cannot fully understand the implications of such behavior (e.g., Fundenberg and 
Tirole, 1995; DeFond and Park, 1997). Furthermore, the threat of dismissal of a top executive 
without an employment agreement can lead to agency problems, such as increasing the magnitude 
of the myopia engaging in suboptimal behavior in order to deliver short-term performance 
(Yermack, 2006; Rustics, 2006; Rau and Xu, 2010). Therefore, given a short CEO horizon, it can 
be optimal for the firm to not invest (under-invest) into NPV-positive projects.
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 As such, CEOs 
with an employment contract (with long horizon) are more likely to undertake value-enhancing 
decisions and increase firm performance than those without one. 
 
2.3 Value-Destroying Perspective 
While an employment agreement may enhance shareholder value by alleviating managerial 
risk aversion, some could argue that EA reflects manager entrenchment and low corporate 
governance quality (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Kuhnen and Zwiebel, 2009). For example, 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Atanassov (2013) suggest that after the anti-takeovers law 
enforcement, CEOs of affected corporations prefer a quiet life and avoid making risky investments. 
In addition to that, Cannella and Shen (2001) find that powerful managers who are isolated from the 
stock market avoid costly efforts and risky decisions. Muscarella and Zhao (2015) document that 
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managers with severance pay agreements have lower investments and innovation, and all the above 
lead to shareholder value destruction. 
This managerial power effect of CEO employment agreements can have large impacts on 
newly listed firms. Prior literature suggests that CEOs may undertake value-destroying decisions to 
reap personal benefits at shareholder expense. Masulis et al. (2007) find lower announcement 
returns for acquirers with more anti-takeover provisions, implying that powerful managers tend to 
make value-decreasing mergers and acquisitions. Moreover, managers are more likely to engage in 
myopic behavior when they are under pressure to have a high short-term performance (e.g., success 
of an IPO) and prefer to protect themselves from negative outcomes (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 
1995; DeFond and Park, 1997). Therefore, the alternative view is that CEO employment 
agreements may be a reflection of agency conflicts.  As a result, CEOs who prefer a quiet life and 
with an employment contract which is a reflection of agency problems is more likely to engage in 
value-destroying decisions. 
 
3. Sample Selection Procedure 
My sample selection starts with retrieving all the initial public offerings (IPOs) between 
2000 and 2014 from the Thomson One Banker database. Following prior literature, I eliminate 
financial institutions, American Depository Receipts (ADRs), closed-end funds, unit offers, and any 
other non-common stock type of shares. In addition, I eliminate any IPOs with offer price below 
$5.00. I obtain IPO background and issuance information from the Thomson ONE Banker, 
including the issue data, offer price, total proceeds raised, whether the firm is backed by venture 
capital and the bookrunners. For underwriter prestige ranking, the study employs Jay Ritter’s 
updated measures of underwriter quality. Accounting data are retrieved from the Compustat 
database, and public trading prices are from the Center for Research and Security Prices (CRSP). 
Data regarding the executive compensation (e.g. salary, bonus, restricted stock, options, 
non-equity incentive plans, and total compensation) and contracts of the named executive officers 
(NEOs) of IPOs are carefully hand collected from firm prospectuses (S-1, 424, and DEF-14A) on 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s EDGAR. Also, I use the IPO prospectuses to 
construct the biographical profiles of CEOs (e.g., CEO duality, tenure) and for information about 
their work experience I use the BoardEx database. Also, I manually collect data on executive 
compensation for the post-IPO year from the DEF-14A file. After merging the data from the above 





3.1 Information on Type of Employment Agreements 
The contracts are comprehensive written agreements that specify employment terms — 
including the CEO’s responsibilities, compensation, perquisites, termination conditions, and 
payments — as well as restriction on outside activities.  A typical fixed-term CEO contract has a 
fixed length of from one to five years and can be renewed, amended, or extended. In the US, 
employment can be also at-will.
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 Under at-will employment, both the employer and the employee 
can terminate the relationship for “good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong, 
without being thereby guilty of legal wrong”. In other words, at-will employment can be terminated 
at any time. 
Therefore, I create three variables to capture major features of CEO agreements: The 
presence of a fixed-term employment agreement (Fixed-Term Contract), contract duration 
(Duration of Contract), and at-will agreement (At-Will). The fixed-term employment agreement is a 
binary variable taking the value of one if the CEO has a comprehensive employment agreement for 
the compensation year, and zero otherwise. The duration is the duration of the employment 
agreement in the compensation year. It measures the length of protection remaining on the 
contractual agreement. I follow Gillan et al. (2009) and Zhao (2013) and set duration equal to one 
day for contracts that the CEO is employed at will. In addition, I follow Gonzalez-Uribe and Groen-
Xu (2017) and create a variable to measure the continuity of the CEO contract (Renewable). 
Renewable is a binary variable taking the value of one if the contract automatically renews unless a 
prior notice is given, and zero otherwise.
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Appendix B illustrates three examples of CEO employment contracts from my sample 
firms. For example, the employment agreement between Home Diagnostics Inc and Mr J. Richard 
Damron states that “We entered into an employment agreement with J. Richard Damron, Jr., our 
President and Chief Executive Officer, as of January 1, 2006. Mr. Damron’s employment 
agreement expires on December 31, 2008, and provides for an annual base salary of $500,000, 
which may be increased by our board of directors from time to time”. The second contract in the 
appendix represents a renewable contract. The employment agreement between Osiris Therapeutics 
Inc and Randa Mills, argues that “ 
Dr. Mills' employment agreement, the agreement renews automatically each May 15 for successive 
one-year terms.” Another example is Mr Peter Thompson at-will agreement with Trubion 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. 
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 The contract length as well as its continuity (renewable) is determined ex ante (in the fiscal year prior to the IPO). 
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 Fixed-term contracts and at-will are mutually exclusive. 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the distributional statistics for the pre- and post-IPO compensation, IPOs 
activity, and the number of fixed-term and at-will employment agreements. Panel A displays the 
distribution by year, while Panel B reports the cross-industry variability of the above variables. 
Despite the substantial yearly fluctuations, both pre- and post-IPO compensation have an increasing 
trend. The highest average values of pre- and post-IPO CEO remuneration are in 2011 and 2013, 
respectively, while for both measures the lowest values are in 2000. With respect to the number of 
contracts, they follow almost the similar pattern with the yearly distribution of the number of IPOs. 
Panel A illustrates that the majority of the IPO firms prefer to have at-will employment agreements 
compared to the fixed-term contracts. From 2000 to 2010, fixed-term contractual agreements 
account more compared to “at-will, however, this trend changes after 2011.  
Panel B of Table 1 displays the distribution of IPO firms by two-digit SIC code industry and 
demonstrates the highest compensation packages in entertainment services and the lowest in 
scientific instruments and electronic equipment sectors (less than $1 million). The computer 
equipment and service sector has the highest representation of IPO firms, while food products and 
entertainment services sectors have the lowest number of IPO issuers. Regarding the number of 
employment agreements, they follow the same trend as the IPOs activity and at-will agreements 
account more in comparison with the fixed-term in the most of the sectors. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for my overall IPO sample and the sub-samples of 
IPO firms with and without employment agreements. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of 
CEO horizon characteristics. Inconsistent with Gillan et al. (2009) and Gillan and Nguyen (2016), I 
document that 26% of the CEOs have fixed-term contracts with average duration of three years, 
while only one third of them is renewable. The 28% of the CEOs have at-will employment 
contracts and approximately 10% of the IPO firms’ does not have contractual agreements with their 
CEOs. Finally, the one fourth of the companies does not provide any information about their 
employment agreements. 
Panel B of Table 2 displays descriptive statistics on CEO characteristics. The typical CEO 
serves for around three and a half years and is 50 years old. Approximately the one third of the 
CEOs is also firm founders, while less than 50% are also the chairperson. Furthermore, it seems 
that firms prefer to hire CEOs with general managerial skills (60%) and foreign experience (34%). 
In terms of their education, only 4% of them hold a professional degree (e.g., ACCA, CFA), 12% 
has an MBA and 30% obtained a PhD. Finally, firms probably prefer to hire CEOs to complete 
their IPO, as approximately 40% of the CEOs leave the next five years after the issue date.  
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The differences of the most of CEO characteristics across the groups with and without 
contracts are not statistically significant. A noticeable difference is the CEOs who are also the 
chairperson have employment agreements, which is in line with Xu (2011). By contrast, consistent 
with Zhao (2013) founder-CEOs do not have either fixed-term or at-will employment agreements. 
Also, the CEO turnover rate is greater for top managers with fixed-term contracts compared to their 
counterparts with at-will agreements 
Panel C of Table 2 reports the firm and IPO characteristics for the overall sample and the 
sub-samples of firms with and without employment agreements. The average age of IPO firms is 
around 15 years and around half of them have positive earnings. More than two thirds have 
independent members and the average underpricing is 21%. Around half of IPOs are venture 
packed, audited by the Big 4 accounting firms and 39% are underwritten by top-tier investment 
banks. Furthermore, 37% of firms are in a high-tech sector and 10% are labeled as internet firms. 
Finally, tracking for five years after the issue date, 23% were acquired, and 7% were failed (i.e., 
dropped).  
The types of employment agreements differ considerably from one another in terms of firm 
age, EPS, board governance quality, VC, underwriter, technology firms, and the dropped firms. In 
particular, old firms tend to have fixed-term CEOs, while firms with positive earnings prefer at-will 
CEOs. Also, the percentage of venture-backed and technology firms and of those with high 
governance quality and prestigious underwriters are significantly higher for the sample of IPOs 
with at-will CEOs. In contrast, the most of dropped firms led by fixed-term CEOs and this finding 
provide preliminary support to my hypothesis. 
 
4.2 Different Types of Employment Agreements as Part of Contract Negotiation 
In negotiations between the CEO and the firm, the ability to offer a fixed-term contract or an 
at-will agreement can affect the trade-off between career concerns and compensation. Risk-averse 
managers are likely to value the insurance provided by longer contracts more than risk neutral 
firms. As Gibbons and Murphy (1992) show theoretically, the optimal contract maximizes the sum 
of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from compensation. 
Thus, a longer contract may make the manager willing to forgo other compensation, or accept a 
risky position to begin with. For a risk-neutral firm, a sum equal to a multiple of annual CEO 
compensation is less relevant, although not trivial (Kuhnen and Niessen, 2012). Thus, from the 
firm’s perspective, longer contracts can provide benefits in addition to any incentive effects, which 
may further offset the cost of having longer, less flexible contracts. One possible prediction is 
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therefore that CEOs with fixed-term contracts receive lower incentive pay, than CEOs employed at-
will.  
Ultimately, it is difficult to use my sample to test whether contracts are optimal since I do 
not observe the counterfactual: compensation for a CEO with long contract may be lower than with 
a short contract, but may still be high compared to similar-looking firms. Longer contracts may 
coincide with high compensation because those firms had difficulty attracting CEOs (e.g., such as 
distressed firms), and thus had to offer more compensation as well as longer contracts. Because top 
executives labor markets are matching markets (Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Tervio, 2008; Gayle et 
al., 2015), it is also possible that unobservable traits such as the perceived match quality between 
the firm and the CEO dominate the effect of compensation. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) argue that 
CEOs with a short horizon have less motivation because their performance has little chance of 
affecting future compensation. Dahiya and Yermack (2008) find that long-term incentive pay often 
vests upon termination. A high probability of termination, thus reduces the motivating effect of 
long-term incentive and future compensation. 
To examine the trade-off between contract length and compensation, in Panel A and B of 
Table 3 I present the statistics of compensation components by contract type. Generally, the pre-
IPO incentive pay of fixed-term and at-will CEOs is not significantly different. Consistent with 
prior research (Gillan, et al., 2009; Song and Wan, 2017; Gonzalez-Uribe and Groen-Xu, 2017), I 
find that incentive and cash compensation is greater for CEOs with fixed term compensation. This 
pattern is similar for pre-IPO total CEO compensation but not statistically significant. With respect 
to the post-IPO compensation by contract type the trend is the opposite. Specifically, total CEO 
remuneration is greater for at-will CEOs and this is mainly due to stock awards compensation. The 
explanation for this result is that IPO firms’ offer this type of compensation, as they prefer to 
motivate their top managers by providing them long-term incentives and better align the incentives 
of the shareholders and top managers 
I next regress measures of compensation on indicators for fixed-term and at-will contracts, 
as well as several CEO and firm characteristics, year and industry fixed effects. Panel C and D 
show that the cash compensation of CEOs with fixed-term contract is higher compared to the at-
will CEOs. This pattern is similar for total remuneration. The economic effect is significant: the 
coefficient of 0.18 suggests that CEOs with fixed-term contracts receive, on average, 19.72% 
higher than the total compensation of CEOs without a fixed-term contract, which translates into 
$305,155 (i.e., 19.72% ∗ $1,547,438). On the other hand, at-will CEOs receive more of their pay in 
the form of incentive compensation and they are also better remunerated after the IPO compared to 
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the pre-IPO year. Taken together, the above results are in line with the notion that fixed-term 
managers are more risk-averse. 
 
4.3 Contracts and Career Outcomes-CEO Turnover-CEO Outcomes 
The probability that the CEO leaves the executive labor market after the issue of her leading 
firm is an important driver of her expected personal costs of IPO. To examine this issue, in this 
section I initially provide turnover statistics and estimate the determinants of CEO turnover, 
including the role played by different type of employment agreements. 
 
4.3.1 Life of CEOs after IPO 
I record information on CEO turnover and appointments, relying on SEC filings and, from 
Boardex database. To assess their professional activities after IPO, I explore the follow up 
appointments schedules. Panel A of Table 4 reports the CEO turnover rate for five years after the 
issue date for managers with fixed-term and at-will agreements. The most of the CEO departures 
occur in the second and third year for both types of contracts. The turnover rate is slightly greater 
for fixed-term CEOs. Regarding the proportion of CEO departures three years after the issue date 
only the 5% of the firms decided to change CEO and a plausible explanation is that more than one-
third of the firms are led by CEO-founders (see Panel B of Table 2).  
More than 95% of the managers remain in the same firms one year after the IPO and any of 
them with more responsibilities. Specifically, around 30% of the CEOs are also President and 10% 
is the CEO triality (CEO, Chairman, and President). Less than 3% of my sample does not hold non-
executive positions. Such individuals may therefore be used by other or the same organizations as 
non-executive directors providing valuable advice (consultants), involve in policy making and 
planning exercises. 
 
4.3.2 How Do CEOs Contract Matter for CEO Turnover?  
A key assumption underlying my main argument is that employment agreements protect 
CEOs from short-term performance swing and reduce the likelihood of dismissal. While prior 
research provides supportive evidence, in this section, I explicitly test this assumption by 
investigating whether CEO contractual protection reduces CEO turnover-performance sensitivity in 
my sample. For this purpose, I examine the effect of contractual agreement and its type on the 
likelihood of CEO turnover in the five years after the issue date by following prior CEO turnover 
studies (see for example Parrino, 1997; Denis et al., 1997; DeFond and Park, 1999; Jenter and 
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where   (   is the baseline hazard function, and   is the time to turnover. The dependent variable is 
a dummy variable that indicates the CEO turnover (i.e., whether the firm changes CEO within 5 
years after the IPO). The type of contracts variables are fixed-term and at-will agreements. Fixed-
term contract is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has entered into a contract with the CEO, 
and zero otherwise. At-will agreement is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm or the employee 
can terminate the relationship at any time and for any cause, and zero otherwise. 
Panel C of Table 4 presents the results of the impact of CEO contract types on the 
probability of CEO turnover using Cox proportional hazards model after controlling for various 
CEO and firm characteristics that may influence the CEO change. The probability of CEO change 
is positively associated with fixed-term CEOs, while at-will CEOs are less likely to be replaced. 
This finding supports the argument that CEO protection in the form of at-will employment 
agreement can protect managers from short layoff. The hazard ratio of 0.763 (exp(-0.27)) suggests 
that the CEO turnover rate of firms with at-will managers is 76.3% lower of the CEO turnover rate 
of firms without at-will managers. I also find that firms with no agreements have higher turnover 
rates. 
A plausible explanation for my results is the following. The average duration of a fixed-term 
contract in my sample is three years and only the one third of them is renewable agreements. I 
should also consider that around 30% of the firms are led by CEO-founders. Take all the above into 
account, I expect that the majority of the firms hire the CEO only to issue their firms and for a small 
transitional period (i.e. one-two years) after the IPO.  
With respect to the results about the remaining control variables, the most noticeable results 
are those about compensation, founder, powerful CEOs and decision horizon. In particular, my 
findings suggest that managers with generous remunerated packages are less likely to be replaced. 
Additionally, I expect that founder-CEOs long-term interests are closely tied to their firms’ future 
prospects and find that these types of firms are less likely to replace them during the next five years 
after the issue date. Also, compared to non-entrenched CEOs, entrenched CEOs are positively 
associated with CEO turnover. Finally, myr results document that CEOS with great career concerns 
have lower retention rates. Among the firm characteristics, turnover decreases in firms with high 
board independence and prestigious underwriters, while the significance of firm age, suggests that 




4.3.3 Endogeneity Concerns 
An important concern is that the relationship between CEO turnover and the contract type is 
driven by factors that are likely to influence CEO employment contracts but are not adequately 
controlled for in my models (due to missing variables problem or due to functional form 
misspecification), resulting thus, in incorrect inferences. For instance, firms which interested only 
about the completion of IPO may choose shorter contracts to take advantage of their flexibility. To 
eliminate such endogeneity issues and to ensure that firms with CEO employment agreements and 
non CEO employment agreements are comparable across the observable firm characteristics 
associated with the probability of CEO turnover, I use two alternative approaches to address this 
potential endogeneity issue. First, I employ the two-stage Heckman model (Heckman, 1979). 
Particularly, in the first-stage I use probit models for the likelihood of a given IPO firms having a 
different type of contract (e.g., fixed-term, at-will, renewable, no agreement, no information). In the 
second stage of my selection model, the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) from each model is included in 
the basic Cox model.  
To further address the issue of endogeneity and self-selection bias associated with my 
contract variables, I use the propensity score matching (PSM) procedure to compare the impact of 
several types of contracts on CEO turnover. I measure the propensity score, which the conditional 
probability of receiving a treatment (having a fixed-term contract/at-will) given a firm’s pre-
treatment characteristics, for all the firms by using a probit regression for the probability of 
companies having a contract with the manager. In my models, I include the same control variables 
as in my baseline regression. Table 5 presents the results for the Heckman Two-Step model and 
PSM.  The results are consistent with my prior findings, and as a result, my estimation using 
ordinary least squares will not result in biased coefficient estimates. 
 
5. Types of Contractual Agreements, Investments, and IPO Success 
5.1 The Effect of Employment Agreements on IPO Underpricing 
There are two contrasting views over the strategies of top executive managers around IPOs. 
The first view, states that employment agreement between the firm and the CEO, make it easier for 
investors to forecast a firm’s cash flows, thereby decreasing the cost of capital. In this regard, they 
will sign employment agreements with their CEOs to convey private information to the market to 
signal the firm’s future prospects. The opposite view supports that IPOs constitute an important 
milestone for private firms because their success specifies the money raised, and as a result 
influences the ability of a company with few resources to propel its growth (Kenney et al., 2012; 
Borisov et al., 2017). Therefore, this uncertainty increases the option value of waiting, making thus 
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firms more cautious in their investment behavior and undermining their growth prospects. I 
examine the effect of contractual and non-contractual agreements on initial returns by using the 
following multivariate model: 
 
                                                                             (2) 
 
where underpricing, is estimated as the percentage difference between the offer price and the 
closing price of the first trading day.  
Table 6 provides the results about the impact of various types of employment agreement on 
IPO underpricing. Consistent with the notion that, CEO contracts are being used by the firms as an 
indicator of firm’s future prospects, Columns (1) to (3) report that the coefficients for the fixed-
term, and renewable agreements are negative but not significant. This means that firms with fixed-
term contracts have lower underpricing. In Column (5), I find that firms without employment 
agreements are associated with higher IPO first-day returns (at the 5% level), which is consistent 
with the idea that no agreements lead to information asymmetry which created the problems of 
adverse selection, and as a consequence, lead to higher underpricing. The effect is of high economic 
significance: the average IPO underpricing for firms with non-employment agreements increases by 
7.19%.  
 
5.2 Contractual Agreements and Risk 
The different types and term of CEO employment agreements imply different volatility 
patterns after the IPO. My central argument is that a long-term EA can provide incentives for the 
top executives to take actions that are not reflected in performance until future periods. This is 
useful if such actions are optimal for the firm but not for a CEO who fears early turnover. Thus, 
long-term agreements motivate managers to take actions that are ultimately positive-net present 
value, but temporarily be observationally equivalent to a bad CEO-firm match, low CEO ability, or 
shirking. The key friction that long-term EAs can alleviate is the transient volatility of ultimately 
profitable projects. 
 In addition, without uncertainty about the quality of the match – if the contract length 
matched to the completion of the IPO and the CEO is dismissed after she completes this task – there 
is no reason to expect any association between volatility and employment agreements. This is 
because the market has all the information about the actions and projects taken throughout the 
contract in advance. I label this the selection argument. Uncertainty about the identity of the next 
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task facing the firm, or the next top manager may lead to an increase in volatility towards the end of 
the incumbent CEO’s contract. 
 Finally, the pure learning argument predicts that there are no incentive effects of contracts, 
and volatility should decline during the tenure of the CEO (Pan et al., 2015). The decline in 
volatility should be monotonic over time, and volatility should not increase at contract renewals. 
The decreasing pattern in volatility should be driven by idiosyncratic risk.  However, the incentives 
from the CEO contractual agreements can also lead to a negative association between CEO contract 
horizon and risk. Prior literature suggests that a longer contract horizon is associated with lower 
risk-taking (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Edmans and Liu, 2011; Cassell et al., 2012). Another 
strand of the literature finds that short-term contracts are related to higher return volatility (Huang et 
al., 2011). Therefore, I expect that managers who engage in such behavior, they must invest on 
short-term projects toward the end of their contract so that she can enjoy the potentially high 
payoffs in the immediate future. Thus, another prediction is that CEO employment agreement is 
negatively associated with risk. To investigate the effect of contractual agreements on risk, I 
estimate the following model: 
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where (Post-IPO return) total volatility is computed as the standard deviation of residuals from a 
firm-specific market model estimated over +5 to +26 (trading) days post-IPO. 
Panel A of Table 7 reports the results. Consistent with Cziraki and Groen-Xu (2019), I 
document a strong and significant positive association between fixed-term contracts (and their 
duration) and return volatility. My finding is consistent with the notion that IPO firms prefer to 
have fixed-term agreements with CEOs who are hired only to complete this task and, as a result, the 
uncertainty about the next task facing the firm, or the next CEO may lead to an increase in 
volatility. One additional year remaining on the CEO’s contract corresponds to an increase of 1.00 
bps in return volatility.  
To the extent that different components of total volatility may capture different risk-
incentives, I further decompose total volatility into the systematic and idiosyncratic volatility, 
where the systematic is the market beta which is the standard deviation of slope coefficient from a 
firm-specific market model estimated over +5 to +26 (trading) days post-IPO and idiosyncratic is 
the standard deviation of residuals from a firm-specific market model estimated over +5 to +26 
(trading) days post-IPO. My results from Panels B and C of Table 7 also show that changes in 
volatility are driven by idiosyncratic rather than systematic risk. In general, my findings are in line 
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with those studies examining return volatility (Coles et al., 2006; Roussanov and Savor, 2014; 
Bernile et al., 2017; Cziraki and Groen-Xu, 2019). 
 
5.3 CEO Contract Horizon and Sources of Risk 
In this section, I examine the possible channels that could drive the change in volatility. In 
doing so, I initially assess how employment agreement affect risk-taking, by constructing two 
variables for investment: research and development expenses (R&D), and capital expenditures 
(CAPEX). To examine the impact of employment agreement on investment measures, I estimate 
the following model: 
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where Avg Inv. Measures are the average values of either R&D or CAPEX the following three 
years after the issue date.  
Panel A and B from Table 8 show a negative association between fixed-term contracts and 
both investment measures which is not line with Cziraki and Groen-Xu (2019). On the other hand, 
my results indicate that at-will CEOs are positively related to risky strategies. In economic terms, 
the average R&D investment for firms with at-will CEOs increases by 3%. Overall, the results 
indicate that, given a short-term CEO employment agreement, it can be optimal for the firm to 
underinvest into NPV-positive projects, while for CEOs with long-term contracts it is better to 
overinvest as they are associated with higher investment.  Since, in my sample at-will CEOs have 
longer horizon than fixed-term CEOs, my results on the sources of risk provide support to the 
value-enhancing hypothesis, which states that managers with long horizon are more likely to adopt 
risky and value-enhancing strategies. 
 
5.4 The Impact of Employment Agreements on Firm Performance and Survival 
Implicit in the above sections is the assumption that employment agreements may affect 
firm performance and survival through their impact on CEOs outcome, firms’ investment decisions, 
and financial policies. By exploring the relationship between contractual agreements and firm 
performance, I can further and more completely understand the role of employment agreements in 
managerial decision-making. In this section, I examine the impact of EAs on firm performance 
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where Avg ROA is the average value of ROA the following three years after the IPO. ROA is the 
ratio of net income to total assets. To estimate the effect on firm survival, I use following Cox 
proportional hazard model: 
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where   (   is the baseline hazard function, and   is the time to delist. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that indicates the failure risk (i.e., whether the firm is delisted/dropped within five 
years after the IPO).
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Panel A and B of Table 9 contains regression results for ROA. The coefficient on fixed-term 
contracts is negative and both statistically and economically significant, confirming that fixed-term 
contracts are value-decreasing and their effect remains persistent over time. On average, the ROA 
of firms led by fixed-term CEOs decreases by 14%. On the other hand, the average ROA of firms 
led by at-will CEOs increases by 6%. Table 10 shows that IPO firms run by fixed-term CEOs have 
a higher probability of failure. The coefficient of 0.61 indicates that the risk of delisting due to 
negative reasons of IPO issuers with a fixed-term CEO is 84% higher of the delisting risk of firms 
without a fixed-term CEO. Also, CEOs with at-will agreements are negatively associated with IPO 
failure at 10% level. Combine with my earlier evidence on corporate investment and risk taking, at-
will managers seem to make risky and value-enhancing investments and increase future firm 
performance. 
 
6. Heckman Two-Step Method and Matching Estimator 
My findings, so far, establish a robust negative (positive) association between fixed-term 
(at-will) employment agreement and Post-IPO operating performance. It is possible, however, that 
endogeneity issues may exist in my empirical analysis. Specifically, my model may be suffered 
from sample selection bias or due to endogenous CEO-firm matching because of observable 
distributional differences of firm and CEO characteristics between firms with and without 
employment agreements. In this section, I address these concerns by performing a two-stage 
Heckman model as well as a matching estimator. 
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 It should be noted that the time horizon that I examine the survivorship of each firm after its issuance is five years. 
Therefore, my sample-period spans from 2000 to 2012. 
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6.1 Heckman Two-Step Model 
I first estimate two probit models: one modeling for the likelihood of having a fixed-term 
contract, and a second modeling of the likelihood of having an at-will agreement. In the second 
stage of my selection model, the Inverse Mills Ratios (IMR) from each probity are included as 
additional variables in Eq. (5). I report only the results from the second-stage of the selection model 
in Panel A of Table 11, as the results from the first-stage are the same as in Section 4.3.3. My 
results indicate that, sample selection bias is not a concern in my analysis, because both of the 
IMRs are statistically insignificant. Furthermore, my results regarding the employment agreement 
measures remain consistent with my prior findings. 
The results of the second-stage of the selection model are reported in Panel B1 of Table 11. 
They show that sample selection bias is not a concern in my baseline analysis, because neither of 
the two IMRs is statistically significant at conventional levels. Also, my managerial pay measures 
continue to be significant. 
 
6.2 Matching Estimator 
 To further assess the issue of endogeneity I apply the propensity score matching method. It 
could be the case that CEOs and IPO firms are not matched randomly. Rather the selection of a 
CEO is decision taken solely by the board of directors. The existence of a matching mechanism 
between CEOs and firms could be explained, for instance, if private firms that plan to go public, 
hire managers with a fixed-term contract and with main aim to complete this task. As Panel B and 
C of Table 11 shows, CEOs with fixed-term contracts tend to be also Chairman and they run mature 
and large firms. On the other hand, at-will CEOs are preferred by venture-backed firms with strong 
corporate governance. 
 I perform a one-to-one propensity score matching to ensure whether my conclusions are a 
statistical artifact stemming from distributional differences in CEO and firm characteristics between 
firms with and without fixed-term (at-will) employment agreements. I initially run a probit 
regression to estimate propensity scores, i.e., the probability of receiving the treatment (i.e., fixed-
term) conditional on a set of control variables. For each treatment firm with fixed-term contract, I 
select a matching control firm without a contract from the same year and industry, with the 
requirement that the absolute difference of the propensity score among pairs does not excess 0.01. I 
apply this procedure without repetition and estimate the propensity score for each firm, after 




 This method yields 334 unique pairs of firms, which is approximately 22% of the initial 
sample. I apply the same method for firms led by at-will CEOs and this method yields 886 unique 
pairs of firms (which is approximately 60% of the initial sample). Panel B1 of Table 11 reports 
difference-in-difference means of the control variables for firms with and without fixed-term (at-
will) EAs. The corresponding difference-in-difference means become statistically insignificant for 
the matched sample, confirming that the propensity score matching succeeds in making the 
subsamples comparable. Based on the matched set of treatment and control firms, I re-run the OLS 
model of Table 9. The findings on Panel B2 of Table 11 confirm the significantly negative 
(positive) association between fixed-term (at-will) contractual agreements and Post-IPO operating 
performance, and thus, suggesting that there is a systematic difference of the employment 
agreements effect on future firm performance.  
 
7. Cross-Sectional Analysis 
In the previous sections, I documented strong evidence in favor of my hypotheses. In this 
section, I further assess the robustness of my findings by examining cross-sectional variations in the 
importance of CEO contractual agreements on future firm performance along the different 
dimensions of CEO characteristics and corporate governance. An important advantage of this 
analysis is that it can demonstrate a more completed picture of the effect of employment agreements 
by highlighting cases in which their effectiveness is strengthened or attenuated. 
 
7.1 CEO Career Concerns and Corporate Governance Quality 
An interesting question is what role corporate governance plays in the association between 
employment agreements and future firm performance. In particular, I are interested in whether high 
governance quality magnifies or attenuates the contractual agreements effect. Chahine and 
Filatotchev (2008) argue that the role of board independence mitigate agency conflicts between the 
issuer and potential investors. In addition to that, Chahine and Filatotchev (2011) find that high 
corporate governance may supplement the job provided by the auditors. Therefore, the central 
questions is whether the potential agency problems that tend to exist between employment 
agreements and firm performance are mitigated by the quality of corporate governance. 
My evidence supports the notion that high governance quality strengthens the value-
enhancing hypothesis for at-will CEOs and weakens the value-destroying hypothesis for fixed-term 
CEOs. I construct a measure of corporate governance by using four variables and split the sample 
by the sample median. Panel A of Table 12 indicates that the negative association between fixed-
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term CEOs and future firm performance is less pronounced for firms with high governance quality. 
Panel B of Table 12 shows that the coefficient for at-will CEOs is indeed positive for firms with 
high corporate governance.  
Another perspective that could affect the link between EAs and firm performance is the 
CEO career concerns. I expect that my results regarding the at-will CEOs should be stronger in 
cases where top managers have greater career concerns. For example, Jenter and Lewellen (2015) 
find that CEOs just over the average retirement age of 65 are less willing to continue to lead the 
company. Existing literature (e.g., Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Serfling, 2014; Lee et al., 2018) 
suggest that CEOs with longer career horizons are more likely to make investments.
56
 In addition, 
CEOs with short tenure can be characterized as new CEOs and are more likely to shape market’s 
beliefs and bring fresh air into the firm. I also capture the career concerns of the CEOs by 
examining whether they are overconfident, as this type of manager seems to be more risky (see for 
example, Chowdhury et al., 2017). My findings suggest that the positive at-will agreements-future 
firm performance relationship is more pronounced in firms with overconfident CEOs and with high 
decision horizon. On the other hand, I find that the negative link between fixed-term CEOs and 
future average ROA is more pronounced for firms with CEOs with less career concerns. 
 
8. Conclusion 
This study examines the impact of CEO contract horizon on both CEO and firm outcomes 
around Initial Public Offerings. I find that CEOs with fixed-term contracts have higher turnover 
rate, higher pre-IPO compensation and lower compensation change compared to those with at will 
agreements. In line with the value-enhancing hypothesis, my results also indicate that, at-will CEOs 
are positively associated with investment strategies and future firm performance. On the other hand, 
I document that fixed-term CEOs are negatively related to risky strategies, firm performance, and 
survival. Finally, the positive effect of at-will agreements on future firm performance is reinforced 
for firms with high corporate governance and CEOs with high career concerns. 
Overall, this study makes the following contributions. To my knowledge, this is the first 
study to investigate the impact of employment agreements on IPOs firm investment decisions as 
well as on short- and long-term performance. Second, it expands the literature on CEO turnover by 
creating a measure of CEO turnover that improves the precision of turnover models. In addition, I 
contribute to the IPO literature by indicating how employment agreements can provide incentives to 
the top managers and by demonstrating the long-run effects of each contract. 
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Appendix A: Definitions of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: IPO Pricing 
Underpricing 
The difference between the first secondary market closing price available in CRSP and IPO offer price, divided 
by IPO offer price. 
Panel B: Compensation Variables 
CEO Salary The logarithmic value of cash awarded to the CEO as cash compensation in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
CEO Bonus The logarithmic value of cash awarded to the CEO as bonus in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
CEO Stock Awards The logarithmic value of stock granted to the CEO evaluated at grant date using own firms’ estimates. 
CEO Option 
Awards 
The logarithmic value of options granted to the CEO as option awards under the year (prior to the IPO) plan in 




The logarithmic value of the actual amount earned under short-term, performance-based cash incentive plan for 
fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
CEO All Other 
Compensation 
The logarithmic value of all other compensation awarded to the CEO in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
CEO Total 
Compensation 
The logarithmic value of the sum of all the above compensations awarded to the CEO in the fiscal year prior to 
the IPO. 
Panel C: CEO Contract Types 
Fixed-Contract Dummy variable equal to one if the CEO has a fixed-term employment contract, and zero otherwise. 
Duration of Contract The duration of each contract (in years). 
Renewable Dummy variable equal to one if the contract is renewable, and zero otherwise. 
At-Will 
Dummy variable equal to one if the firm or the employee can terminate the relationship at any time and for any 
cause, and zero otherwise. 
No Agreement 
Dummy variable equal to one if there is no employment agreement between the CEO and the firm, and zero 
otherwise. 
No Info 
Dummy variable equal to one if there is no information on SEC filings about any employment agreement between 
the CEO and the firm, and zero otherwise. 
Panel C: Governance Characteristics 
CEO Duality Dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is both chairman/chairwoman and CEO, and zero otherwise. 
General Ability 
Index 
First factor of applying principal components analysis to five proxies of general managerial ability: Number of 
roles, Number of firms, Number of industries, CEO experience dummy, Conglomerate experience dummy 
(following Custodio et al., 2012). 
Generalist 
Dummy variable equal to one if CEO is a generalist, and zero otherwise. CEO is classified as a generalist if 
CEO’s general ability index is equal to or above the sample median. 
Founder Dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is both founder and CEO, and zero otherwise. 
Powerful CEO 
Dummy variable equal to one if the CEO Powerful Factor score is above the sample median. CEO Powerful 
Factor score from Principle Component Analysis (PCA) using CEO tenure, CEO ownership, CEO Duality and 
CEO Triality (CEO, Chairman and President).   
Overconfident CEO 
Dummy variable equal to one if CEO is overconfident and 0 otherwise (using the investment-based measure as 
well as three IPO characteristics following Boulton and Campbell (2016). 
CEO Age 
Age of CEO (in years).  Old CEOs are those who have age over the sample median (51) and young CEOs are 
those who have age lower than the sample median. 
CEO Gender Dummy variable equal to one1 if CEO is female, and zero otherwise. 
CEO Tenure 
Number of years working as CEO in the firm until the IPO. CEOs with High Tenure are defined those with tenure 
above the sample median. 
CEO Donation 
Dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s CEO has engaged in political money contributions in the fiscal year 
prior to the IPO. 
CEO Turnover 
Dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s CEO exits the firm prior to the five year-anniversary of the firm’s 
initial public offering. 
Decision Horizon 
(DH) 
                                               , where           is the number of years the CEO 
has held that position prior to IPO,        is the age of the CEO who works for firm I in year t,             
(          is the industry median of TENURE (AGE) (following Antia et al., (2010)). 
Panel D: Firm Fundamentals 
Firm age 
The number of years elapsed since firm’s foundation to IPO date, using foundation dates from Thomson Financial 
database as well as from the Field-Ritter dataset. The variable is transformed into the regressions by adding one 
and taking the natural logarithm. 
VC  Dummy variable equal to one for venture capital-backed firms, and zero otherwise. 
Proceeds The natural logarithm of gross proceeds raised by the IPO estimated as shared offered times the offer price. 
Size The natural logarithm of total assets in the year prior to the IPO. 




Dummy variable equal to one for most prestigious underwriters, zero otherwise. Most reputable underwriters are 
those with a ranking score of 9.0 or above based on Jay Ritter’s underwriter (prestige) rankings. 
Internet  
 
Dummy variable equal to one for IPOs of Internet firms, and zero otherwise. Internet firms are classified those 




Dummy variable: one for IPO firms with SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578 (computer hardware), 3661, 
3663, 3669 (communications equipment), 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679 (electronics), 3812 
(navigation equipment), 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (measuring and controlling devices), 3841, 3845 (medical 
instruments), 4812, 4813 (telephone equipment), 4899 (communications services), and 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 
7375, 7378, and 7379 (software). 
Big 4 Auditor 
Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is audited by a big four audit firm, and zero otherwise. Big four audit 
firms include Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
Nasdaq Dummy variable equal to one for NASDAQ-listed IPOs, and zero otherwise. 
R&D Intensity It is the ratio of total R&D expense to total sales in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
Capital Expenditure It is the ratio of total capital expenditures to total sales in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
Leverage The ratio of total liabilities over total assets in the fiscal year prior to IPO. 
EPS Dummy variable equal to one for positive earnings per share in the fiscal year prior to IPO, and zero otherwise. 
Panel E: Other Firm Characteristics 
Delist Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is delisted within five years after its IPO, and zero otherwise. 
Survival Time The natural logarithm of the time to delist (survival time) which is measured in months. 
Market Return The compounded daily return on CRSP value-weighted index over the 20 trading days trailing the IPO. 
Board Governance  
Board Governance measure is constructed by taking the first factor of applying principal component analysis to 
the following variables: board independent measured as the ratio of the number of independent outside directors 
to the total number of directors; a dummy variable equal to one if the board has a nominating committee that is 
composed solely of independent directors, (and zero otherwise); the percentage of outside directors on the board 
that were appointed after the current CEO took office; the natural logarithm of the average number of other 
directorships held by independent directors serving on the board; a dummy variable, equal to one if the majority 
of outside directors on the board serve on three or more other boards; the natural logarithm of the number of 
board meetings; the natural logarithm of the number of directors serving on the board. 
Board Independence 
The ratio of the number of independent outside directors to the total number of directors. High Board 
Independence is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firms’ number of independent members is above the sample 
median. 
HHI 
HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) is calculated by squaring the market share if each firm competing in a market 
and then summing the resulting numbers. 
Total Volatility It is the standard deviation of daily equity returns over the 30-day window beginning the day after the IPO. 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
It is the standard deviation of residuals from a firm-specific market model estimated over the 30-day window. 
Beta 
Beta is the standard deviation of slope coefficient from a firm-specific market model estimated over the 30-day 
window. 
Average R&D 
Is the average value of R&D expenditures from one year after the issue date to three years after going public. 
R&D expenditures is the ratio of R&D to sales. 
Average CAPEX 
Is the average value of CAPEX from one year after the issue date to three years after going public. CAPEX is the 
ratio of capital expenditures to net property plant and equipment. 
Average ROA 
It is the average value of ROA from one year after the issue date to 3 years after going public. ROA is the  ratio of 
net income to total assets. 
Diversified Index 
Factor score from Principle Component Analysis (PCA) using the natural logarithm of sales, the natural logarithm 
of the number of segments, the natural logarithm of the number of geographic segments, and the natural logarithm 
of firm age. 















A. Excerpt from Contract between Mr J. Richard Damron, Jr., and Home Diagnostics Inc (2-year 
fixed-term contract) 
“We entered into an employment agreement with J. Richard Damron, Jr., our President and Chief Executive 
Officer, as of January 1, 2006. Mr. Damron’s employment agreement expires on December 31, 2008, and 
provides for an annual base salary of $500,000, which may be increased by our board of directors from time 
to time.” 
B. Excerpt from an “Renewable Contract” Agreement between Mr C. Randal Mills, M.D., FACP 
Osiris Therapeutics Inc 
 
Under Dr. Mills' employment agreement, dated as of May 15, 2004, he serves as our Chief Executive Officer 
for an initial three-year term. Thereafter, the agreement renews automatically each May 15 for successive 
one-year terms, unless either party provides notice of termination at least ninety days prior to May 15. 
Dr. Mills' agreement provides for a base salary of $300,000 per year, subject to yearly adjustment, and 
performance-based bonuses granted at amounts determined by the Board of Directors in its discretion.  
C. Excerpt from an At-Will Agreement between Mr Peter A. Thompson, M.D., FACP Trubion 
Pharmaceuticals Inc 
We have an employment agreement with Dr. Thompson, our president and chief executive officer. Pursuant 
to the terms of the agreement, Dr. Thompson is an at-will employee with an annual base salary of $345,000 
and is eligible to receive an annual incentive bonus of up to $180,000 if certain milestones established at the 












Table 1: Yearly and Industry Distribution Statistics 
This table presents distributional statistics for a sample of 1,488 U.S. IPOs from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2014. The IPOs 
are described by issue-year in Panel A, whereas in Panel B the IPOs are distributed by industry. IPO deals are retrieved from the 
Thomson ONE Banker database.  
Panel A: Yearly Distribution 
Year 
Total CEO Compensation 
Before IPO 






No. of “At-will” 
Agreements 
2000 $641,877 $704,195 263 74 63 
2001 $1,156,223 $1,051,767 59 15 12 
2002 $874,829 $908,422 48 19 8 
2003 $1,087,501 $1,071,542 47 12 12 
2004 $718,181 $1,019,729 129 37 42 
2005 $1,271,822 $1,683,422 115 45 28 
2006 $1,204,794 $1,667,520 126 38 34 
2007 $1,428,090 $1,743,934 112 31 25 
2008 $1,029,783 $1,663,002 17 5 3 
2009 $2,081,741 $2,803,633 38 9 4 
2010 $1,850,826 $1,948,696 72 18 13 
2011 $3,775,585 $3,531,189 71 14 19 
2012 $1,852,870 $3,071,458 80 15 27 
2013 $3,372,193 $3,696,437 139 29 50 
2014 $1,782,900 $3,119,439 172 30 81 
Total $1,547,438 $1,951,641 1,488 391 421 
 
Panel B: Industry Distribution 










No. of “At-will” 
Agreements 
Oil and Gas  (13) $1,670,766 $2,649,440 62 21 6 
Food Products  (20) $1,299,160 $2,519,127 16 6 3 
Chemical 
Products  
(28) $1,142,866 $1,979,063 281 42 122 




(35, 73) $1,589,739 $1,892,699 393 89 124 
Electronic 
Equipment  
(36) $852,847 $963,394 128 27 33 
Scientific 
Instruments  






$2,007,681 $1,962,521 122 41 16 
Wholesale & 
Retail Trade  














Table 2: Determinants of CEO Contracts 
The Table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of U.S. IPOs over the period from 2000 to 2014. CEO contract 
horizon characteristics are presented in Panel A. CEO characteristics are illustrated in Panel B. Firm and offering 
characteristics are reported in Panel C. Tests of differences in means between the two sub-samples of IPO firms with a fixed-
term (at-will) CEOs and those with non-fixed term (non-at-will) CEOs are based on t-tests. The number of observations for 
each variable is 1,488. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: CEO Horizon Characteristics 
 Mean SD 
Contract 0.26 0.44 
Duration of Contract 2.98 1.20 
Renewable Contract 0.11 0.32 
At-will 0.28 0.45 
No Agreement 0.12 0.32 
No Information 0.25 0.43 




















 Mean Mean Mean p-value Mean Mean p-value 
CEO Tenure 3.66 3.65 3.66 0.4838 3.38 3.76 0.0600 
CEO Duality 0.40 0.44 0.38 0.0197 0.34 0.42 0.0045 
Founder 0.31 0.27 0.33 0.0179 0.29 0.32 0.1534 
CEO Age 50.04 50.98 49.69 0.0032 49.64 50.20 0.1166 
Generalist 0.60 0.58 0.61 0.1887 0.58 0.61 0.1092 
CEO Turnover 
After IPO 
0.40 0.44 0.40 0.1417 0.40 0.42 0.1922 
Foreign 
Experience 
0.34 0.34 0.34 0.4184 0.36 0.33 0.1353 
Professional 
Degree 
0.04 0.03 0.04 0.4077 0.04 0.04 0.4137 
MBA 0.30 0.28 0.31 0.1098 0.28 0.31 0.1095 
PhD 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.0227 0.18 0.09 0.0000 




















 Mean Mean Mean p-value Mean Mean p-value 
Firm Age 14.93 19.48 13.31 0.0000 11.10 16.49 0.0000 
Proceeds 4.48 4.58 4.44 0.0160 4.35 4.53 0.0028 
Leverage 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.2750 0.38 0.35 0.0957 
EPS 0.47 0.44 0.56 0.0001 0.35 0.52 0.0000 
Initial Returns 21.17 14.96 23.38 0.0006 25.84 19.33 0.0052 
Board Ind. 0.68 0.62 0.70 0.0001 0.73 0.66 0.0001 
Board 
Governance 
0 -0.36 0.12 0.0000 0.31 -0.14 0.0000 
HHI 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.4990 0.48 0.49 0.1972 
Big 4 Auditor 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.4021 0.45 0.47 0.2709 
VC 0.53 0.33 0.60 0.0000 0.71 0.45 0.0000 
Underwriter 0.39 0.36 0.41 0.0387 0.42 0.38 0.0566 
Technology 0.37 0.28 0.39 0.0000 0.41 0.35 0.0217 
Internet  0.10 0.09 0.11 0.1258 0.11 0.10 0.2935 
Nasdaq 0.69 0.63 0.71 0.0016 0.78 0.65 0.0000 
Dropped 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.0678 0.06 0.07 0.2793 






Table 3: CEO Career Outcomes 
The Table reports the CEO Career Outcomes for the sample of U.S. IPOs over the period from 2000 to 2014. Panels A and B 
present the statistical differences in compensation across fixed-term and at-will CEOs. Tests of differences in means between 
the two sub-samples of IPO firms with a fixed-term (at-will) CEOs and those with non-fixed term (non-at-will) CEOs are 
based on t-tests. Panels C and D present the effects of CEOs with Fixed-Term and At-Will Agreements on Compensation 
using ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. Specifically, Panel C shows the effect of fixed-term CEOs and Panel D 
presents the effect of at-will CEOs on total compensation, cash compensation, incentive to total compensation and 
compensation change. T-statistics are included in the parentheses and are adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors clustered by year and industry. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 





















 Mean Mean Mean p-value Mean Mean p-value 
Salary $352,520 $370,802 $346,009 0.0647 $334,539 $359,608 0.0583 
Bonus $184,388 $268,641 $154,386 0.0000 $119,071 $210,136 0.0006 
Stock Awards $291,306 $282,402 $319,415 0.3956 $214,432 $347,248 0.1653 
Option Awards $387,673 $436,508 $403,472 0.3619 $559,399 $354,101 0.0122 
Non-Equity 
Incentives 
$134,625 $144,295 $131,182 0.3349 $96,308 $149,730 0.0376 
Other $154,373 $238,971 $124,248 0.0407 $160,997 $151,762 0.4430 
Total $1,547,438 $1,740,687 $1,478,621 0.1112 $1,484,184 $1,572,372 0.3372 





















 Mean Mean Mean p-value Mean Mean p-value 
Salary $430,029 $463,586 $419,142 0.0029 $425,463 $433,326 0.5898 
Bonus $164,688 $248,942 $130,273 0.0000 $127,859 $175,993 0.0817 
Stock Awards $403,330 $411,591 $406,319 0.9564 $474,829 $381,219 0.3205 
Option Awards $499,020 $353,489 $571,545 0.0156 $686,440 $446,306 0.0064 
Non-Equity 
Incentives 
$217,589 $192,350 $196,280 0.9045 $192,198 $196,459 0.8940 
Other $148,093 $139,487 $151,852 0.8518 $181,489 $135,134 0.4732 













Panel C: Differences in Compensation Across Fixed-Term CEOs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total Compensation Cash Compensation 























































































































































































Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R
2 
0.3619 0.3748 0.1225 0.0564 










Panel D: Differences in Compensation Across At-Will CEOs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total Compensation Cash Compensation 























































































































































































Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R
2 
0.3575 0.3743 0.1240 0.0586 










Table 4: CEOs Life After IPO 
The Table presents the Life of CEOs after IPO for the sample of U.S. IPOs over the period from 2000 to 2014. Panel A 
displays the turnover probability by contract type, while Panel B presents the CEO title after IPO. Panel C reports the 
estimation of the Cox proportional hazards model of probability of CEO turnover. Our dependent variable is whether or not 
a firm changed CEO five years after its IPO. Regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are 
suppressed. T-statistics are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Turnover Probability by Contract Type 
Turnover Probability Fixed-Term Contract At-will 
First-Year 0.05 0.05 
Second-Year 0.12 0.12 
Third-Year 0.12 0.09 
Fourth-Year 0.07 0.08 
Fifth-Year 0.08 0.05 
CEO Turnover 0.44 0.40 
Company Status 
Public  0.97 0.14 
Private 0.03 0.19 
Panel B: CEO Titles After IPO  
Title Mean SD 
CEO, President and Chairman 0.10 0.30 
CEO, President and Director 0.07 0.25 
CEO, Chairman and Director 0.01 0.03 
CEO, President and Secretary 0.01 0.03 
Former President, CEO and 
Director 
0.03 0.16 
CEO and Chairman 0.13 0.33 
CEO and President 0.31 0.46 
CEO and Director 0.01 0.11 
Executive Vice President 0.01 0.11 
Director 0.01 0.09 
Independent Director 0.01 0.06 
Chairman 0.02 0.15 
President  0.01 0.06 















Panel C: Contract Horizon and Turnover Probability 




     
Duration of Contract  
0.07*** 
(3.05) 
    
Renewable   
0.28** 
(2.51) 
   








No Information      
0.09 
(1.45) 










































































































































































































































Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Chi-Square 21,174 41,231 54,641 28,452 18,869 9,708 








Table 5: Endogeneity Tests for CEO Turnover 
This table displays the effects of CEO employment agreements on CEO Turnover using the Two-Step Heckman and the 
Propensity Score Matching procedures. Panel A1 shows the first-stage results from the Heckman model using as dependent 
variables the following variables: Fixed-Contract, High Duration, Renewable, At-Will, No Agreement, No Information. Panel A2 
reports the second-stage results for each type of contract using the Inverse Mills Ratios from the first stage. Panel B illustrates the 
average treatment effect of the treated for CEO turnover in firms with and without contract, controlling for the endogeneity of 
CEO employment agreements using propensity score matching. The sample consists of initial public offerings from 2000 to 2014 
in the US stock market. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined 
in Appendix A. 
Panel A1: First Stage Heckman Results 



















































































































































































































































Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Pseudo R
2 
0.1026 0.1302 0.0563 0.1026 0.0803 0.0347 








Panel A2: Second Stage Heckman Results 




     
Duration of Contract  
0.06*** 
(2.69) 
    
Renewable   
0.26** 
(2.28) 
   








No Information      
0.10 
(1.43) 













Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Chi-Square 23,114 13,098 10,443 11,555 12,038 4,598 
Number of Obs. 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 
 
Panel B: Propensity Score Matching 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ATET 




     
ATET 
(High Duration of 





    
ATET 





   
ATET 
(At-will Agreement vs. 
Non At-will Agreement) 





(No Agreement vs. 
Agreement) 





(No Information vs. 
Information about 
Contract 
     
0.07* 
(1.95) 











Table 6: The Effect of Employment Agreements on IPO Underpricing 
This table displays the effects of CEO employment agreements on IPO first-day returns using ordinary least square (OLS) 
regressions. The sample consists of initial public offerings from 2000 to 2014 in the US stock market. The dependent variable is 
IPO first-day returns and calculated as the percentage changes from the first day closing price to offer price. T-statistics are 
included in the parentheses and are adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by year and industry. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 




     
Duration of Contract  
-1.08 
(-1.28) 








   






















































































































































































































































Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R
2 
0.2195 0.2181 0.2172 0.2211 0.2194 0.2190 





Table 7: Total Volatility and its Components 
This table presents the effects of CEO employment agreements on Volatility using ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. The 
sample consists of initial public offerings from 2000 to 2014 in the US stock market. Panel A shows the impact of employment 
contacts on Total Volatility, while Panel B and C report the results from the effect of employment agreements on idiosyncratic 
volatility and beta. T-statistics are included in the parentheses and are adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors 
clustered by year and industry. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: The Impact of EAs on Total Volatility 




     
Duration of Contract  
0.01*** 
(3.56) 
    
Renewable   
0.01 
(1.05) 
   








No Information      
-0.01 
(-1.36) 










































































































































































































































Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R
2 
0.1505 0.1502 0.1485 0.1481 0.1503 0.1488 





Panel B: The Impact of EAs on Idiosyncratic Volatility 




     
Duration of Contract  
0.01*** 
(3.44) 
    
Renewable   
0.01 
(0.75) 
   








No Information      
-0.01 
(-1.48) 










































































































































































































































Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R
2 
0.1472 0.1469 0.1445 0.1446 0.1468 0.1456 








Panel C: The Impact of EAs on Beta 




     
Duration of Contract  
-0.01 
(-0.25) 
    
Renewable   
0.21*** 
(2.86) 
   








No Information      
0.03 
(0.28) 










































































































































































































































Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R
2 
0.0758 0.0758 0.0791 0.0755 0.0754 0.0759 








Table 8: Sources of Risk 
This table presents the effects of CEO employment agreements on Sources of Risk using ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. 
The sample consists of initial public offerings from 2000 to 2014 in the US stock market. Panel A shows the impact of 
employment contacts on the average value of R&D expenses the following three years after the IPO, while Panel B reports the 
results from the effect of employment agreements on the average value of CAPEX the following three years after the IPO. T-
statistics are included in the parentheses and are adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by year and 
industry. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 
A. 
Panel A: The Effect of EAs on R&D 




     
Duration of Contract  
-0.01*** 
(-4.65) 
    
Renewable   
-0.03** 
(-2.27) 
   








No Information      
0.01 
(0.01) 










































































































































































































































Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R
2 
0.4930 0.5930 0.5922 0.5957 0.5901 0.5891 




Panel B: The Effect of EAs on CAPEX 




     
Duration of Contract  
-0.01 
(-0.41) 
    
Renewable   
-0.03*** 
(-4.17) 
   








No Information      
-0.01 
(-0.95) 










































































































































































































































Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R
2 
0.3198 0.3183 0.3194 0.3302 0.3179 0.3181 








Table 9: The Impact of Employment Agreements on Post-IPO Performance 
This table presents the effects of CEO employment agreements on Future Firm Performance using ordinary least square (OLS) 
regressions. The sample consists of initial public offerings from 2000 to 2014 in the US stock market. Future firm performance 
(post-IPO performance) is the average value of ROA the following three years after the IPO. ROA is equal to the net income 
divided by total assets. T-statistics are included in the parentheses and are adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors 
clustered by year and industry. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 




     
Duration of Contract  
-0.04*** 
(-2.87) 
    
Renewable   
-0.20 
(-1.56) 
   








No Information      
-0.01 
(-0.01) 










































































































































































































































Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R
2 
0.1291 0.1287 0.1293 0.1271 0.1269 0.1267 





Table 10: The Impact of Employment Agreements on Failure Risk 
The table illustrates the estimation of Cox proportional hazards model of probability of failure. My dependent variable is whether 
or not a firm survived 5 years after its IPO. Regression control for industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are 
suppressed. T-statistics are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 




     
Duration of Contract  
0.20** 
(2.21) 
    
Renewable   
0.30 
(1.07) 
   








No Information      
-0.03 
(-0.10) 










































































































































































































































Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Chi-Square 373.49 839.29 330.29 450.39 281.69 459.16 






Table 11: Heckman Two-Stage Model and Matching Estimator 
This table displays the effects of CEO employment agreements on Future Firm Performance using the Two-Step Heckman and 
the Matching Estimator methods. Panel A1 shows the second-stage results from the Heckman model. Panel B reports the analysis 
on the relation between Employment Agreement and Future Firm Performance using the One-to-One Propensity Score Matching 
(PSM) procedure. Panel B1 presents univariate analysis for 167 (443) firms with fixed-term EAs (at-will agreements) and 167 
(443) firms without fixed-term EAs (at-will agreements). The variables used to estimate differences in means are tested based on 
t-test. Panel B2 displays the results using OLS on the matched samples. My dependent variable is the average value of ROA the 
following three years after the IPO. I use the nearest-neighbor estimator (nnmatch) from Abadie, Drukker, Leber, Herr and 
Inmbens (2004). I use the same control variables as in Table 9 for both models (Heckman and PSM) and type of EAs (fixed-term 
and at-will). Regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Heckman Two-Stage Method 
 Second-Stage Results 













Inverse Mills Ratio (At-Will)   
Industry & Year FE Y Y 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1439 0.1280 
Number of Obs. 1,350 1,350 
Panel B: Matching Estimator  
Panel B1: Mean Differences Between Treatment and Control Group of PSM Sample 
 Fixed-Term Agreements At-Will Agreements 
 Treatment Control Difference (p-value) Treatment Control Difference (p-value) 
Total CEO Compensation 13.67 13.71 0.7560 13.59 13.58 0.8701 
Founder 0.29 0.27 0.6277 0.33 0.32 0.8759 
CEO Duality 0.64 0.68 0.5645 0.71 0.65 0.0658 
Foreign Experience 0.33 0.35 0.7296 0.35 0.34 0.7345 
DH 4.53 4.36 0.8774 5.23 4.78 0.5005 
Powerful CEO 0.53 0.51 0.7434 0.63 0.56 0.2770 
Overconf. CEO 0.65 0.66 0.7307 0.61 0.62 0.7030 
CEO Donation 0.24 0.26 0.7073 0.22 0.24 0.5055 
Board Ind. 0.73 0.74 0.7755 0.78 0.73 0.0164 
Technology 0.28 0.23 0.3182 0.42 0.34 0.0241 
Internet 0.08 0.05 0.3791 0.10 0.09 0.5497 
Proceeds 4.71 4.73 0.8467 4.41 4.61 0.0111 
Leverage 0.35 0.35 0.9476 0.40 0.33 0.0157 
Underwriter 0.44 0.42 0.7410 0.49 0.42 0.0798 
VC 0.36 0.39 0.5744 0.72 0.43 0.0000 
EPS 0.57 0.59 0.7400 0.37 0.57 0.0000 
Firm Age 20.16 17.80 0.3740 11.20 17.74 0.0000 
Diversified Firms 0.67 0.65 0.7296 0.55 0.56 0.7524 
HHI 0.50 0.54 0.2751 0.51 0.49 0.3762 
Panel B2: Estimation of OLS Models on Matched Samples 








Control Variables Y Y 
Industry & Year FE Y Y 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1637 0.1271 






Table 12: Cross-Sectional Analysis 
This table reports results from OLS regressions in which Future Firm Performance is my dependent variable and Employment 
Agreements are our independent variables of interest. Panel A and B present the impact of CEO career concerns and corporate 
governance on the association between EAs and future firm performance. T-statistics are included in the parentheses and are 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by year and industry. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: The Impact of CEO Career Concerns and Governance Quality on Fixed-Term Contracts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 














Control Variables Y Y Y Y 
Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R
2 
0.3626 0.1431 0.1519 0.1420 
Number of Obs. 589 588 589 588 
Panel B: Panel A: The Impact of CEO Career Concerns and Governance Quality on At-will Contracts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




















Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R
2 
0.3619 0.1422 0.1296 0.5006 0.1410 0.1620 





































































Chapter 5: Conclusions, Implications, and Future 
Research 
1.1 Conclusions 
In this thesis, I examine the effects of internal and external tournament incentives on firms 
conducting Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). Firstly, I study the impact of total CEO compensation, 
firm pay gap, industry pay gap, and local pay gap on IPO underpricing. I find strong evidence that 
firms led by CEOs with greater compensation packages and high pay gaps are negatively associated 
with IPO underpricing, while those firms with high industry and/or local gap are positively 
associated with IPO first-day returns. In addition, my results show that that the association between 
total CEO remuneration and immediate aftermarket returns is pronounced among firms with high 
accounting performance led by founder-CEOs and top managers who are graduates from top 
institutions. The link between firm pay gap and underpricing is stronger among firms led by non-
founder and old top managers. Finally, I document that the effect of industry pay gap is pronounced 
among firms with overconfident and specialist top managers, while the impact of local pay gap is 
weaker among firms with young CEOs and those which belong to competitive industries. Overall, 
my results from this chapter confirm the relevance of signaling, efficient-contracting, and 
tournament theories. 
Secondly, I provide novel empirical evidence on the association between managerial 
incentives and firm survival. I document that IPO firms with highly remunerated CEOs and large 
pay gaps have lower failure rates and longer survival time in the periods following the offering. I 
also find that the effect of CEO compensation on firm longevity is stronger in environments with 
lower agency conflicts, whereas the link between pay gap and IPO survival is weaker among firms 
with weaker internal promotion incentives. Moreover, my findings suggest that greater managerial 
pay is associated with lower information asymmetry and higher operating performance in the post-
IPO market. 
Thirdly, I examine the role of CEO time horizon, measured by the type and time remaining 
until the end of CEO employment contracts on firms’ and CEOs’ outcomes. I initially find that top 
managers with fixed-term contractual agreements tend to leave earlier the firms, while they also 
face lower compensation increase compared to those with at-will contracts. Furthermore, I 
document that at-will managers seem to be more risk-seeking as they are positively related to risky 
investments and post-IPO operating performance. On the other hand, my results indicate that, 
although the fact, that fixed-term contracts protect the firms’ top managers, these types of firms are 
negatively associated to risky strategies and IPO survival. Lastly, the positive link between firms 
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with at-will contracts and post-IPO performance is stronger among firms with strong corporate 
governance and CEOs with high career concerns. 
 
1.2 Implications 
The results in this thesis may provide implications for academics, corporate boards, 
practitioners, policy makers, prospective issuers as well as top managers. Chapter 2 documents that 
CEO compensation is among others, a crucial determinant of IPO success, and hence, this finding 
can help investors in making rational investment decisions. This Chapter also shows that internal 
and external pay gaps may also play a key role on the money left on the table. These findings can 
also help corporate boards understand how the remuneration packages of their top executives can 
affect their public access. The findings in Chapter 3 and 4 may also provide important implications 
for prospective issuers, investors and top executives.  
In particular, Chapter 3 shows that high managerial increases could lead to firm survival. 
These findings can help IPO issuers better understand how important determinants are 
compensation incentives for the IPO survivability. These results are also important for top 
managers as they have more incentives to work harder and increase firm performance in order to 
increase the probabilities to go for the position of CEO.  
Chapter 4 documents that employment agreements with no specific term can provide more 
incentives to CEOs to engage in long-term investments as way to increase firm performance and 
survival as well as their compensation and retention rate. Thus, these results are relevant to 
founders’ and top executives, because it indicates that, the effectiveness of employment contracts 
do not only affect firms’ risk policies but should also affect its future performance and longevity. 
Overall the results are of relevance to policy makers interesting in invigorating the fragile 
and declining US IPO market. To the extent that compensation arrangements enhance the quality of 
corporate governance structures, compensation and tournament incentives may help to better handle 
the transition from being private to public, and more generally, to boost entrepreneurial initiatives, 
innovation, and job creation.  
 
1.3 Limitations and Future Research 
In this section, I note some limitations to my thesis and also suggest directions for future 
research. Firstly, I have examined my hypotheses in the context of the U.S. IPO market. 
Examination of whether my results hold in the U.K., European, and International IPO markets 
could provide useful further insights help establish the generalizability of my main inferences. More 
precisely, further research on the countries with a different regulatory and corporate governance 
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setting than US may be useful in strengthening the understanding of the role of executive 
compensation, tournament incentives, and employment agreements. In addition to that, further 
research on the European markets may help us to better understand the implications of 
compensation arrangements in less capital market oriented.  
In this thesis, I use the remuneration packages of the top management team to test their 
impact on the price setting process as well as on firm survival. However, it could be also useful to 
consider compensation data of the rank-and-file employees. By doing so, additional measures of 
pay gap can be constructed, thereby internal tournament incentives can be investigated in more 
depth. 
Moreover, although I consider several alternative outcomes, future research could also 
expand my study by investigating the impact of internal and external tournament incentives on 
financial reporting outcomes such as earnings management around IPOs. The findings from the 
prior literature are conflicting. Some studies find that internal promotion incentives increase the 
costs of opportunistic reporting, and hence suggest a negative association between firm pay gap and 
firm’s earnings management, while another strand of the literature finds that industry tournament 
incentives are negatively associated with earnings management. In my case, I can examine both of 
these associations for small, young, fast growing firms such as those conducting an Initial Public 
Offering (IPO). 
In a similar vein, it would be fruitful to investigate how the type and the duration of each 
employment agreement can influence the firm’s earnings management. In this regard, it will be also 
useful to explore several channels through which compensation and tournament incentives can have 
an impact on earnings quality (e.g., prior work experience of CEO, CEO career concerns, and 
corporate governance quality). Therefore, another good idea could be to explore the effect of both 
CFO career concerns and contractual agreements on earnings management or audit fees.   
In this thesis, I find that firms with top managers with better remuneration packages and 
large pay disparities tend to increase firm survival. However, I can also examine how these factors 
can influence firm innovation (patents, citations, and trademarks). Despite that the literature have 
focused on large established firms, the effect of compensation and tournament incentives on IPOs is 
scarce, providing thus considerable score for further research.    
In addition, future studies can also explore in depth the pay-setting process in private firms 
even before the IPO. How do they differ compared to IPOs and mature public firms? How the 
optimal benchmarks are determined and to what extent these arrangements affect the probability of 
going public, staying private or being acquired? Investigation of these issues may enhance our 
understanding about the pay design process evolved through the life cycle of the firm.  
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Similarly, future research may examine whether the effectiveness of compensation and 
tournament incentives is affected by other governance elements such as the existence of dual-class 
shares. Existing studies suggest that dual-class shares reduce shareholder values, in IPO this is not 
necessarily the case. Therefore, it is interesting to study whether traditional managerial incentives 
interact the dual structure of shares and how this interaction may affect the prosperity of an IPO.  
Furthermore, the engagement in corporate political activism by wealthy individuals (e.g., 
CEOs, CFOs, founders) is a hotly debate in the United States, especially since the 2010 Supreme 
Court Citizens United ruling, which relaxed constraints on corporate political donating. Therefore, 
future research could also examine if the directors’ donate their own capital for their firm or for 
their own benefits and how the latter interact with compensation incentives. Their own benefits 
could include their compensation, employment agreements, severance pay agreements, and the 
most important thing, their retention within the firm that they work. 
Last but not least, I restricted my analysis mainly to the CEO characteristics. Although 
Chief Executive Officers are at the top of the hierarchy, considering detailed characteristics and 
contractual agreements of other senior officers such as the Chief Financial Officers’ (CFOs), would 
be potentially fruitful areas of future research. Hence, future research can examine the impact of 
“watchdogs” career concerns (e.g., CFO age and tenure) on IPO performance. Another key 
characteristic is their prior work experience and their financial diversity. As in the case of CEOs, I 
can also investigate the effect of CFO employment agreements on several IPO outcomes.  
 
 
